

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Centre of British Studies

# TONY BLAIR'S ROLE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER - MORALITY IN RHETORIC AND PRACTICE

Author: Alissa Nordmeier

Supervisor: Marc Stauch

Berlin, 25 October 2005

## TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION.....	1
I – THE NEW WORLD ORDER.....	4
I.1 – THE GULF WAR AND GEORGE BUSH’S VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER.....	4
I.1a – THE NEW WORLD ORDER SPEECH.....	7
I.2 - THE NEW WORLD ORDER AS A DOCTRINE.....	9
II - TONY BLAIR AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER – MORALITY IN RHETORIC.	20
II.1 - BLAIR’S CHARACTER.....	20
II.1a – BACKGROUND AND INFLUENCES.....	20
II.1b – RELIGION.....	22
II.2 – BLAIR THE PRIME MINISTER.....	26
II.2a – THE FIRST TERM.....	26
1. ANGLO-AMERICA AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.....	26
2. BLAIR AND CLINTON.....	28
3. IRAQ 1998 AND THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY.....	34
4. KOSOVO AND ‘WARLIKE HUMANITARIANISM’.....	39
II.2b – THE SECOND TERM.....	45
1. GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER.....	45
2. THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACKS AND THE WAR ON TERROR.....	50
3. IRAQ 2003 AND THE DOCTRINE OF PRE-EMPTION.....	58
III – MORALITY IN PRACTICE.....	69
III.1 – LEGITIMACY.....	69
III.2 – JUST WAR.....	72
III.2a – JUST WAR THEORY.....	72
III.2b – THE JUST WAR THEORY APPLIED TO BLAIR’S WARS.....	74

III.2c – WERE THE INTERVENTIONS MORAL?.....	79
IV – CONCLUSION.....	80
APPENDIX.....	83
V – BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	84

## INTRODUCTION:

One of the most notable traits of Tony Blair's premiership has been his conduct of foreign policy. As early as 1996 he recognised the emergence of a doctrine of American global pre-eminence and the need for him to align Britain closely to the United States in order to secure a place as a 'global player' for the UK in the emergence of a new world order<sup>1</sup>. This partly explains his decision to partake in several wars that, as this paper attempts to show, have been fought within the framework of the New World Order doctrine. The paper concentrates on the Iraq interventions and the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan, whilst omitting the interventions in Sierra Leone and East Timor.

The other driving force in his decision-making process can be attributed to his staunch belief in his own moral judgement. Thus these two components both influenced his decisions to commit Britain to these interventions. It is important to note that, of course, Blair did not take these decisions alone – many of his decisions have been taken in accordance with the other cabinet members and approved by his government and Parliament. Discourse on these democratic decision-making processes has been largely omitted in this paper, since the decisions taken reflect Blair's own convictions and ambition.

The paper thus concentrates on military interventions. It has been noted that an important aspect of an 'ethical foreign policy' is the government's arms trade conduct. However, this is not discussed, for it opens up a new discourse that would have gone beyond the scope of this thesis.<sup>2</sup>

The first chapter summarises the doctrine of the New World Order<sup>3</sup> as laid out by theorists such as Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Also, in talking about the New World Order, the economic aspect is of major importance. However, the thesis is rather more concerned with the polity, security, and doctrinal aspects of the New World Order and thus largely omits a discussion of the economic side. In economic terms, the New World Order is guided by neo-liberal economic principles (such as monetarism, extension of free trade through the liberalisation of all sectors of the economy from state control and its eventual

---

<sup>1</sup> Blair, *New Britain – My Vision of a Young Country*, 1996; p.257: "The United Kingdom and the New World Order"; p.268: "This is a patriotism born [...] of an understanding of the changing nature of the world, and a determination to secure our place within it – confident, influential, with a real sense of identity. A new Britain for a new world"

<sup>2</sup> For an extensive discussion on New Labour's arms trade policy, see Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Please note that 'New World Order' (when capitalised) is meant to connote the specific doctrine of American global pre-eminence, whilst 'new world order' refers to the time and the state of global affairs after the end of the Cold War.

privatisation, or the free flow of money, all of these being bound by the ideology of economic globalisation). These are applied largely through international institutions such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund. It is argued that these institutions are heavily under the influence of the United States (see Stiglitz, 2002; Hoogevelt, 2001). For example, Paul Wolfowitz, one of the 'Hawks' of the first Bush Jr. Administration, a member of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and thus one of the main advocates of the New World Order, is now the president of the World Bank<sup>4</sup>.

The second chapter firstly seeks to explain Blair's character and the source of his moral convictions. It is then divided into two sub-chapters, which respectively deal with Blair's first two terms. The third term is not discussed. Both sub-chapters are constructed loosely chronologically and focus on four of the interventions Britain has been involved in under Blair, namely Iraq 1998, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, and Iraq 2003. These are then discussed with reference to the 'special relationship' and Blair's role in the New World Order. Furthermore, by way of quoting Blair directly, his moral argumentation for legitimising these interventions is presented and assessed. Thus, an overview of Blair's morality in rhetoric is given.

The third chapter analyses Blair's morality in practice by way of assessing it in relation to the principles of the just war theory.

The conclusion presents a short summary and overall assessment on the depth of Blair's moral justifications, posed in the context of the New World Order and Blair's ambition for Britain to play the role of a pivotal power within that framework.

---

<sup>4</sup> [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

## **CHAPTER I – THE NEW WORLD ORDER**

When the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, it was clear that this event symbolised a new beginning as much as it marked an end. The Wall had, throughout its existence, been a tangible reality of a polarised world: on one side, the democratic, capitalist, western system led by the United States of America; on the other, the Soviet Union and its allies, representing the eastern, communist sphere. The fall of the Berlin Wall represented the end of this bipolar world, which had existed through over forty years of a Cold War, held in check by a system of nuclear deterrence and containment which only reverted to 'real' war in third party states (such as in Vietnam, or in Afghanistan).

The era was heralded as a new beginning, a new world order, made possible by the will of a democratic international community, that would result in an era of peace and prosperity for all.

## **I.1: The Gulf War and George Bush's New World Order Speech:**

On 2 August 1990, the Middle Eastern state of Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein invaded its neighbour, Kuwait. Prior to that, there had been some disputes over oil pricing; also, Iraq was still indebted to Kuwait from its long war with another neighbouring state, Iran. Iraq had already laid claim to Kuwait as early as 1961, after it ceased to exist as a British protectorate<sup>5</sup>.

Iraq's latest move was sharply condemned by the international community through the United Nations, which passed Security Resolution 660, demanding withdrawal from the occupied territories. The United States and the USSR issued a joint statement on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, concluding that "Governments which resort to flagrant aggression must know that the international community cannot and will not reconcile itself to aggression or assist in it."<sup>6</sup>

Based on a broad coalition, a multinational force of forty nations assembled in the Gulf region in August 1990. According to a 1993 Central Office of Information publication, "President Bush announced that military action was being taken in accordance with UN resolutions and with the consent of the United States Congress, and he stressed that the goal of the operation was not the conquest of Iraq but the liberation of Kuwait"<sup>7</sup>.

This first Gulf War was ended victoriously for the United States and their coalition, which also included certain Arab countries, such as Pakistan, Egypt and Syria. There seemed to be widespread consent amongst Arab nations that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant; however, as Samuel Huntington points out, "he

---

<sup>5</sup> Central Office of Information, 1993: *Britain and the Gulf Crisis*, (London: HMSO); p.3

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p.7

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p.25

[was their] bloody tyrant”<sup>8</sup>. He also makes clear that the Arab countries within the coalition all got their rewards for siding with the United States: “In return for these actions, Turkey strengthened its claim to get into Europe; Pakistan and Morocco reaffirmed their close relationship with Saudi Arabia; Egypt got its debt cancelled; and Syria got Lebanon.”<sup>9</sup>

This bargaining technique is one frequently employed by the United States. One example of it is the support of Saddam Hussein himself during the Iran-Iraq war: “our [the American] government supported his regime during his war with Iran, a war in which he used chemical weapons on the battlefield with our full knowledge, with our arms, money and military intelligence.”<sup>10</sup> According to John Pilger, US support to Iraq continued up to the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait, with US officials visiting Iraq during the 1980s: “When John Kelly, the US Assistant Secretary of State, visited Baghdad in 1989, he told [Saddam Hussein]: ‘You are a force of moderation in the region, and the United States wants to broaden her relationship with Iraq’”<sup>11</sup>. Also, Donald Rumsfeld, the current Secretary of Defense, embarked on a visit to Baghdad as early as 1983, where his handshake with Saddam Hussein was filmed and thus documented. Furthermore, military exports by US defence contractors with approval of the US Department of Commerce to Iraq had been going on throughout the 1980s, as a 1994 report by the US General Accounting Office amply documents:

“License applications [for the export of defence items] valued at \$48 million were approved [...] The Department of Commerce approved the licenses for exporting \$1.5

---

<sup>8</sup> Huntington, 1996: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*; (London: Simon & Schuster), p. 248

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> Rivers Pitt, cited in Coates and Krieger, 2004: *Blair’s War* (Cambridge & Malden: Polity Press); p.82-3

<sup>11</sup> Cockburn and Cockburn, cited in Pilger, 2002: *The New Rulers of the World* (London & New York: Verso); p.69



billion of dual use items [items that have both civilian and military uses] to Iraq between 1985 and 1990 [...] A long list of high-technology items [were] sold to Iraq during the 1980s".<sup>12</sup>

In light of this ongoing cooperation between the United States and Iraq, both commercially and politically, it is somewhat surprising that Iraq took centre stage as the "first assault"<sup>13</sup> towards the new world order, as laid out by President George Bush Senior below.

### **I.1a – The New World Order Speech**

On 11 September 1990, President George Bush held a memorable speech to the House of Representatives. It was in this speech that the wording 'new world order' was first publicly invoked and laid out as a concept for the post-Cold War world:

"We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective--*a new world order*--can emerge: A new era--freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.

This is the vision I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf and around the world, understand that how we manage this crisis today, could shape the future for generations to come.

The test we face is great--and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose; if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination; it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.

America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we will.

---

<sup>12</sup> US General Accounting Office, 1994: *Iraq – U.S. military items exported or transferred to Iraq in the 1980s*; <http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9498.htm>; pp.1;5

<sup>13</sup> Bush Sr, 1990, *Address by the President of the United States – 11 September 1990* <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r101:4:./temp/~r101gdZgw5:e0:>

For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital. Our *world leadership* and domestic strength are mutual and reinforcing; a woven piece, as strongly bound as Old Glory”<sup>14</sup> (emphasis added)

Thus the concept of the new world order was introduced to the world.

In a less general sense, according to Bush, this meant having a “lasting role [...] in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf”, not least to defend the “vital economic interests [that] are at risk as well”, since “Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world’s proven oil resources. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that” and “we cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless”.<sup>15</sup> Also, there was already anticipation of more chaos rather than order, since Bush in this very address called on Congress to immediately

“enact a prudent multiyear defense program--one that reflects not only the improvement in East-West relations, but our broader responsibilities to deal with the continuing risk of outlaw action and regional conflict [...] The world is still dangerous. Surely that is now clear. Stability is not secure. American interests are far-reaching. Inter-dependence has increased. The consequences of regional instability can be global.”<sup>16</sup>

These very paragraphs show that less than one year after the breaking up of the old Cold War structure, the United States were already in anticipation of global instability, warning of the new dangers the world was facing. The enemy was, as to yet, unfound, but President Bush seemed to have no doubt that one would surface eventually, as the “multiyear defense program” plea suggests. This adaptation to US foreign policy re-introduced into international relations the advocacy of pre-emptive and preventative military operations. At the time, Bush appeared convinced that this war – or, rather, “cause of peace in the Persian

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Ibid

Gulf”<sup>17</sup> in which Americans “serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians, and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order”<sup>18</sup> was but the first stepping stone to his dream of a new world order.

However, as the next section will show, ulterior motives existed that guided this vision, with the most important one being unchallenged and unbridled global American primacy.

## **I.2 –The New World Order as a Doctrine:**

“A world without United States primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the US is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.”<sup>19</sup>

The above quote by Samuel Huntington clearly lays out the essence of the New World Order. Throughout the 1990s, he and other influential US strategists, politicians and theorists have published numerous theories on what form this new world order should take, often in the boldly assertive form displayed in the quote above, and always with the interest of the United States as the central argument.

The end of the Cold War has left the United States as the last remaining superpower – the ideological concern is to uphold and maintain this hegemony

---

<sup>17</sup> Ibid

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Huntington, cited in Brzezinski, 1997:*The Grand Chessboard - American Primacy and its Geostategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books), p. 31

through any and all means necessary, including armed force and offensive intervention. Central to these theories is the question who the new enemies are, in order to then being able to subdue them. Huntington, a Harvard professor and director of security planning for the National Security Council in the Carter administration, wrote a hugely successful and influential book in 1996, namely *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, according to the dustjacket "one of the most talked about books of the decade". In it, he lays out in great detail who these enemies are likely to be, and also why it is so important to actually have an enemy: "There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are"<sup>20</sup>. This quote is reminiscent of George Orwell's famous novel *1984*, where the necessity of a perpetual war is asserted and the population is presented with changing enemies to hate as a means of furthering the agenda of the rulers of Orwell's dystopic authoritarian world.

According to Huntington, the biggest threat to world peace is a clash between the western and non-western civilizations, a new form of separation between 'cultural communities' rather than political ones along the lines of communism and capitalism: "Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics."<sup>21</sup>. By these cultural communities he means largely religious

---

<sup>20</sup> Dibdin, cited in Huntington, 1996: *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster); p. 20

<sup>21</sup> Huntington, 1996: p.125

ones: "The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness."<sup>22</sup>

Huntington recognises the mistakes the West is making towards the rest of the world:

"Hypocrisy, double standards and 'but nots' are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; non-proliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel;[...] human rights are an issue with China but not Saudi Arabia"<sup>23</sup>.

However, by pointing these truths out, he has not arrived at his own central argument: the real source of enmity between the West and Islam, for it is between these two civilizations, according to Huntington, that the "struggle for a new world order will begin"<sup>24</sup>. In bold language he asserts: "Muslims fear and resent Western power and the threat it poses to their societies and beliefs" because "they see Western culture as immoral"<sup>25</sup>. Hence, the struggle is not an ideological one but a fundamental one, based on fundamentally different values and morals. Religion and its respective superiority are of major importance – God is frequently invoked on both sides. Thus the usage of the term crusade in recent discourse by both George W. Bush and Tony Blair (in Blair's case as early as during the Kosovo conflict) irrevocably reminds the audience of the Christian attempt to "establish Christian rule in the Holy Land"<sup>26</sup>, which, in today's

---

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p.183

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p.184

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p.213

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p.209

terminology, could be translated as imperialism; according to the Hutchinson's Dictionary of World History, *crusade* means the

"European war against non-Christians and Heretics, sanctioned by the Pope; in particular, the Crusades, a series of wars 1096-1291 undertaken by European rulers to recover Palestine from the Muslims. Motivated by religious zeal, the desire for land, and the trading ambitions of the major Italian cities, the crusades were varied in their aims and effects."<sup>27</sup>

In this light, the use of the term is critical in that it invokes this historic clash of civilizations and could be understood – and indeed is interpreted - as a direct threat by the West against Islam.

However, Huntington seems to see the West less of a threat to Islam than the other way around:

"The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. *It is Islam*, a different civilisation, whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power"<sup>28</sup>(emphasis added).

He thus asserts that *all* Muslims, Muslims in their entirety, pose a threat to the West. To emphasise this discourse, Huntington states: "wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peaceably with their neighbours [...] Muslims [...] have been far more involved in intergroup violence

---

<sup>27</sup> Hutchinson's Dictionary of World History, updated version 1998, (Oxford: Helicon Publishing) p.157

<sup>28</sup> Huntington, 1996: p.217

than the people of any other civilisation."<sup>29</sup> And hence the enemy, the entity we are not, which allows us to love what we are, is established.

Samuel Huntington paints a picture of Islam that is haunting and threatening, which contributes to its demonisation. The self-criticism of the West offered earlier in his book is replaced by bold assertions about the general nature of Muslims to facilitate his argument. However, looking at European history for the last thousand years, one would get to the same conclusions: that Europeans had problems living peaceably with their neighbours, and that the amount of 'intergroup violence' was enormous.

Nonetheless, Huntington then proceeds to point out problems within the Western civilisation. He sees the West (headed by the United States) as a civilisation in its "golden age", with intra-West wars being "virtually unthinkable"<sup>30</sup>. However,

"in previous civilizations this phase of blissful golden age with its visions of immortality has ended either dramatically and quickly with the victory of an external civilization or slowly and equally painfully by internal disintegration"<sup>31</sup>.

With this external civilisation having been firmly identified as Islam earlier, he thus goes on to establish what or who might facilitate the 'internal disintegration': firstly, internal decay in the form of "moral decline, cultural suicide and political disunity in the West"<sup>32</sup> is, according to him, a threat to Western civilisation. "Political disunity" is an interesting concept, since it is not

---

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p.256

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p.302

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p.303

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p.304

qualified here. It is not clear whether he means different pluralistic and democratic forces, such as opposing political parties with a diverse range of ideologies 'reigning' across the Western nations, or rather dissenting voices, hence people who question the political establishments in the West. In any case, a danger to the civilization *per se* is asserted.

Secondly, another form of decay (or challenge to Western culture) comes, according to Huntington, "from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation [...] This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe...[and] among Hispanics in the United States"<sup>33</sup>. In context of the overall text, this could be interpreted as an attempt at fostering mistrust for immigrants in the reader.

And thirdly, and most critically, internal decay, according to Huntington, is being facilitated by multiculturalism. It is in this argument that Huntington's right wing agenda is at its most blatant, and it is hence worth being quoted in greater detail:

"An [...] immediate and dangerous challenge exists in the United States. Historically American national identity has been derived culturally by the heritage of Western civilization and politically by the principles of the American Creed [...] liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. In the late twentieth century both components of American identity have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked identification of the United States with Western civilization [...] and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings [...]"

The Founding Fathers saw diversity as a reality and as a problem: hence the national motto, *e pluribus unum* [...]"

---

<sup>33</sup> Ibid



The American multiculturalists [...] reject their country's cultural heritage. [...] History shows that no country so constituted can long endure as a coherent society. [...]

Rejection of the Creed and of Western civilization means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. *It also means effectively the end of Western Civilization.*"<sup>34</sup> (Emphasis added)

This is what Huntington calls the "*real clash*" (his italics), one that can only be averted if the "siren calls of multiculturalism"<sup>35</sup> are rejected. It is somewhat incongruous that the USA are a country of immigrants, that the Founding Fathers and Huntington's ancestors themselves were not native to that country, a country where the Irish, Italian, German, etc. traditions are, to this day, celebrated and held dear. This could be interpreted as the double standard that Huntington himself earlier critically assesses as a Western weakness.

Moreover, Huntington remains convinced that in order to avert the looming "state of invasion" when the civilization, no longer *able* to defend itself because it is no longer *willing* to defend itself, lies wide open to "barbarian invaders"<sup>36</sup> (his italics), the West needs to come together politically and economically, which "depends overwhelmingly on whether the United States reaffirms its identity as a Western nation and defines its global role as the leader of Western civilization"<sup>37</sup>. This is the central argument and ultimate idea – the quest for American global primacy.

---

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 305-7

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Quigley, cited in Huntington, p. 303

<sup>37</sup> Huntington, p.308

Therefore, the best policy would be “adopting an Atlanticist policy of close cooperation with its European partners to protect and *advance* the interests of the unique civilization they share”<sup>38</sup>(emphasis added).

Huntington concludes his book with a daunting picture: “On a worldwide basis, Civilization [as opposed to barbarism] seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Ages, possibly descending on humanity.”<sup>39</sup>

This is the worldview of but one influential American intellectual who enjoys considerable influence in the higher echelons of the American political establishment. The book in itself is a ‘siren call’, a warning of attack by internal as much as external forces. With so many potential enemies, it moves one to the question just who it addresses, to which the answer may be: a minority of people, possibly even a minority of Americans. However, it is in this minority’s interest that today’s policymakers try to shape the world according to the New World Order laid out in *The Clash of Civilizations* – American global primacy in the face of threats from without and within. This book presents the ideological foundation of a world shaped in America’s interest, a theory that, as will be shown later, is currently attempted to be made into an axiom.

Other theorists have set out to address the same problem from other angles. Notable amongst them is Zbigniew Brzezinski, an influential geo-strategist from the Cold War era. Brzezinski, a professor of American foreign policy at John Hopkins University, was national security advisor under Carter, served on Ronald

---

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p.312

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p.321

Reagan's [Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board](#), and co-chaired the [Bush](#) National Security Advisory Task Force in 1988<sup>40</sup>. He published a large amount of work on the Cold War.

According to Sabine Feiner, Brzezinski uses "geo-politics as a method transforming his concept of world order into a practical strategy"<sup>41</sup>. Many arguments he has developed during the Cold War era are still applicable in the new order. His arguments support Huntington's theory from a geo-strategic, military angle, and he is explicit about America's aims: "In effect, the United States must maintain an integrated military capability for surface, sea, and space combat as the prerequisite for an enduring and consuming *political* contest for earth control"<sup>42</sup> (his italics). Similar to Huntington's warning of multiculturalists, Brzezinski warns of pacifism: "The contamination of strategy by pacifism is the key danger for the United States inherent in crusading arms control"<sup>43</sup>. It has to be remembered that these quotes are taken from a book that was written in 1986; however, they appear as contemporary as another one of his works, namely *The Grand Chessboard*, a further geo-strategic text published in 1997. His main focus lies on the importance of Eurasia for the forces striving for global superiority: "Eurasia is the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy will be played"<sup>44</sup>. It is thus important that the United States play it well:

---

<sup>40</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zbigniew\\_Brzezinski](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zbigniew_Brzezinski)

<sup>41</sup> Feiner, 2000: *Weltordnung durch US-Leadership? Die Konzeption Zbigniew K. Brzezinskis*, (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag); p. 165 \*translations from German by author; for original wording, see Appendix I

<sup>42</sup> Brzezinski, 1986: *Game Plan – a Geostrategic Framework for the conduct of the US – Soviet contest* (Boston & New York: Atlantic Monthly Press) p. 146

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p.148

<sup>44</sup> Brzezinski, 1997: p. 31

“That megacontinent is just too large [and diverse] to be compliant toward even the most economically successful and politically pre-eminent global player. This condition places a premium on geostrategic skill, on the careful, selective and very deliberate deployment of America’s resources on the huge Eurasian chessboard”<sup>45</sup>

Using the chessboard analogy, it is worrying that the populations ‘inhabiting’ the chessboard seem to be nothing but the pawns, usually the first ones to be sacrificed in a game of chess.

The question is: what makes Eurasia so valuable? Partly it is the European section of the ‘megacontinent’. As Huntington pointed out, the USA and Europe constitute ‘the West’, and are part of the same civilisation with common values. It is thus in the American interest to protect and assist Europe as a vital ally. Furthermore, Europe is the conduit, or rather the gate to the rest of the megacontinent and the last bastion of ‘our’ civilisation.

The other significant factor in Eurasia’s importance is its wealth and resources:

“most of the world’s physical wealth is there, [...] both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60% of the world’s GNP and about three-quarters of the world’s known energy resources”<sup>46</sup>.

This seems to be the crux of the strife for dominance on the Eurasian landmass and critical within the context of the New World Order. George Bush Senior mentions it in the speech quoted earlier; and Huntington, in a potential scenario of the clash developing into a violent civilisational world war which he presents towards the end of his book, makes a note of the scramble for

---

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 35

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p.31

resources: "Control of and access to oil is of central importance to all combatants"<sup>47</sup>.

Thus, the unhindered access to resources (most importantly, oil and natural gas deposits) is, amongst political, economic and military dominance, one of the decisive factors in the reordering of the world.

It is noteworthy how both Huntington and Brzezinski present the struggle for global dominance and primacy by the USA as conceptually benign and almost coincidental. Sabine Feiner interprets Brzezinski's work as follows:

"The moral dimension and the concomitant duty to *world leadership* in Brzezinski's work is made clear through his presentation of this position as a historic stroke of fate rather than the result of deliberate politics. [...]

By interpreting the global political engagement of the USA as a result, not of their national interest, but rather of the assignment by a higher instance - namely "history", which is understood as Providence - Brzezinski awards the position of the USA with a moralist elevation, which can be generally found in the American tradition of exceptionalism."<sup>48</sup> (her italics)

It is the old and reoccurring theme of Manifest Destiny that is repeatedly invoked by the theorists, strategists and politicians examined above. As a bonus, the rest of the world, in Brzezinski's view, can supposedly benefit from providence having led to the United States inhabiting the position as the world's sole superpower: "Individual self-fulfilment is said to be a God-given right that at the same time can benefit others by setting an example and by generating wealth". Furthermore, "as the imitation of American ways gradually pervades the world, it

---

<sup>47</sup> Huntington, 1996; p.313

<sup>48</sup> Feiner, 2000; p.107-8

creates a more congenial setting for the exercise of the indirect and seemingly consensual American hegemony"<sup>49</sup>.

In an apparent contradiction, Brzezinski talks of the need to "formulate specific U.S. policies to offset, co-opt, and/or control [the geo-politically dynamic Eurasian states], so as to preserve and promote vital U.S. interests"<sup>50</sup>. Similarly, "the American global system [...] relies heavily on the indirect exercise of influence on dependent foreign elites"<sup>51</sup>. It is by these statements that the argument of providence as advanced above loses validity, for it points out clearly that the position as the global superpower is not bestowed upon, but, to the contrary, heavily constructed. The very concept of geo-strategy and the chessboard analogy imply careful manoeuvring.

Another interesting point Brzezinski makes is that "the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public's sense of domestic well-being"<sup>52</sup>. The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in its 2000 document entitled *Rebuilding America's Defenses* similarly states:

"Further, the process of transformation [meaning a desired revolutionary change in military affairs with new technologies and operational concepts - thus the furthering of America's defences], even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – *like a new Pearl Harbor*"<sup>53</sup> (emphasis added)

Hence the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 in all their atrocity could be interpreted as just such a challenge to the public's sense of well-being. The

---

<sup>49</sup> Brzezinski, 1997: p.27

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 39

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p.25

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p.36

<sup>53</sup> *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century*, 2000: <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf> p.51

supposed threat by Saddam Hussein in 1990 as well as 2002-2003 could be seen in a similar light. Thus these events, particularly the 9/11 attacks, became instrumental to furthering the United States agenda towards global primacy, and, as the above quote shows, supplied the cataclysmic event, the new Pearl Harbour, that the PNAC deemed necessary for a revolution in military affairs apparently needed for securing American pre-eminence. They also confirmed Huntington's theory of a fundamental clash between the West and Islam begun by "terrorist gangs violently assaulting Civilization"<sup>54</sup>.

## **CHAPTER II: TONY BLAIR AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER**

### **– MORALITY IN RHETORIC**

The following chapter attempts to assess Tony Blair's character, his convictions and his actions in reference to the new world order and the 'special relationship' between him and the American leaders, namely Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, during his first two terms.

#### **II.1 - BLAIR'S CHARACTER**

There are numerous references to Blair's character and 'drive', both by biographers and confidantes. However, the best picture is painted by Blair

---

<sup>54</sup> Huntington, 1996; p.321

himself, since there is a body of speeches in which he makes his convictions clear.

From biographies on his person it can be derived that Blair is a man with strong convictions and a sense of righteousness; in his politics, he often seems to be driven by these convictions rather than the party line.

### **II.1a - Background and Influences**

Tony Blair does not come from a Labour background. On the contrary, both his parents were communists (until his father turned to conservatism after the Second World War)<sup>55</sup>. Blair himself did not join the Labour party until 1975, at the age of twenty-two. He has been heavily influenced by the thinking of John Macmurray, a "Christian, communitarian moral philosopher"<sup>56</sup> who, amongst other things, explored the relationships between society and community and between religion and politics. According to Seldon, Macmurray "opted for a third way"<sup>57</sup>. Blair himself wrote: "I also find him immensely modern [...] in the sense that he confronted what will be the critical political question of the twenty-first century: the relationship between individual and society."<sup>58</sup>

Blair's early thinking has been heavily influenced by Macmurray. It was this early that Blair saw the necessity of a new, modern approach, which was to be translated later into the concept of the Third Way. It is also interesting to note

---

<sup>55</sup> Seldon, 2004: *Blair*, (London: Free Press); p.18

<sup>56</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John\\_Macmurray](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Macmurray)

<sup>57</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.32

<sup>58</sup> <http://johnmacmurray.gn.apc.org/DiscoveringMacmurray.htm>



that this influence on his thinking was Christian, communitarian and moral, three concepts that can be found in Blair's thinking time and again.

Blair has been an MP for Sedgefield since 1983; for the first few years as a professional politician he did follow the party line, although it can be assumed that his thinking at that time was already more or less formed. It was during the early 1990s that his personal political convictions became more publicly known. In an interview with the BBC's *On the Record*, he defended himself against claims that he was "engaged in a conspiracy to subvert the Labour Party, to turn it into a version of the Democratic Party and destroy the soul of the Labour Party in the process"<sup>59</sup>. In his defence he made clear his beliefs on what the Labour Party should do:

"What I believe that the Labour Party requires is not a process of adjustment, it is a project for renewal [...] That is a radical message; it is a populous message, it's anti-elite, it's anti-establishment and it is the fulfilment of our values, not the shedding of them."<sup>60</sup>.

Blair emphasises 'values' throughout his speeches and comments. For example, he explained in his speech during the arrival ceremony at the White House in 1998: "The Third Way [...] is about traditional values in a changed world"<sup>61</sup>. The values that "are essential to a just society" are: "equal worth, opportunity for all, responsibility and community"<sup>62</sup>. Here, again, his credo of community and also morality is invoked.

---

<sup>59</sup> *On the Record*; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/otr/intext92-93/Blair17.1.93.html>

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>61</sup> Blair, 1998 in Richards, 2004 *Tony Blair in his own Words* (London: Politico); p.188

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p.190

Blair himself appears to perceive the concept of 'values' in moralistic and religious terms as part of a greater religious philosophy of community and responsibility.

## II.1b - Religion

In trying to define certain traits of Blair's character, convictions and values, it is inevitable to take into consideration his religious belief, particularly since, as Seldon asserts, "few Prime Ministers have been so influenced by their faith"<sup>63</sup>.

In 1993 Blair presented the public with his view of Christianity and its applicability in modern politics. In a contribution to the Christian Socialist Movement's book *Reclaiming The Ground*, Blair maps out basic traits of his personal belief system. To him, Christianity is "above all [...] about the union between individual and community [... acknowledging] that we do not grow up in total independence, but interdependently"<sup>64</sup>. This shows the connection Blair is trying to make between his religion and his profession, and also where his highly moralist stand on his 'traditional values' originates. Blair has, on several occasions, tried to explicitly link Christianity to the Labour Party, for example in his foreword to Graham Dale's book *God's Politicians*<sup>65</sup>, or in his speech to the 1992 Labour Party Conference, where he said that "we are trying to establish in the public mind the coincidence between the values of democratic socialism and those of Christianity"<sup>66</sup>. According to Peter Osborne, writing in *The Spectator*,

---

<sup>63</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.515

<sup>64</sup> Blair, 1993 in Richards, 2004; p.72

<sup>65</sup> Dale, 2000: *God's Politicians-the Christian contribution to 100 Years of Labour* (London: HarperCollins)

<sup>66</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.517

Blair once "identified the Saviour with New Labour. 'Jesus was a moderniser', he asserted"<sup>67</sup>.

In Easter 1996, Blair made another telling statement in the *Sunday Telegraph*. He talked of his fascination with the Gospels, based on

"the characters [being] so real. Pilate is fascinating [...] he tried to do the good thing rather than the bad. [...] It is possible to view Pilate as the archetypal politician, caught on the horns of an age-old political dilemma. [...] Should we do what appears principled or what is politically expedient? Do you apply a utilitarian test or what is morally absolute?"<sup>68</sup>

With hindsight it can be assumed that Blair tried to do what *to him* appeared principled, or morally absolute. Slobodan Milošević and Saddam Hussein were, in his view, absolute villains; hence the decisions on going to war to rid the world of them were taken on the basis of Blair's moral outlook (or at least that is how the cases for war were presented to the public).

It is also in the *Reclaiming The Ground* contribution that his understanding of concepts of 'good and evil' is presented: "Christianity is a very tough religion. [...] It is judgemental. There is right and wrong. There is good and bad. [...] We should not hesitate to make such judgements. And then follow them with determined action."<sup>69</sup>

During his wars, Blair constantly employed judgemental language like the above. It makes sense that a religious person like Blair would understand Christianity in those terms (particularly reading the Old Testament); however, people are fallible. According to that very same ancient text, it is ultimately God

---

<sup>67</sup> *The Spectator*, April 5, 2003 <http://www.lewrockwell.com/spectator/spec52.html>

<sup>68</sup> Blair, 1996, cited in Rentoul, 1996: *Tony Blair* (London: Warner Books); p.454

<sup>69</sup> Blair, 1993, cited in Richards, 2004; p. 73

who casts judgement. Through Blair putting himself in the position where he is the judge over good and evil, a dogmatically impossible elevation takes place.

On the other hand, Ian Shapiro points out that under the philosophy of 'natural law', this elevation is permissible: "Natural law, or God's natural right, [...] sets outer boundaries to a field within which humans have divine authority to act as miniature gods, creating rights and obligations of their own."<sup>70</sup> Both interpretations are valid. From both these views one could follow Seldon's assertion that "[Blair's] convictions also made it very hard for him to admit that he has ever done anything wrong."<sup>71</sup> Or, in Peter Riddell's words,

"Blair generally believes that he can manoeuvre around problems. Either his personal skills will persuade other leaders, or his strong convictions will be vindicated since they are self-evidently right. Because he believes he is right, then events will justify him."<sup>72</sup>

Moreover, history has shown that Blair does not hesitate to follow his judgements with determined action, even though he might be facing overwhelming opposition, which the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq wars amply prove. His sternness and belief in his own moral righteousness goes as far as ignoring the advice of the highest Christian leaders; for example, after an audience with the Pope in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, the Vatican issued a statement saying "the Pope had urged Blair to do everything he could to avert 'the tragedy of war' in the Middle East."<sup>73</sup> The Bishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, criticised the government for rushing into Iraq and "losing sight of

---

<sup>70</sup> Shapiro, 2003; *The Moral Foundations of Politics*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press); p.15

<sup>71</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.531

<sup>72</sup> Riddell, 2003, *Hug Them Close – Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'Special Relationship'* (London: Politico's Publishing); p.13

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, p.522

'truth'" and suggested that mass civil disobedience would be an "appropriate response"<sup>74</sup>. So, even in face of total opposition by church authorities, Blair continues to follow his once chosen path apparently based on his Christian conviction of being an appropriate judge of good and evil.

It is interesting to note in this context that although Blair believes in Old Testamentary notions of good and evil in politics, particularly in foreign affairs, he is astonishingly liberal on other topics such as homosexuality and abortion. This suggests that Blair's view of Christianity is very selective.

In conclusion, Blair can be described as a man of very stern moral convictions, which are rooted in his personal view of Christianity. This allows him to elevate himself in his own view to a level above others, a level where his passing of judgement is more valid than other people's. However, this outlook makes it impossible for him to deviate from a once chosen moral position or to accept criticism even by people who have more authority on the subject. Hence a distinctly moralist righteousness ensues.

---

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p.525

## II.2 - BLAIR THE PRIME MINISTER

The following chapter examines Tony Blair's foreign policy conduct during his first two terms. Of particular importance will be the Anglo-American relations, especially his working- and personal relationships with the American presidents of that time, namely Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, in view of what is termed the 'special relationship'. From this it should be possible to derive Tony Blair's role in the New World Order as laid out in chapter I.

### II.2a - The First Term

#### 1. Anglo-America and the Special Relationship

"Anglo-America is a political space constituted by wider economic, political, ideological and cultural relationships and is as a consequence many-sided. It is a military alliance, a model of capitalism, a form of government, a global ideology, and a popular culture. Anglo-America is all these things, a complex set of inter-linked narratives and institutions which together has created a global hegemony in the last two-hundred years, which has passed through several stages and has most recently been the site of the discourses and projects of globalisation and of the new world order."<sup>75</sup>

The above quote by Andrew Gamble provides a concise definition of the notion of 'Anglo-America'. The Anglo-American sphere has been more narrowly defined as existing through a special relationship.

The question whether this special relationship exists between the United Kingdom and the United States has been assessed by numerous writers (see, for example, Baylis, 1981; Bartlett, 1992; Dumbrell, 2001). These have come to different conclusions, but the issue is generally examined along the lines of cultural, economic, trade, and linguistic relations and also the personal ones

---

<sup>75</sup> Gamble, 2003: *Between Europe and America – The Future of British Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); p.86

between the respective leaders. Some scholars trace the special relationship back as far as having roots in Britain's colonial past in North America; others concentrate on more recent times, particularly events since the Second World War. Once the existence of the 'special relationship' becomes accepted, it becomes most praised when a friendship between the British Prime Minister and American President is assumed. The most notable of these relationships in recent history was that between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Margaret Thatcher herself admitted that "her heart lay across the Atlantic rather than across the Channel"<sup>76</sup> and also took it upon herself to make a statement on what the special relationship was: "There is a union of mind and purpose between our peoples which is remarkable and which makes our relationship truly a special one. I am often asked if it is special, and why, and I say: 'It is special. It just is and that is that!'"<sup>77</sup>.

For the relationship between the US and UK leaders of the time to be considered special, a congruence of ideas and ideologies seems instrumental. Between Thatcher and Reagan, this congruence was evident in their "equally vehement opposition to the USSR and communism"<sup>78</sup>. The same could be later observed between Clinton and Blair and their common ideas on the Third Way. But, as Ritchie Owendale noted, "it has been observed that in official circles the Anglo-American special relationship has consistently been taken to mean a defence [...] and intelligence relationship"<sup>79</sup>.

---

<sup>76</sup> Owendale, 1998: *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (New York, St Martin's Press); p.152

<sup>77</sup> <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/Speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=105971>

<sup>78</sup> Bartlett, 1992: *'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (London & New York: Longman); p.150

<sup>79</sup> Owendale, 1998; p.147

Examples of this are, i.e., the American air strikes against Libya in 1986 because of alleged links of Gadaffi's regime to international terrorism, where Thatcher, despite of her recognition of the strikes being illegitimate under international law, agreed to the use of American bases in Britain<sup>80</sup>; the solidarity of taking action in the Gulf against Saddam Hussein; the ensuing strikes on Iraq throughout the 1990s; Kosovo and the 'War on Terrorism'.

Certainly, there have been issues over which there was animosity (such as president Reagan's Star Wars programme or the Iran Contra scandal); on the whole however, both states have on numerous occasions publicly recognised the concept of the special relationship existing.

## 2. Blair and Clinton:

By the time the New Labour party won the General Elections in 1997, making Blair the Prime Minister, Bill Clinton had been President of the United States for five years.

In fact, Blair had visited the United States several times during the 1990s. According to Seldon, these trips were defining for Blair. It was particularly the Democrat's modernisation project that interested him, and he applied many of the tactics he learned first-hand during his trips to the Labour Party. For example, the affix 'New' (Labour) is something directly imported from the Democratic Party; furthermore, as John Kampfner asserts, Blair "was fascinated by the Clinton phenomenon, the marriage of centre-left politics with electoral

---

<sup>80</sup> Bartlett, 1992; p.158



success<sup>81</sup> which led him to recognise the importance of 'Middle England' as the electoral base, just as the Democrats under Clinton had tried to "forge a populism with the centre"<sup>82</sup>. Another tactic copied from the New Democrats was the usage of the media, which was later to be brought to perfection by Alistair Campbell, who managed to "use the media to the fullest and most professional extent"<sup>83</sup>. Anthony Seldon actually describes these early 1990s trips as a turning point, because the Clinton campaign constituted a "road map" for Blair and his fellow modernizers for "how to attract middle-ground voters"<sup>84</sup>.

And so, after re-inventing the traditional Labour Party as 'New Labour', Blair succeeded in convincing the electorate of his course for modernisation. In his speech to the Labour Party conference in 1997, he pronounced his ambition for Britain:

"Today I want to set an ambitious course for this country. To be nothing less than the model 21st century nation, a beacon to the world. Old British values, but a new British confidence. We can never be the biggest. We may never again be the mightiest. But we can be the best."<sup>85</sup>

The wording of this quote is informative of his own ambition; 'to be nothing less than *the* model nation' suggests that he believes it is entirely possible to reach that aim; and that it can be achieved through him, having first found a new role for Britain and now leading the nation towards its fulfilment. It was Blair himself, two years later, who reminded his audience at the Lord Mayor of London's Banquet 1999 of "Dean Archeson's barb – that Britain had lost an empire but not

---

<sup>81</sup> Kampfner, 2003: *Blair's wars* (London: Free Press); p.9

<sup>82</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.123

<sup>83</sup> Ibid

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p.127

<sup>85</sup> Blair, 1997a: *Labour Party Conference Speech 1997*

<http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=47983>

yet found a role"<sup>86</sup>, whilst at the same time suggesting that the search for one was over. It was particularly his own role that he had staked out: providing the bridge between Europe and America.

According to Seldon, Blair wrote in 1993: "I've no doubt at all that Britain's future lies in Europe."<sup>87</sup> In 1997, he pointed out his 'guiding light' principles of modern foreign policy at the Lord Mayor of London's Banquet: "Consistent with our national interest, we must end the isolation of the last 20 years and be a leading partner in Europe. [...] Britain is part of Europe. It must play its full part in leading it."<sup>88</sup> This is, by any standard, an ambitious policy. But, as Blair himself pointed out, it was meant to be a new approach.

It is in the same 1997 speech that Blair referred to Britain as a bridge: "We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it." Furthermore, he used the much quoted phrase "Strong in Europe and strong with the US. There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other".

In this emphasis on strength for Britain, which in this context could be interpreted to mean power, Blair stakes out a new role for Britain in global power-relations, for which the 'bridge' is instrumental, but not an end in itself.

"We cannot in these post-Empire days be a super-power in a military sense. But we can make the British presence in the world felt. With our historic alliances, we can be pivotal. We can be powerful in our influence - a nation to whom others listen. [...] By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player."<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>86</sup> Blair, 1999 cited in Toennies [ed], 2003; *Britain under Blair* (Heidelberg: Universitaetsverlag Winter); p.49

<sup>87</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.316

<sup>88</sup> Blair, 1997b *Lord Mayor of London's Banquet 1997*, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1070.asp>

<sup>89</sup> Ibid

The end is hence to achieve maximum influence in the world under the given circumstances for Britain in the new world order. It is interesting to note how mature Blair's vision was so early into his premiership. Of course, it could be argued that British as well as leaders of other countries would want to (and have attempted to) achieve a 'global player' role<sup>90</sup>; it is hindsight that lends his words special gravity.

At this point it is interesting to juxtapose and compare Blair's words to what Brzezinski had to say that very same year about Britain in *The Grand Chessboard*:

"Active geostrategic players are the states that have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter – to a degree that affects America's interests – the existing geopolitical state of affairs [...] Great Britain is not a geostrategic player. It has fewer major options, it entertains no ambitious vision of Europe's future, and its relative decline has also reduced its capacity to play the traditional role of the European balancer. [...] Its attachment to a waning special relationship with America has made Great Britain increasingly irrelevant insofar as the major choices confronting Europe's future are concerned. [...] Its friendship needs to be nourished, but its policies do not call for sustained attention. It is a retired geostrategic player"<sup>91</sup>

It is probable that Brzezinski was writing here with John Major's Britain in mind. Blair's statements are in contrast of that view; as though he had arrived at the same conclusions and was not prepared to accept that view whatsoever. His project was therefore to reverse that trend, to prove to the world that Britain indeed could be a geo-strategic, global player. It could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to play a defining, globally relevant role in the New World Order, not least to defy 'doubters' like Brzezinski.

---

<sup>90</sup> compare, for example, Ernest Bevin's words from 1946: 'Her Majesty's government does not accept the view ... that we have ceased to be a great power. ... We regard ourselves as one of the powers most vital to the peace of the world, and we still have a historic part to play', cited in Gamble, 2003; p.189

<sup>91</sup> Brzezinski, 1997; pp 40-3

Thus, in relation to the preceding discussion on his character, particularly the single-mindedness and conviction with which he sees through a once chosen path against all opposition, it can be derived that Blair has attempted to realise the foreign policy vision laid out by himself in 1997 ever since.

True to the promise of strengthening ties within Europe, he tried to spread the new New Labour doctrine via the European Union early in his first term, talking enthusiastically about it at his first EU-summit. Also, he attempted early on to build personal relationships with Helmut Kohl and Jaques Chirac<sup>92</sup>.

However, the politician who had the biggest impact on Tony Blair was Bill Clinton. Both being modernizers and Third Way enthusiasts, they furthermore established close personal ties, which apparently went as far as being rightly called "friendship and camaraderie"<sup>93</sup>

Another point of congruence was their shared "acceptance of globalisation"<sup>94</sup>. One of Blair's frequently employed terms is 'interdependence'. He not only uses it both in domestic as well as global contexts as the anathema of isolationism; interdependence is also perceived as a moral, and distinctly Christian, value.

Objectively examined from the global perspective, interdependence could be interpreted as another term for globalisation, which was frequently used in Clintonite terminology. In Brzezinski's words, "President Clinton was especially relentless in preaching the historical inevitability, social desirability, and need for

---

<sup>92</sup> Seldon, 2004, p.319

<sup>93</sup> Steve Marsh: *Blair, Britain and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*; in Toennies, 2003; p.53

<sup>94</sup> Riddell, 2003; p.84

American political leadership of mankind's march into the era of globalization"<sup>95</sup> Furthermore: "[...] for the United States in its new role as the dominant world power, globalization as a doctrine provides a useful frame of reference for defining both the contemporary world and America's relationship to it."<sup>96</sup>. Perceived from this angle, globalisation in Clinton's era is but another term for New World Order; a doctrine of the world after the Cold War, with American pre-eminence at the centre. Taking into account the 'special relationship' not only between Britain and the USA, but also between the two personalities Clinton and Blair, Blair's usage of 'interdependence' in a global context as linked to 'globalisation' in Brzezinski's perception could be interpreted as belonging to the realm of New World Order terminology<sup>97</sup>. Taking into account Blair's speech at the Economic Club in Chicago in 1999, this becomes ever more evident:

"I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. Today the impulse towards interdependence is immeasurably greater [than after World War II]. Just as within domestic politics, the notion of community - the belief that partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-interest - is coming into its own; so it needs to find its own international echo."<sup>98</sup>

The ease with which Blair connects his own views and convictions to the notion of interdependence or globalisation is apparent in the above quote. It could also be interpreted as an indicator for Blair staking out a role for himself

---

<sup>95</sup> Brzezinski, 2004; *The Choice – Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books); p.142

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, p.145

<sup>97</sup> It needs to be mentioned though that globalisation usually refers to economics and technological development. One of the main principles of economic globalisation is free trade. Steve Marsh observed that 'Whilst Blair and Clinton collaborated closely in the call for global free trade, the US since 1993 either imposed, or threatened, unilateral economic sanctions 60 times on 35 nations that comprise 40 per cent of the world's population.' Toennies, 2003; p.59

<sup>98</sup> Blair, 1999a [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair\\_doctrine4-23.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html)

and Britain within the framework of the New World Order. As Coates and Krieger point out, "both Blair and Clinton wanted to change the world, to *reorder it*"(emphasis added)<sup>99</sup>.

According to Steve Marsh, "the Blair government complemented all of this with general support for Clinton administration policies that [...] emphasised Britain's importance as America's foremost ally [...] and bolstered British claims to pivotal power status."<sup>100</sup>

### 3. Iraq 1998 and the Project for the New American Century:

Soon after establishing their working relationship, foreign policy in both countries once more began to focus on Iraq for the same reasons given in 2003. Already in the speech to the Lord Mayor of London's Banquet in 1997, Blair warned Saddam Hussein of consequences for non-compliance with UN resolutions regarding weapons inspections on account of Weapons of Mass Destruction<sup>101</sup>.

Also, the feeling in the United States' higher echelons of power was that Saddam Hussein was "messing around with the inspectors for too long ...[and

---

<sup>99</sup> Coates and Krieger, 2004; p.13

<sup>100</sup> Toennies, 2003; p.55

<sup>101</sup> 'This Government's determination to stand firm against a still dangerous dictator is unshakeable. We want to see a diplomatic solution and will work with others to achieve this in the next few days. But Saddam should not take as a sign of weakness the international community's desire to find a peaceful way forward if possible. He has made this fatal miscalculation before. For his sake, I hope he will not make it again.' Blair, 1997b <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1070.asp>

they] decided [they] had to take action.”<sup>102</sup>. However, Saddam Hussein seemingly complied, and for the first ten months of 1998, inspections proceeded.

With respect to Iraq, it is vital to note two points:

Firstly, the tremendous strain the country was under due to sanctions, which had been imposed on Iraq during the Gulf War. According to Meghan O’Sullivan, sanctions led to “increased poverty, food insecurity, eroded social services and deteriorating infrastructure [all of which] contributed to sharp increases in malnutrition, disease and mortality rates in Iraq”<sup>103</sup>. A 1995 report by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) supposedly states that “567,000 Iraqi children under the age of five had died as a result of the sanctions”<sup>104</sup>. In a famous interview in 1996, Margaret Albright, Clinton’s Secretary of State, was confronted with that number: “We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that’s more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?” Her answer was: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price—we think the price is worth it.”<sup>105</sup>

The sanctions therefore had catastrophic humanitarian effects, with the full knowledge of the international community. O’Sullivan disputes that the price was worth it: “Sanctions neither ushered in a victory for a new post-Cold War order nor facilitated the international rehabilitation of Iraq”<sup>106</sup>

---

<sup>102</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.387-8

<sup>103</sup> O’Sullivan, 2003: *Shrewd Sanctions – Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution) p.143

<sup>104</sup> <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1084>

<sup>105</sup> Ibid

<sup>106</sup> O’Sullivan, 2003; p.105

Coming to the second point, it has to be noted that American, British and Turkish air strikes were conducted against Iraq throughout the entire 1990s<sup>107</sup>, which also affected and endangered the Iraqi civilian population.

The question thus arises: after seven years of air strikes and sanctions, why did Iraq suddenly gain such prominence as a target again?

One explanation could be found in the intensive lobbying by groups such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) or the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the latter being an organisation founded in 1997 and consisting of prominent figures of the neo-conservative American right wing, such as Richard L. Armitage, Richard Perle, Francis Fukuyama, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. All of these have been connected to the ideology of the New World Order as laid out in Chapter I, and some of these have held (or are holding) prominent posts in George W. Bush's Administration and the Department of Defense.

The Project for the New American Century lobbied Bill Clinton to take an authoritative stand on Iraq. In an open letter dated January 26, 1998, the PNAC asked Clinton to "enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power", claiming that the US had the right to do so under existing UN resolutions. Albeit: "In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council"<sup>108</sup>. This last quote from the letter could be interpreted as a hint displaying the belief of the group that America should have

---

<sup>107</sup> For a full list of all sorties, see <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/swa-ops.htm>

<sup>108</sup> <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>



every right to protect or advance American global hegemony, even in defiance of established organs of the international community. "Multilateral if possible, unilateral if necessary"<sup>109</sup> seems to be the credo of this group. In Kampfner's assessment,

"Their ideology had it that the world was a dangerous place, that civilisation was hanging by a thread. At the same time the US was endowed by Providence with the power to make the world better if only it would take the risks of leadership"<sup>110</sup>

In 2000, the Project for the New American Century published a document titled *Rebuilding America's Defenses*. In it, the *raison d'être* for the PNAC is clearly laid out: "the Project for the New American Century is a nonprofit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership"<sup>111</sup>. They propose a 'grand strategy' based on the new world order, or current 'disorder': "At present the United States faces no global rival. America's grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible"<sup>112</sup> because "At no time in history has the international security order been as conducive to American interests and ideals. The challenge for the coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American peace.'"<sup>113</sup> Hence it becomes obvious that the Project for the New American Century is guided by the principles and ideas of the New World Order as laid out in Chapter I. This, it is argued in their document, should be achieved through the furthering of America's defence capabilities, which in turn would require

---

<sup>109</sup> Coker, 2003: *Empires in Conflict – The Growing Rift between Europe and the United States* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies); p.3

<sup>110</sup> Kampfner, 2003; p.24

<sup>111</sup> *Rebuilding America's Defenses: [Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century](#)* – from the foreword

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p.i

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, p.iv

increased spending on the Pentagon. Also, four core missions for the American forces are established: `

“defend the American homeland; fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars; perform the ‘constabulary’ duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions; transform U.S. forces to exploit the ‘revolution in military affairs;”<sup>114</sup>

This does not imply protecting a nation’s interests; it means offensively advancing them.

As mentioned above, some of the people involved in the Project for the New American Century later became holders of key posts within the Bush Administration; and some of these had already served in the previous administration (under Bush Sr.). The Project for the New American Century can thus be said to be highly influential in the shaping of US foreign policy, and they had a lot of leverage even under Clinton.

During the latter part of the 1990s, Clinton was undergoing domestic troubles. The sudden re-emergence of Iraq as a most-important foreign policy topic might also be attributed to that fact, used partly as a tool to avert attention; hence, the ensuing air strikes have been dubbed “Monica’s war”<sup>115</sup>.

Furthermore, the public in the West was becoming more aware of the humanitarian catastrophe taking place in Iraq. In Kampfner’s words, “the moral case was being lost”<sup>116</sup>.

In any case, Clinton began to focus on Iraq, and so did the rest of the world. However, the other members of the UN Security Council were not in favour of military resolution of the current conflict, which was based on Saddam’s faltering cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors. According to Seldon, they

---

<sup>114</sup> Ibid

<sup>115</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.390

<sup>116</sup> Kampfner, 2003; p.21

held the view that "Saddam had to be given more time"<sup>117</sup>. Blair, however, immediately assured Clinton of his support even in the case of an intervention. As David Coates and Joel Krieger observed, "New Labour did not invent the special relationship. It inherited it. Nor did it put joint action in Iraq on the agenda for that relationship. That too it inherited from its Conservative predecessors"<sup>118</sup>. As true as this statement might be, it does not provide a satisfying explanation for why Blair chose to support the United States by all means necessary; particular after his announcements of also being strong in Europe, Blair could have chosen to side with Europe. It can be assumed that the reason for his decision was, at least partly, personal; he had been troubled by Saddam Hussein's continuing leadership for a long time. His policy of that time cannot be judged as a hypocritical, spur of the moment hype to position himself closer to Clinton; it is true that Iraq, Saddam Hussein and Weapons of Mass Destruction had been on his agenda since he first started talking about foreign policy<sup>119</sup>. But nonetheless, his move solidified the special relationship between him and Clinton as well as their respective countries.

And so, Iraq was targeted for four days in December 1998.

The reason why this very short intervention has been treated in such length is that the run-up to it is reminiscent of run-up to the large-scale war in 2003; also, because patterns started to form, and forces that in 2003 were instrumental began to emerge and gain gravity at the end of the 1990s. Furthermore, this intervention was the "first occasion for Blair to become

---

<sup>117</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.390

<sup>118</sup> Coates and Krieger, 2004; p.10

<sup>119</sup> compare n101

involved in a serious military issue"<sup>120</sup>, which led to him becoming more confident. In Seldon's words: "[Blair] had been bold and decisive in the face of world opinion, had stuck by what he believed to be morally right, and he had carried the day."<sup>121</sup>

#### 4. Kosovo and 'Warlike Humanitarianism'

The following year, another issue arose. The former territory of Yugoslavia had been the site of repeated tensions between the various ethnic groups throughout the 1990s. In 1999, it was reported that Serbia under President Milošević was conducting ethnic cleansing within the region of Kosovo. The international community sharply condemned Serbia's conduct. Blair himself "considered Milošević, like Saddam, to be a bully and a deeply evil man"<sup>122</sup>. Hence, another intervention ensued. It was one fought under NATO command, but with Britain (and, to a lesser degree, the United States, although they committed the largest proportion of troops and hardware) being the motivating force behind it. For Blair, Kosovo became instrumental in the creation of a doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention'. In a speech now known as the 'Blair doctrine' to the Economic Club in Chicago, Blair revealed his thinking and reasoning, a lot of which did not change much over the following years. It was (and remains) of immense importance to him to justify his policies, which is integral to his political charisma. If the legalities of the policies (for example in the case of intervention) could be questioned, he tends to revert to a 'moral common sense' argument, as he does in the following statement:

---

<sup>120</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.387

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, p.392

<sup>122</sup> Ibid

"This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values [...] If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later [...] Just as I believe there was no alternative to military action, now it has started I am convinced there is no alternative to continuing until we succeed [...] Many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men - Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević. Both have been prepared to wage vicious campaigns against sections of their own community. As a result of these destructive policies both have brought calamity on their own peoples."<sup>123</sup>

It is here that his increasingly moralist tone can be discerned, speaking of values, of justice, of evil, of having no alternative. It is also interesting to note his use of the term 'just war', which will be explored in a later chapter. A war, at least for the civilians affected by it, can usually be deemed to a force of malevolence. For no matter how much care is being taken in minimising what is called 'collateral damage', civilians are likely to suffer. If it is not only by the strikes taken against their country themselves that endanger them, it is the ensuing and somewhat deliberate breakdown of infrastructure and even society as such that places an immense strain on the people. Blair's speaking in absolutist terms of 'good and evil' however implies that 'evil' is one-sided; that it is only these dictators who are evil and the evil consequences faced by the respective populations by intervention in their countries have been brought on by the action of the dictators in the first place.

Furthermore, in the Chicago speech, or Blair doctrine, specific New World Order terminology can be discerned. He stresses the security dilemmas in the new world order, or rather disorder (which, as has been discussed in the first chapter, is a theme leading through New World Order terminology), asserting that during the Cold War, at least things were certain whilst now the biggest dilemma is the uncertainty of how relations are to unravel. He also includes more

---

<sup>123</sup> Blair, 1999a [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair\\_doctrine4-23.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html)

moral justifications, further presented as 'moral common sense', or rather biased basic facts. In this case they are strongly reminiscent of Huntington's insistence on having to protect the values of the Western civilisation, or, in Blair's words, 'our' values, in order to grant the safety of Western civilisation *per se*:

"Have the difficulties of the past decade simply been the aftershocks of the end of the Cold War? Will things soon settle down, or does it represent a pattern that will extend into the future? As we address these problems at this weekend's NATO Summit we may be tempted to think back to the clarity and simplicity of the Cold War. But now we have to establish a new framework. No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer."<sup>124</sup>

The Chicago speech is particularly interesting because in it, Blair laid out his guiding principles for when intervention is justified. He suggested five points by which to measure whether nations should intervene in the affairs of sovereign states:

"Are we sure of our case? Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? On the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Are we prepared for the long term? Do we have national interests involved?"<sup>125</sup>

It is this test, which Blair readily admits is not absolute, which caused the speech to receive a lot of attention (in fact, Seldon calls it the "foreign policy equivalent of Clause IV"<sup>126</sup>). Most importantly, it seemed to cohesively provide a framework for when humanitarian intervention, or "warlike humanitarianism"<sup>127</sup> could, or should, be conducted.

---

<sup>124</sup> Ibid

<sup>125</sup> Ibid

<sup>126</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.406

<sup>127</sup> Coates and Krieger, 2004; p.21

In the imminent context, this framework was applied in the intervention in Kosovo. Blair took a more decisive stance on the issue than Clinton and was even prepared to commit ground troops; a threat that was later claimed to have led to Milošević's capitulation<sup>128</sup>. As Marsh suggests, "Blair emerged clearly as the leader [...] and demonstrated his readiness to risk British lives for moral principles."<sup>129</sup>

Because of Clinton's unwillingness to commit the United States to contributing ground troops, a momentary rift occurred between the two leaders. According to Riddell, "the conflict marked a change in [Blair's] relationship with Clinton. He had come of age."<sup>130</sup> Furthermore:

"Kosovo ingrained in Blair that he was the bridge between the United States and Europe, and that he uniquely could explain one to the other. Clinton's equivocations gave him a mistrust of the ability of the United States to reach the right conclusions without him. After Kosovo, Blair saw the Atlantic relationship as *the* fundamental axis for the preservation of a liberal world order."<sup>131</sup> (his italics)

In line with his character assessment, Blair seemed to become more confident in his ability to judge events correctly. On his visits to the region, his rhetoric became gradually more moralising. It is likely that visiting the refugee camps made a lasting impression on him and hence led to the stepping up of moralising tones (although Britain has been criticised for its reluctance to admit refugees from that region<sup>132</sup>). For example, he said: "this is no longer just a military

---

<sup>128</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.403

<sup>129</sup> Toennies, 2003; p.60

<sup>130</sup> Riddell, 2003, p.115

<sup>131</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.406

<sup>132</sup> See, for example, Will Bartlett, in Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000: *New Labour's Foreign Policy – A New Moral Crusade?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press); p.143

conflict. It is a battle between good and evil, between civilisation and barbarity"<sup>133</sup>.

And another important term was applied for the first time: "We can then embark on a new *moral crusade* to rebuild the Balkans without [Milošević]"<sup>134</sup> (emphasis added)

As suggested in chapter I, crusade is a critical and quite threatening term to use. Nonetheless, it was to be used again, two years later, by the conservative Christian who took over the presidency of the United States of America in 2000.

To conclude, it follows that throughout his first term, Blair's conviction of his own judgement of what is moral was already formed. This becomes evident when examining quotes from that period. He forged a relationship to Bill Clinton that was widely recognised as being 'special' and continuing the legacy of special Anglo-Americanism that had diminished under Clinton and Major and had had its last recognisably 'special' period under Reagan and Thatcher. Contrary to Thatcher, however, Blair also wanted to be recognised as being Europhile, so as to constitute a transatlantic bridge, which was supposed to be the foreign policy branch of the Third Way. Due to his strong moral convictions, his attempt to assert Britain as America's closest ally, as well as his wish for Britain to once again resume 'global player' status, he did not shy away from military intervention, presented as humanitarian intervention (or, in his own words, as a 'moral crusade') and further emphasised by the Chicago Speech. According to

---

<sup>133</sup> Kampfner, 2003; p. 56

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, p.60; compare *n*27



Kampfner, his reasoning was widely accepted by his party and the country, and the Kosovo conflict thus constituted the "high point in liberal intervention"<sup>135</sup>

As Riddell suggests, "the main personal consequence was that he became more sure of his views and more assertive internationally."<sup>136</sup>

## **II.2b - The Second Term**

### 1. George W. Bush and the New World Order

On 7 June 2001, New Labour won the General Election with the largest second-term majority in history. Tony Blair remained Prime Minister of Britain.

By that time, the Democrats had lost the millennium election in the United States (although the outcome had been controversial) and George W. Bush took over the American presidency. New Labour were anticipating how the transatlantic relationship would develop, whilst Blair himself was determined to make it work, despite the perceived ideological differences. He feared that America under Bush would become increasingly isolationist. An article by

---

<sup>135</sup> Kampfner, 2003; p.47

<sup>136</sup> Riddell, 2003; p.116

Condoleezza Rice, titled *Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest* and published in *Foreign Affairs* in 2000, seemed to affirm that fear.

Rice, who later became Bush's national security advisor, laid out foreign policy principles under a new Republican government. These were quite contrary to Blair's assertion that "we are all internationalists now" and his belief in an 'international community'. Also, she refuted reasoning in favour of humanitarian intervention. Some examples of those guiding principles are quoted below:

"Foreign policy in a Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist, [...] but it will also proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an *illusory international community*. ...[It is not] isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the world and should not adhere to every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose. [...] Yet many in the United States are (and have always been) uncomfortable with the notions of power politics, great powers, and power balances. In an extreme form, this discomfort leads to a reflexive appeal instead to notions of international law and norms, and the belief that the support of many states -- or even better, of institutions like the United Nations -- is essential to the legitimate exercise of power. The 'national interest' is replaced with 'humanitarian interests' or the interests of 'the international community.' The belief that the United States is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so on behalf of someone or something else was deeply rooted in Wilsonian thought, and there are strong echoes of it in the Clinton administration. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect. U.S. intervention in these 'humanitarian' crises should be, at best, exceedingly rare."<sup>137</sup> (emphasis added)

This seemed to affirm the worries of the Labour Party and Tony Blair about a continuation of congruence in the common transatlantic values and policies. For example, on Kosovo she said that "the United States had an overriding strategic interest in stopping Milošević" rather than having acted out of humanitarian concerns, which implies that the Clinton administration was well aware of the strategic interest during the intervention. The above quotes are reminiscent of Brzezinski's imperative on geo-strategy as a means to advance and secure American global dominance, as well as reaffirming the central tenets of the PNAC.

G. John Ikenberry, Professor of international relations theory, American foreign policy, and international political economy at Princeton University, interprets the reasons for a more isolationist stance as follows: "Apocalyptic violence is at our doorstep, so efforts at strengthening the rules and institutions of the international community are of little practical value."<sup>138</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> Rice, 2000, *Promoting the National Interest*: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5-p60/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html>

<sup>138</sup> Ikenberry, 2002: *America's Imperial Ambition* <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020901faessay9732/g-john-ikenberry/america-s-imperial-ambition.html>

The United States government should thus, in Rice's view, turn to another strategy: the one of strengthening America's military capabilities:  
"The next president should refocus the Pentagon's priorities on building the military of the 21st century. [...] U.S. technological advantages should be leveraged to build forces that are lighter and more lethal.[...] The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be.[...]"

The American military must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe -- areas in which not only our interests but also those of our key allies are at stake."<sup>139</sup>

This strong emphasis on furthering America's military capability can be found throughout literature preoccupied with the post-Cold War advancement of American interest and the securing of America's unchallenged position as the dominant actor in global affairs. For example, the 2000 PNAC document, *Rebuilding America's Defences*, mainly deals with suggestions on how to enhance American military capability in order to "support an American grand strategy committed to building upon this unprecedented opportunity."<sup>140</sup> This is supposed to be achieved through a defence strategy outlined by the Defense Department of the first Bush administration, led by Dick Cheney, in 1992, which "provided a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests."<sup>141</sup>

After having established the 'civilisational' and geo-strategic theories and aims of how to best deal with the new challenges facing the world in order to

---

<sup>139</sup> Rice, 2000

<sup>140</sup> *Rebuilding America's Defences*, 2000; p.ii

<sup>141</sup> cited in *Rebuilding America's Defences*; p.ii

advance the American interest in the first chapter, it is now that another factor comes into play, namely the *means* of how to achieve that aim. Judging from the available documents, it becomes apparent that the proponents of such a world order are convinced that it will have to be reordered by military means: by defence, deterrence, but also by offence.

Another revealing document preoccupied with the role of the military in order to advance American interest is the *Joint Vision 2020*, published in 2000 by the joint chiefs of staff of the five branches of the American military (Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guards) and thus under the auspice of the Pentagon. This document is not merely concerned with 'American preeminence', but actually provides a framework for the establishment of *Full Spectrum Dominance*. According to the document, this means:

"Full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations. The full range of operations includes maintaining a posture of strategic deterrence. It includes theater engagement and presence activities. It includes conflict involving *employment of [...] weapons of mass destruction, major theater wars, regional conflicts, and smaller-scale contingencies.*<sup>142</sup> (emphasis added)

With George Bush as President, the proponents of the New World Order doctrine and policies of advanced military preparedness to ensure its success gained power. His administration includes members of the Project for the New American Century (such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith). Dick Cheney, a Republican hardliner who had already served under Bush Sr., became Vice President, and Condoleezza Rice became national security advisor. These personalities are known as neo-conservatives, or

---

<sup>142</sup> *Joint Vision 2020*; <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm> ; p.6

neocons, representing "corporate America"<sup>143</sup>. Neocons are, according to Krell, split up into two groups: hardliners, many of which had already served under Bush Sr., and "Christian-fundamentalist and nationalist neo-conservatives."<sup>144</sup> It is the latter group, to which George W. Bush himself is counted, which underpins the strategies and aims of the former with religious and moralising concepts.

It is thus not surprising that the Blair government, who's stand had so far been internationalist, trans-governmental and committed to multilateralism, was unsettled by Bush's presidency. Nonetheless, Tony Blair was adamant to remain in the position of America's closest ally and to keep the special relationship alive. He did not need to choose that position; after having committed Britain to trying to be 'leading in Europe', he could have orientated Britain closer towards the European Union and observe how global affairs under Bush would unravel. However, he made clear that he would not choose to do so. In a newspaper interview in March 2001, he stated: "I've been as pro-America a Prime Minister as is possible to have. There is not a single issue I can think of in which we haven't stood foursquare with America."<sup>145</sup>

Judging from his earlier statements on internationalism and multilateralism through interdependence, one might reach the conclusion that there were issues on which there should have been disagreement. His strong refutation of the existence of points of incongruity could be interpreted in the context of his self-image and his ambition to provide a role for Britain as a pivotal power; it is possible that not only did he perceive himself as a bridge between

---

<sup>143</sup> Toennies, 2003; p.63

<sup>144</sup> Krell, 2003: *Arroganz der Macht, Arroganz der Ohnmacht – der Irak, die Weltordnungspolitik der USA und die Transatlantischen Beziehungen (Report 1/2003)*; Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK); p.ii

<sup>145</sup> Blair, 2001 cited in Kampfner, 2003; p.90

the EU and a US, but also as a balancer between the two; that he believed he could be the force influencing the American President towards more moderate approaches; and that it was instrumental to follow the once chosen path of strong alignment with the United States in order to preserve the “fundamental axis [necessary] for the preservation of a liberal world order”<sup>146</sup>

The opportunity for Blair to prove to America that, despite the seeming ideological differences between the two respective governments, Britain was still its closest ally came on 11 September 2001.

## 2. The World Trade Center Attacks and the War on Terror

After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Blair attempted to assert himself straight away as the United States’ foremost and staunchest ally, although virtually every regime in the world assured America of its sympathy on that day. In a statement delivered in response to the events in New York and Washington, Blair assured his audience (particularly the American one) that Britain stands “shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.”<sup>147</sup> A few days later, at the Labour party conference, he renewed his vow: “We were with you at the first. We will stay with you to the last”<sup>148</sup>

In the statement made on 11 September, Blair asserted that terrorism had started a battle with “the free and democratic world”. It was a taste of things to

---

<sup>146</sup> see n131

<sup>147</sup> Blair, 2001a: *Prime Minister Tony Blair statement in response to terrorist attacks in the United States, 11 September 2001* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1596.asp>

<sup>148</sup> Blair, 2001b, *Labour Party Conference Speech, 3 October 2001*; in Richards, 2004; p. 221

come, namely the War on Terrorism, which, from the beginning, has been presented as a “global war”<sup>149</sup>, and hence, by definition, a ‘world war’.

It was quickly established that an Islamic fundamentalist group named al Qaeda was charged with carrying out the attacks, led by a Saudi multimillionaire, Osama Bin Laden<sup>150</sup>. According to President Bush, al Qaeda’s goal is “remaking the world”<sup>151</sup>. From the previous discussions, it could be derived that al Qaeda shares a common goal with the proponents of the New World Order.

Tony Blair moved swiftly to position himself closely to George Bush in the aftermath of the attack. He was the first foreign leader Bush spoke to; and in Bush’s address to the American people from the 20 September 2001, the President assured that “America has no truer friend than Great Britain”<sup>152</sup>. The special relationship, should it ever have waned, was truly re-established. By following this path, Tony Blair inevitably linked himself to American policies in response to 9/11; again, it is possible to suggest that one of his motives was trying to exert some influence on the American President and thus act as a moderating force, because, as Seldon observed, “fear grew of a disproportionate American reaction”<sup>153</sup>. Therefore he tried to convince Bush of the need to present clear evidence about al Qaeda’s complicity in the attacks, in order to “win over world opinion”<sup>154</sup>. Another motive, juxtaposed to viewing himself as the bridge, was attempting to provide a link between the Americans and other

---

<sup>149</sup> D. Rumsfeld, cited in Coates and Krieger, 2003; p.34

<sup>150</sup> Note that although Bin Laden was presented as the mastermind behind the attacks and the most sought after person in the world, the 9/11 attacks do not appear on the list of charges against him on the FBI ‘most wanted’ website: <http://www.fbi.gov/mostwanted/topten/fugitives/laden.htm>

<sup>151</sup> Bush, 2001a; *Remarks by the President, 16 September 2001*

<http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0109/S00071.htm>

<sup>152</sup> Ibid

<sup>153</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.488

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, p.492

governments around the globe. This becomes apparent when studying Blair's conduct in the aftermath of 9/11, when he travelled to numerous countries in an attempt to rally support for an alliance in the War on Terror.

He also harnessed strongly emotive, moralistic language in making his own support unequivocally clear, such as in his speech to the House of Commons on September 14, 2001:

"These attacks were not just attacks upon people and buildings; nor even merely upon the USA; these were attacks on the basic democratic values in which we all believe so passionately and on the civilised world. [...] We have not just an interest but an obligation to bring those responsible to account. [...] It will be determined, it will take time, it will continue over time until this menace is properly dealt with and its machinery of terror destroyed."<sup>155</sup>

This suggests that Blair had, by that time, already grasped that the War on Terror was a global affair that was most likely to be drawn out; and albeit he tried to moderate Bush, he asserted that the attack was serious enough to constitute an attack on the entire 'civilised' world, readying Britain for involvement in any ensuing retaliatory strikes. For, as Georg Meggle observed, although the attacks were presented as attacks on the entire world and thus civilisation *per se*, "it wasn't [civilisation's] representation in the form of the United Nations but rather solely the USA which was to be responsible for deciding on an appropriate response."<sup>156</sup> David Coates and Joel Krieger recognised that "the UK government moved immediately to position itself alongside the US Administration [...] as an architect and leading player in the design and implementation of the global anti-terrorism campaign."<sup>157</sup> This affirms the assumption that Blair chose to play a leading role not only in the War on Terror

---

<sup>155</sup> Blair, 2001c: *Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons following the September 11 attacks, 14 September 2001* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1598.asp>

<sup>156</sup> Meggle, 2005: *Ethics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag); p.171

<sup>157</sup> Coates and Krieger, 2003; p.44



but also in the implementation of the New World Order. On the reasons for that decision, Seldon argues that

“[Blair] believed in his unique persuasive powers in bringing the international community behind US plans, and that he was engaged in a clear-cut moral struggle pitting the forces of good against evil, [...] with his particular responsibility being to create a better world.”<sup>158</sup>

Several authors have noted the ambiguity of the term 'War on Terror'. Brzezinski, for example, points out that terrorism is a “lethal technique for intimidation employed by individuals, groups, and states. One does not wage war against a technique or tactic”<sup>159</sup>. And the acclaimed historian Sir Michael Howard observed: “To 'declare war' on terrorists, or even more illiterately, on 'terrorism' is at once to accord them a status and dignity that they seek and which they do not deserve. It confers on them a kind of legitimacy.”<sup>160</sup>

It was established that al Qaeda was based in largely in Afghanistan, using former CIA training camps from the times of the Afghan-Soviet war. Hence, the retaliatory attacks were to be carried out against Afghanistan, headed by the Taliban, in line with President Bush's threat that

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”<sup>161</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.498

<sup>159</sup> Brzezinski, 2004; p.28

<sup>160</sup> Howard, 2001: *Analysis of the Terrorist Crisis* <http://english.pravda.ru/main/2001/11/01/19888.html>

<sup>161</sup> Bush, 2001b *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 20 September 2001*: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

Due to the intelligence concerning the whereabouts of al Qaeda's base, the Taliban, an ultraconservative regime, were considered 'hostile' and regime change became a further issue parallel to trying to locate Bin Laden and destroying the terrorist network, although regime change is in contravention of international law. Also, whilst precisely targeting the training camps (or at least attempting to) might appear justified, it is not obvious why war was waged on the entire country,<sup>162</sup> especially when there was no clear evidence that Bin Laden was actually there

In line with Sir Michael Howard's evaluation, it is questionable whether it is indeed possible to fight a war against terror; as the events following 9/11 proved, the war in Afghanistan was ultimately fought against a country and did not bring about a cessation of the terrorist threat, but regime change and, despite the probably positive ending of an oppressive dictatorship, the intervention in Afghanistan brought about internal turmoil that continues until this day.

The events of 9/11 not only gave rise to the War on Terror in militaristic terms; they also brought about a stepping up of highly moralising language. The events were presented in stark black-and-white terms; terrorists were presented as the personified evil on both sides of the Atlantic. Both Blair and Bush spoke in terms of 'good and evil', 'civilisation and barbarity'. The political effect was to create a dichotomy between 'us' and 'them', and an elevation of both. The absence of a balanced argument could be explained by Blair's 'moral common sense' as pointed out in relation to the Chicago speech. By asserting that the

---

<sup>162</sup> See 'Just War' discussion in the next chapter

terrorists and anyone affiliated (or even anyone trying to establish a balanced discourse on the political motives behind the attacks) were barbarians, it followed unequivocally (by application of 'common sense') that 'we' are civilised. Such a view elevates Huntington's work to a self-fulfilling prophecy. It was also now that George Bush asserted that 'we' are now involved in a crusade against evil<sup>163</sup>.

As pointed out earlier, 'crusade' as a term carries the distinctly religious and historical meaning of a fight between Christianity ('us') and Islam ('them'), which in this statement is the 'evil', and it means the same as the Islamic term 'Jihad' – Holy War. Both Blair and Bush have assured their audiences that it is not Islam and Muslims who are the enemy. However, the implications from their comments indicate otherwise. They carry a charged, distinctive meaning that by the very choice of words is designed to trigger an emotive reaction. Dibdin's thought on defining oneself through hating the other<sup>164</sup> gains validation by the statements made by both Blair and Bush.

However, attempts have been made by some authors to see the attacks not merely as unfounded acts of hate against Western values by fanatic lunatics, but as being driven by a resentment which is rooted in the conduct of the West, and particularly America. For example, Arundhati Roy wrote in *The Guardian*:

"[Usama Bin Laden is] the savage twin of all that purports to be beautiful and civilised. He has been sculpted from the spare rib of a world laid to waste by America's foreign policy: its gunboat diplomacy, its nuclear arsenal, its vulgarly stated policy of "full-spectrum dominance", its chilling disregard for non-American lives, its barbarous military interventions, its support for despotic and dictatorial regimes, its merciless economic agenda."<sup>165</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup> Bush, 2001a: "This is [...] a new kind of evil. This crusade [...] is going to take a while"  
<http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0109/S00071.htm>

<sup>164</sup> see n20

<sup>165</sup> Roy, *The Guardian*, 29 September 2001

<http://books.guardian.co.uk/writersreflections/story/0,,559970,00.html>

Roy is sensational and candidly harsh in her criticism. The earlier discourse on Iraq, sanctions, the United States' support of Saddam Hussein as long as it was in the national interest, and the unilateral imposition of economic sanctions whilst breaking international agreements themselves, indicate that the underlying critique offered in such crass terms by Roy is not entirely unfounded<sup>166</sup>.

In more balanced terms, Andrew Gamble observed that 'for those outside Anglo-America, it appears as a system of power which excludes others and seeks to impose its solutions and its conceptions of order on them'<sup>167</sup>. However, although indignation on behalf of critics of American conduct allows for discourse, the attacks on innocent people as conducted by the terrorists remain inexcusable.

It is permissible to argue that this is the concept of the New World Order doctrine, applied through actual policies, which Gamble is referring to. And, as argued earlier, it already found application under Clinton, albeit maybe not in as obtuse a form as it did under the George W. Bush administration. Due to Britain's close military and intelligence partnership with the US, this has inevitably led to an increase in the importance of Blair's role in the creation of a new world order.

By being united in facing a common enemy, Blair and Bush were able to overcome any difficulties and uneasiness about their relationship. 9/11 and the War on Terror provided the opportunity for the 'special relationship' to regain momentum and a congruence of thinking and ideas. Steve Marsh noted that their

---

<sup>166</sup> see P.J.Simmons, 2002: *U.S. Behavior on Global Issues: Patterns that Draw Criticism*, pp 6-7  
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/Policybrief17.pdf>

<sup>167</sup> Gamble, 2003; p.88

shared crusade and "Christian missionary zeal" substituted for the ideological congruence in Blair's relationship with Clinton<sup>168</sup>.

The War on Terror thus found its first physical outlet in Afghanistan. It was initially a short campaign, and victory was announced on 13 November 2001, when Kabul fell. However, its success was very limited indeed. It did not achieve regime change. However, that, albeit one of the objectives, had not been the primary one. The invasion did not manage to provide Osama Bin Laden either 'dead or alive'<sup>169</sup>. He remained at large. It did not root out terrorism, implying that other wars would have to be fought. It increased fear in the populations of the United States and Britain that there might be, in turn, retaliatory terrorist attacks<sup>170</sup>. Afghanistan was left unstable and indefinitely in need of a peacekeeping force. *Non sequitur*, the invasion was celebrated as a victory of good over evil, and it was declared that Afghanistan was now 'liberated'.

This marked a turn towards the further consolidation and strengthening of the New World Order as the new world order, and thus the positioning of American resources in Eurasia and the facilitated access to energy resources. Tony Blair irrevocably, and knowingly, established himself as part of it. He took on the role of being instrumental in trying to establish the New World Order, and he realised, as did his counterparts in America, that the atrocity of 11 September offered just the opportunity to do so: "This is a moment to seize. The

---

<sup>168</sup> Toennies, 2003; p.66

<sup>169</sup> Bush, 2001c: *Bush Says U.S. Proud to Lead Fight Against Terrorism*, 17 September 2001

[http://www.usembassy.it/file2001\\_09/alia/a1091715.htm](http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_09/alia/a1091715.htm)

<sup>170</sup> <http://staff.stir.ac.uk/david.miller/publications/opinion-polls.html>

kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. But before they do, let us reorder the world around us.”<sup>171</sup>

### 3. Iraq 2003 and the Doctrine of Pre-emption

The next target in the path towards unchallenged American global primacy was, once more, Iraq. This time regime change was the primary objective. The politics of the conflict, however, presented Blair with a far more difficult case to go to war than his American counterpart. Domestically, Blair faced nationwide discontent and uncertainty about the reasons given for war, which resulted in the largest Anti-War demonstration the country has ever witnessed. Furthermore, the issue of waging a war against Iraq stirred up the largest rebellion amongst MPs in the House of Commons, where in fact it was the support of the opposition party, the Conservatives, that enabled Blair to manifest the British armed services to go to war.<sup>172</sup>

As established in chapter II, the dynamic forces in the United States behind going to war in Iraq in 1998, as well as in 2003, were the same. The difference now was that some members of the Project for the New American Century actually held powerful positions in the Bush government, whilst others held defence positions. At first, in order to use the momentum afforded by the outrage at the 9/11 attacks, a link was attempted to be established between Saddam Hussein and the attacks. That, however, could not be proved and remains highly unlikely. The official reason for waging war, like in 1998, became

---

<sup>171</sup> Blair, 2001b, in Richards, 2004; p. 225

<sup>172</sup> 217 MPs' voted against going to war, 139 of which were Labour, whilst 396 MP's from across the parties were for. <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,917298,00.html>

Iraq's alleged possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. As has been noted earlier, Blair had been worried about Saddam's WMD since the early stages of his premiership. Now, the case for all-out war was being made. Although a link between al Qaeda and Iraq could never be legitimately established, it was still asserted that attacking Iraq was part of the War on Terror. As Donald Rumsfeld claimed, "Iraq is part of the global war on Terror [because] stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war."<sup>173</sup>

The lesson that had been learned in the aftermath of 9/11 was that people responded to highly emotive language. Also, in Bush and Blair being first to take the moral high ground, it would prove hard for dissenters to use morality as an argument *against* the war. It was as early as January 2002 that George Bush, in his State of the Union Address, listed Iraq publicly as belonging to an "axis of evil" (along with Iran and North Korea), which allegedly was "arming to threaten the peace of the world"<sup>174</sup>. Furthermore, "Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world." After having established the new threat, Bush's tone becomes distinctly more threatening:

"America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. [...] I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. [...] America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: 'Let's roll.'"<sup>175</sup>

---

<sup>173</sup> D. Rumsfeld, cited in Coates and Krieger, 2003; p.34

<sup>174</sup> Bush, 2002a: *State of the Union Address 2002, 29 January 2002*  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

<sup>175</sup> Ibid

It is unclear, however, how Iraq now posed more of a threat than it had done so far - much less a growing threat - particularly after having undergone a decade of containment, military targeting and crippling economic sanctions. Had Saddam Hussein been intent on using his alleged stockpile of WMD, it seems likely that he would have done so in defence when Iraq was attacked in 2003. Be that as it may, Bush attempted to brace his nation and the world for a continuation of the War on Terror. In the tradition of Manifest Destiny, Bush interpreted the agenda of the United States not as something constructed and strategically employed, but as bestowed upon: "we've been called to a unique role in human events"; when, in fact, as Kampfner suggests, "The two P's lay at the heart - pre-emption and primacy"<sup>176</sup>. This becomes also clear when considering Bush's remarks at West Point, New York in June 2002: "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge."<sup>177</sup> This is the crux of the new National Security Strategy. In pre-empting a possible, though unproven threat, America seeks to assert its role as the global hegemon and sends out a clear signal that it is prepared to act, unilaterally and against established conventions if it is in the national interest. The 2002 National Security Strategy makes that unequivocally clear. Although Bush assures in the foreword that "We seek instead to create a balance of power", the document itself juxtaposes that claim by making clear that "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense by

---

<sup>176</sup> Kampfner, 2003; p.160

<sup>177</sup> Bush, 2002b *Remarks by President Bush at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, 1 June 2002*  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/westpoint.htm>



acting preemptively"<sup>178</sup>, based on the presumption that "In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather."<sup>179</sup> It is nevertheless claimed that all these policies, even the use of force and pre-emption itself, are conducted in the name of a 'balance of power' and 'freedom'. This is *Non Sequitur*, particularly when noting that probably no country on earth possesses a more intricate and complete military program or as many lethal weapons, both conventional and WMD, than the United States. Nonetheless it is asserted: "Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom"<sup>180</sup>.

The National Security Strategy document could be said to be another blueprint for the establishment of the New World Order. Some of the policies seem benign, but, as Rice already made clear in her *Foreign Affairs* article in 2000, it is America's national interest that comes first. Humanitarian, international concerns should always be secondary to the agenda of the US and thus the assertion of global primacy. The above document and its unconventional policy of pre-emption found application in the 2003 war on Iraq.

Tony Blair again manoeuvred himself close to the American President in a further attempt at providing the bridge, not only between Europe and the United States, but between the United States and the world. Throughout the year-long run up to the war, he tried to commit the United States to legitimising a possible

---

<sup>178</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002; p.6  
[www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html)

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid*, p.15

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid*, p.29

attack on Iraq through the UN. As the National Security Strategy document amply proves, the Bush administration did not believe such a course necessary<sup>181</sup>; however, and partly as a 'reward' for Blair's unwavering loyalty, that route was taken. According to Seldon, that was the only time Blair exercised any real influence over the United States' policy on Iraq<sup>182</sup>. At the same time, he tried to rally support for a war against Iraq at home. It is likely that Blair was aware of the changed conditions on behalf of the United States for a possible attack. If that is the case, he must have been aware of its unconventionality. However, in having guaranteed that Britain would be with America "to the last" and thus having reaffirmed the Anglo-American axis, and in agreeing with the Bush administration's claims concerning the state of Iraq's WMD programme, he chose to cast doubts on the legality of an unwarranted attack aside and assert Britain once again as America's stoutest ally.

In the following months, Blair and those people on his government that agreed to the allegation that Iraq posed a threat to the world, worked hard on making the case for war. The first and foremost given reason for an attack on Iraq was the state of Iraq's WMD programme. Blair came to find the publication of intelligence material helpful in order to make the case for war. In his foreword to the *Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - the assessment of the British government* document, he made the case for action by alleging that "intelligence has established beyond doubt that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear

---

<sup>181</sup> compare n108

<sup>182</sup> Seldon, 2004; p.577

weapons"<sup>183</sup>. This was followed up by another dossier entitled *Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation*, which became more widely known as the 'dodgy dossier', since Channel4 convincingly stated that large parts of the document had been "plagiarised"<sup>184</sup>. The evidence in both documents has since been discredited, such as the claim that Saddam was seeking to obtain uranium from Africa, or that Iraq could have some of their WMD ready "within 45 minutes of an order to use them"<sup>185</sup>. The ensuing Butler Report could not establish whether the assertions were true; in the case of seeking uranium, it only concluded that the intelligence as such was credible, but did not offer a statement on whether the claim was actually factual; and on the 45 minute claim, it concluded that it should not have been included. On other claims, such as intelligence on Iraq's possession of the chemical substance 'dusty mustard', the report concluded that the intelligence was of "dubious reliability"<sup>186</sup>. Furthermore, Blair later had to admit that "Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy"<sup>187</sup>. Nonetheless, decisions were taken in light of these dossiers and the claims were used as evidence against Saddam Hussein.

For the next few months, Blair continued to try and convince the House of Commons as well as the rest of the country of the obligation of waging a war against Iraq, and increasingly so in moral terms. Gradually, the WMD threat as a

---

<sup>183</sup> *Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - the assessment of the British government*, 2003:

<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page271.asp>

<sup>184</sup> [http://www.channel4.com/news/2003/02/week\\_1/06\\_dossier.html](http://www.channel4.com/news/2003/02/week_1/06_dossier.html)

<sup>185</sup> *Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - the assessment of the British government*, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page281.asp>

<sup>186</sup> *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 2004; pp 156-7

<http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/report/report.pdf>

<sup>187</sup> Blair, 2004, *statement on the Butler report - 14 July, 2004*

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/3054991.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3054991.stm)

reason was turned into Saddam's non-compliance with the UN weapons inspections as a reason, until, in a last attempt to rally support, it was the humanitarian aspect that was used to make the case. Blair's statements from the early run-up appear composed and distanced. However, as the weapons inspectors headed by Hans Blix failed to make progress; UN resolution 1441 proved to be legally restrictive as it did not specifically authorise the use of force; and furthermore outright opposition against the war was exceptionally strong, Blair reverted to making the moral case for war. By 25 February 2003, one month before the war eventually began, he used statements such as "The innocent die every day in Iraq victims of Saddam, and their plight too should be heard."<sup>188</sup>, thereby implying if "we" fail to act, our last resort being war, "we" prolong the plight of the Iraqis. It is an assertion aimed directly at the opposition to war. By taking the moral high ground, he makes it awkward for others to argue against his reasoning without seeming immoral for allowing this humanitarian catastrophe to continue by refusing to act through intervention.

As early as April 2002 however, Blair argued emotively for the moral need of taking action. He wove notions of the New World Order into his speech, linking them with the rightfulness of the War on Terror and the need to act on Iraq:

"What brings nations together - what brought them together post September 11 - is the international recognition that the world needs order. Disorder is the enemy of progress. Not all the wrongs of the world can be put right, but where disorder threatens us all, we should act.[...] In today's interdependent world, we need an integrated approach, a doctrine of international community as I put it before, based on the values we believe in. [...] I am arguing that the values we believe in are worth fighting for; [...] We shouldn't be shy of giving our actions not just the force of self-interest but *moral force*. Usama bin Laden's philosophy is not just a security threat to us. It's an assault on our hearts and minds. If the world makes the right choices now

---

<sup>188</sup> Blair, 2003a: *Prime Minister statement on Iraq 25 February 2003*  
<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3088.asp>

- *at this time of destiny* - we will get there. And Britain will be at America's side in doing it."<sup>189</sup>(emphasis added)

The quote contains the familiar hallmarks of the New World Order doctrine as embraced by Blair, including notions of interdependence, values, warning of disorder and the alleged need for 'humanitarian intervention'. Interesting is the insertion of "at this time of destiny". It implies that something will be decided, now and forever. It is fate, or providence, and is thus again something that was bestowed upon, not something that emerged as a result of human agency. The notion that humans were given free will presents humanity with a range of choices. In this view, humanity was presented with a certain situation by fate and now has it in its hands how to deal with it. This viewpoint completely refutes the careful strategic planning that is employed in, to name but one of the hitherto analysed documents, the National Security Strategy.

**In Blair's speech to the Labour Party Conference 2002, the language is even more explicit with regards to the New World Order. The speech was amply entitled *At Best when at Our Boldest*:**

"Today, a nation's chances are measured not just by its own efforts but by its place in the world. Influence is power is prosperity. [...] Sometimes [...], the only chance of peace is a readiness for war.[...] For Britain to help shape this new world, Britain needs to be part of it. [...] The radical decision is usually the right one. [...] Now with globalisation, a new era has begun."<sup>190</sup>

Blair thus gives a partial explanation for why he willingly submits to American notions of the New World Order; because, according to the quote above, it will increase Britain's chances, especially when it comes to shaping the new world. This might be interpreted as a hint of Blair's awareness of the criticisms of the American strategies for global domination, and would thus be

---

<sup>189</sup> Blair, 2002a: *Prime Minister's speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library 7 April 2002*, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1712.asp>

<sup>190</sup> Blair, 2002b *At Best when at Our Boldest, 1 October 2002* [www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/IRAQ/INDEX.HTM](http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/IRAQ/INDEX.HTM)

juxtaposed to his image of himself not only as a bridge, but also a moderating influence between America and the rest of the world, recognising that moderation is needed. As noted earlier, however, his actual influence on the United States' conduct was limited.

On 18 March 2003, Blair made his statement opening the decisive Iraq debate. That day, the decision was taken for going to war<sup>191</sup>, after months of struggle for Blair, questions about the legality of war (particularly since the UN did not issue a new resolution authorising the use of force), strong opposition from the public as well as members of his own cabinet, (which, like in Robin Cook's and later, Claire Short's case, even led to resignations over the issue) and particular doubts about the intelligence information presented as evidence in favour of an invasion.

He once more made the case for war, by interweaving all his arguments:

"The real problem is that, underneath, people dispute that Iraq is a threat; dispute the link between terrorism and WMD; dispute the whole basis of our assertion that the two together constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life. The threat is chaos. [...] Today [Iraq] is impoverished. [...] Thousands of children die needlessly every year from lack of food and medicine. [...] To suffer the humility of failing courage in face of pitiless terror. That is how the Iraqi people live. Leave Saddam in place and that is how they will continue to live.[...] We will stand up for what we know to be right, to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at risk, to show at the moment of decision that we have the courage to do the right thing. I beg to move the motion."<sup>192</sup>

In face of strong opposition, he succeeded. To him, despite the severe strain and potential damage the previous year had placed on him, this victory must have been even further evidence that his justification is not only persuasive, but also, as Riddell noted, "self-evidently right".

His moral righteousness also ensued in the following months, when the invasion of Iraq failed to bring forth evidence of the existence of weapons of

---

<sup>191</sup> see n172

<sup>192</sup> Blair, 2003b: *Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate 18 March 2003*  
<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp>

mass destruction. His speech to the US Congress in July 2003 could be read as an acknowledgement that both the Afghanistan as well as the Iraq campaigns failed in their primary objectives, which, as he asserted, will unequivocally lead to even more wars, rather than admitting the ineffectiveness of the approach so far and thus looking for other ways to achieve the goal of rooting out terrorism:

"Our new world rests on order. The danger is disorder and in today's world it now spreads like contagion. [...] September 11th was not an isolated event, but a tragic prologue. Iraq; another act; and many further struggles will be set upon this stage before it's over."<sup>193</sup>

These words instil fear, and become an affirmation for the world to be prepared for perpetual war in order to achieve perpetual peace. There is no time offered for when this peaceful era is meant to come to pass, nor is it guaranteed that it *will* come to pass; furthermore, waging wars as such is not a secure methodology for sustainable peace, as the violent internal disintegration of Iraq after the war has shown.

On the claim of Iraq being in possession of WMD, the Prime Minister remained adamant that they would be found. However, now he asserted that it would take time to find them, and was pleading for patience: "I keep saying to people, be patient about this. People [...] [say] there will be no weapons of mass destruction. Just wait and have a little patience."<sup>194</sup> This is exactly the patience asked of Blair and Bush by Hans Blix in the run-up to the war, who demanded to be given more time, whilst Blair was adamant that time was running out and thus Blix's request was denied by both the US and the UK. By July 2004, Blair finally

---

<sup>193</sup> Blair, 2003c: *Prime Minister's speech to the US Congress - 18 July 2003* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page4220.asp>

<sup>194</sup> Blair, 2003d: *Prime Minister interviewed on Iraq, WMD, Europe and the Euro - 31 May 2003* [www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3797.asp](http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3797.asp)

admitted that: "I have to accept, as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the time of invasion, Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy."<sup>195</sup> So, one year after the war on Iraq, the Prime Minister had to conclude that he erred on the principal reason for going to war. As a result, thousands have died and, despite the positive outcome of having disposed of Saddam Hussein, the country remains unstable and caught up in spiralling violence.

The question thus arises: has the Prime Minister's foreign policy conduct within the framework of the War on Terror been consistent with the values and morality that he often gave as a reason for intervention?

## **CHAPTER III – MORALITY IN PRACTICE**

---

<sup>195</sup> Blair, 2004



The last chapter has at length debated Blair's role in the New World Order and his moralistic justifications for the consequences of the establishment of the New World Order as favoured by the American neo-conservatives.

Of particular interest in the following chapter will be whether his moral rhetoric was consistent with the resulting actions in the cases of intervention.

### **III.1 - LEGITIMACY**

In order to evaluate whether the first and foremost tenets of morality as an argument for intervention were given in the cases considered, it is imperative to establish whether the interventions were legitimate and hence justified on a legal and/or conventional basis.

The UN Charter is generally recognised as providing a cohesive framework of when an intervention is justified. Article 39 states that:

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."<sup>196</sup>

Article 41 states that, rather than resorting to armed confrontation, the preferred way of enforcing the Security Council's decision is by means of coercion through sanctions and the like. Only if that should also prove to be futile does the Security Council allow for armed force (Article 42). Article 51 furthermore grants the members of the United Nations the right to self-defence in case of an armed attack occurring. Applying Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to the interventions the British armed forces have undertaken under Blair, it becomes

---

<sup>196</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VII <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

apparent that most of them do not qualify as being legitimate under the auspices of the Charter.

In the case of the aerial bombardment of Iraq in 1998, the UN Security Council did not “authorize the use of force in the event of non-compliance”<sup>197</sup>. Hence, the action was illegitimate as well as debased of legal standing.

Kosovo proved to be a more problematic issue. Again, the UN was bypassed. However, as Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector of the United Nations University points out, “neither the UN Charter nor the corpus of modern international law incorporates the right to humanitarian intervention”<sup>198</sup>, which poses a problem, since it has been recognised that humanitarian intervention might be deemed necessary (such as in the cases of Rwanda in the 1990s or East Timor in the 1980s and 1990s). Blair attempted to establish his own legitimising framework for when humanitarian intervention was necessary and deemed so by his perception of ‘moral common sense’ in 1999. Whether one agrees to his guiding principles being sufficient (or rather, providing a legitimate framework) or not, the NATO attacks on Serbia were, under UN jurisdiction, illegal. In Thakur’s opinion “the Kosovo war was a major setback to the cause of slowly but steadily outlawing the use of force in solving disputes except under UN authorization”. And thus:

---

<sup>197</sup> Chomsky, 2000: *Rogue States – The Rule of Force in World Affairs* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press); p.13

<sup>198</sup> Thakur, 2000: *The UN and Kosovo’s Challenge of “Humanitarian Intervention”*  
<http://www.isanet.org/archive/kosovoandun.html>

“the justification for bypassing [the UN] to launch an offensive war remains problematic, and the precedent that was set remains deeply troubling for having posed a fundamental challenge to the normative architecture of world order.”<sup>199</sup>

As the previous analysis has shown, Blair, despite his belief in communitarianism and the existence of an international community, which can be said to be constituted by the United Nations, has chosen to align Britain with the United States as their staunchest ally, even when it leads to defying the United Nations. Consequently the performance of their allied interventions - most of which were carried out in order to secure and advance the American interests (including Kosovo, as Condoleezza Rice suggested in her 2000 *Foreign Affairs* article), bypassed the United Nations, and were offensive - affirmed Thakur’s concerns.

The attack on Afghanistan was legitimate insofar as there was a UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force, since 9/11 was judged as an ‘armed attack’ which then, under Article 51 of the Charter, gave the United States the right to self-defence.

However, it was Iraq in 2003 that proved to be the boldest assault on the authority of the United Nations. Apart from lacking authorisation by the Security Council, the US and UK dealt preventively under the assumption of an unproven threat. Since that was the main reason given for the war, it did not officially fall under the guidelines of humanitarian intervention. Pre-emption legally qualifies as an illegitimate offence; nonetheless. Rice tried to present the attacks as a *response*: according to her, there are times “when you can’t wait to be attacked to respond”<sup>200</sup> Following this logic, the pre-emptive attacks could be said to

---

<sup>199</sup> Ibid

<sup>200</sup> <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0617-04.htm>

constitute "anticipatory self-defence"<sup>201</sup>. This is in defiance of every established international convention and thus illegal as well as illegitimate.

### **III.2 - JUST WAR**

The second point to be considered is the principle of 'just war'. The guidelines for a war to be deemed just have been discussed for millennia; it is a rather philosophical question that seeks to provide highly practical answers. Some of the philosophers concerned with the conundrum of just war have been Aristotle, Grotius, Hobbes and, more recently, Michael Walzer<sup>202</sup>.

After having analysed Tony Blair's and George W. Bush's moral rhetoric in the previous chapter, it has been established that they both reverted to religiously moral arguments of good versus bad, or right and wrong. Hypothetically, by making the case for war on moral terms, it is to be expected that the warfare consequently employed should be in accordance with the principles of just war in order to be morally justifiable<sup>203</sup>.

#### **III.2a - Just War Theory:**

The just war theory derives from a symbiosis of interlocking concepts.

Firstly, the principles of *Jus Ad Bellum* (law to war) and *Jus In Bello* (laws of war) should be established: The former is comprised of the "conditions under which it

---

<sup>201</sup> Coker, 2003; p.56

<sup>202</sup> Coady, in Meggle, 2005: *Terrorism, Just War and Right Response*; p.138

<sup>203</sup> Escapades such as the torture, abuse and humiliation at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba are in contravention of the Geneva Convention, but remain integral to the morally defined War on Terror. By labelling the prisoners 'illegal' or 'unlawful' combatants and thus denying them 'Prisoner of War' status, the US have tried to make the case that the Geneva Convention does not apply.

can be right to resort to a war"<sup>204</sup>. Whether these are given can be established by examining whether there is a just cause (such as self-defence as a response to an armed attack); whether the response is legitimate and legal; or whether there is a possibility of resolving the conflict without violence, and thus whether a war can truly be considered to be a means of last resort. The Jus Ad Bellum can thus be summarised as the "Principle of Legitimate Authority"<sup>205</sup>

The latter should be applied once the Jus Ad Bellum has been established and signifies "permissible methods by which we should wage a legitimate war"<sup>206</sup>  
The principles applied to establishing what are permissible methods are:

The Principle of Discrimination: "This limits the kind of kind of (*sic*) violence that can be used, principally by placing restrictions on what count as legitimate targets"

The Principle of Proportionality: "This limits the degree of response by requiring that violent methods used do not inflict more damage than the original offence could require"<sup>207</sup>. Furthermore:

The Principle of Double Effect: "An unintended but foreseen morally bad effect of an action can be excused, if the action itself as well as its intended effect are morally permissible"<sup>208</sup>

---

<sup>204</sup> Ibid

<sup>205</sup> Bauhn, in Meggle, 2005; *Political Terrorism and the Rules of Just War*; p.125

<sup>206</sup> Coady, in Meggle, 2005; p.138

<sup>207</sup> Ibid

<sup>208</sup> Bauhn, in Meggle, 2005; p.132

All these principles are basically concerned with the protection of non-combatants. There are several philosophical discourses on who these non-combatants are; however, in this discussion they shall be specified as the civilian populations excluding politicians. It is asserted that non-combatants enjoy immunity; since their well-being cannot be granted in a war, the above principles have been established to limit the destructive effects wars have on the civilian populations (or, as the term has been coined, 'collateral damage'). According to Bauhn, this was deemed necessary because of the "idea of persons having *moral rights* to basic goods, such as life [...] and physical integrity"<sup>209</sup>(his italics). Furthermore, and important in the discourse of this paper, Coady included another principle in relation to the War on Terror: The "use of terrorism to combat terrorism should be ruled out"<sup>210</sup> Overall, Meggle states that "wars [...] which are not just wars are [...] a crime against humanity"<sup>211</sup>

### **III.2b – The Just War Theory Applied to Blair's Wars:**

In all the wars hitherto discussed, Blair tended to revert to moral arguments as a justification for attack. The just war principles as laid out above applied to the wars (particularly Afghanistan and Iraq 2003, thus the War on Terror) should amply establish whether his claim to the wars being fought on the premise of morality can prevail.

The Jus Ad Bellum principle, or legitimacy, has been discussed in the previous section. It has been concluded that, except for the war on Afghanistan,

---

<sup>209</sup> Ibid, p.126

<sup>210</sup> Coady, in Meggle, 2005: p.145

<sup>211</sup> Meggle, in Meggle, 2005: *Terror and Counter-Terror: Initial Ethical Reflections*; p.175

all other wars have been fought without explicit authorisation of the United Nations Security Council; that they were offensive wars; and that pre-emption under established conventions is not permissible. Hence, they were illegitimate under the Jus Ad Bellum Principle.

The Jus In Bello principle should provide guidelines along which it should be possible to recognise whether the methods employed in fighting these wars were permissible in moral terms.

Firstly, the Principle of Discrimination: This places limits on morally permissible targets. These, in return, are established by whether they infringe on non-combatant immunity. Thus, to target hospitals, schools, sewage- or water treatment plants etc. is morally impermissible.

As a NATO spokesperson during the Kosovo war admitted, they were targeting power plants, which led to disruption of water supplies as an expected "secondary effect".<sup>212</sup> In Afghanistan, several civilian targets were struck, such as the village of Khorum, "where a number of civilians were reportedly killed; and [...] on 16 October [...] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warehouses in Kabul [were attacked]"<sup>213</sup>

Professor Marc Herold compiled a dossier on the civilian casualties of the Afghanistan war. In it, he also lists some of the civilian targets:

"On Oct. 15, U.S bombs destroyed Kabul's main telephone exchange, killing 12. In late Oct., U.S warplanes bombed the electrical grid in Kandahar knocking out all

---

<sup>212</sup> <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990526a.htm>; see also

<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990524a.htm>

<sup>213</sup> <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110222001?open&of=ENG-AFG>

power [...] On Oct. 31, it launched seven air strikes against Afghanistan's largest hydro-electric power station adjacent to the huge Kajakai dam, 90 kilometers northwest of Kandahar, raising fears about the dam breaking. On Nov. 18, U.S warplanes bombed religious schools [Madrasas] in the Khost and Shamshad areas."<sup>214</sup>

This bombing of civilian targets also continued in Iraq, although much of the Iraqi civilian infrastructure had been pre-destroyed in the 1991 Gulf War and had not been repaired due to sanctions.

Secondly, the Principle of Proportionality. Here, the War on Terror is of specific interest, since it is presented as a response to the 11 September terrorist attacks. Both Afghanistan and Iraq have been presented as attacks conducted within the framework of the War on Terror. According to Marc Herold, whose dossier on civilian casualties in Afghanistan is deemed authoritative because of its detailed collection of media sources such as the Associated Press or the BBC, the "low count" of civilian casualties amasses to 3,035 deaths (between the start of the campaign and 7 February 2002)<sup>215</sup>. The indirect consequences of the attack (such as people starving because aid agencies could not deliver emergency relief due to the war) have been assessed much higher.

Iraq's civilian casualties also amount to a number of several thousand. According to an Associated Press study, conducted between 20 March 2003 (the first day of the war) and 20 April 2003 alone, one month of fighting in Iraq brought about a civilian body count of at least 3,240.<sup>216</sup> Data gathered by IBC (Iraq Body Count), an organization of American and British researchers, states the minimum number of civilian deaths at 8,235 and the maximum at 10,079 as

---

<sup>214</sup> [http://www.j-n-v.org/AW\\_briefings/ARROW\\_briefing011.htm](http://www.j-n-v.org/AW_briefings/ARROW_briefing011.htm); see also [http://www.cursor.org/stories/casualty\\_count.htm](http://www.cursor.org/stories/casualty_count.htm) for a full list compiled from reliable media sources

<sup>215</sup> [http://www.j-n-v.org/AW\\_briefings/ARROW\\_briefing011.htm](http://www.j-n-v.org/AW_briefings/ARROW_briefing011.htm)

<sup>216</sup> <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0610aptallies.htm>



of 7 February 2004.<sup>217</sup> IBC works similarly to Marc Herald in that it uses media reports to establish its numbers. It also gives a minimum and maximum in order to allow for mistakes or numbers lowered or raised for propaganda purposes.

Examined with respect to the Principle of Proportionality, it becomes obvious that the civilian casualties (or collateral damage) in the War on Terror far exceeds the number of casualties of the World Trade Center attacks, which CNN on 29 October 2003 stated to be 2,752<sup>218</sup>. According to the just war theory, this disproportionality (even when the casualties of Iraq and Afghanistan are taken separately) is in breach of the principle and thus renders the War on Terror unjust, which makes it difficult to sustain an insistence on having acted within a framework of morality.

Furthermore, the means employed to fight the wars in discussion were questionable. For example, in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, cluster bombs were used. These are dropped from aircraft and at preset times they release submunitions, which are supposed to explode on impact. Coker states that they then function just like "victim activated" landmines."<sup>219</sup> UNICEF also warns of cluster bombs: "If they do not explode on impact, these function just like anti-personnel mines"<sup>220</sup>, which have been largely condemned as unethical. Another weapon that conflicts with the just war theory is the so-called Daisy Cutter (MOAB – Massive Ordnance Air Blast), a bomb that, according to a document published by the Department of the US Air Force "kills by way of blast or

---

<sup>217</sup> [http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial\\_feb0704.htm](http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial_feb0704.htm)

<sup>218</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/29/wtc.deaths/>

<sup>219</sup> Coker, 2003; p.46

<sup>220</sup> [http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Unicef\\_mine\\_action\\_strategy\\_2002\\_2005.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Unicef_mine_action_strategy_2002_2005.pdf)

fragmentation". It destroys everything within its blast radius. Its "intent is to demoralize or frighten the enemy by impressing them with the large footprint [or blast radius], resulting cloud, and tremendous noise of the explosion", which, according to this document, does not constitute suffering<sup>221</sup>. In other words, the intention is to terrorise everyone who witnesses the explosion. As Coady has established, it is not permissible to fight terrorism with terror.

The last substance to be reviewed is Depleted Uranium (DU). This radioactive substance is applied to shells to harden them in order to destroy tanks and other armoured vehicles and was used in Kosovo and in Iraq since the first Gulf War. On impact, DU is released, which can enter the body by inhalation and through wounds. Disproportionally high cancer rates and birth defects have been recorded in areas where DU ammunition was used. Officially, the harrowing effects of Depleted Uranium have been refuted. However, both the World Health Organisation and the British Ministry of Defence issued hazard warnings, which could be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the dangerous effects of DU. Personnel are thus advised to

"Avoid the surrounding area by at least 50m [... and] NBC rubber gloves or leather gloves and a dust mask, such as Mask, Air Filtering Disposable should be worn. [...] any nose/mouth and glove protection [should be] maintained until *contaminated* clothing has been removed."<sup>222</sup> (emphasis added)

The WHO stated: "small children could receive greater exposure to DU when playing in or near DU impact sites. Their typical hand-to-mouth activity could lead to high DU ingestion from contaminated soil"<sup>223</sup>.

It has been recognised that children continue to pose the biggest risk-group, since they are prone to playing with discarded DU shells. According to

---

<sup>221</sup> [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/moab.pdf](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/moab.pdf)

<sup>222</sup> [http://www.mod.uk/issues/depleted\\_uranium/gulf\\_safety\\_instructions.htm](http://www.mod.uk/issues/depleted_uranium/gulf_safety_instructions.htm)

<sup>223</sup> <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/index.html>

Professor Guenther, he noticed children in Iraq playing with DU projectiles that had been painted on to look like dolls.<sup>224</sup> Should more independent studies be conducted on the birth defects and other illnesses (which has been demanded by human rights groups), linking them to the effects of Depleted Uranium, then Tony Blair's moral argument could indeed be condemned as being immoral.

### **III.2c – Were the Interventions Moral?**

The examination of Britain's involvement in the discussed wars in relation to the Just War theory has shown it to be immoral, since it did not fulfil the basic principles on basis of which a war can be said to be just. In addition, the use of some of the weaponry in itself refutes the claim to morality, for it is indiscriminate and both cluster bombs and DU will pose a threat for the civilian populations (particularly children) for years to come. Blair's assertion of being involved in a fight between good and evil, civilisation and barbarity can thus be seriously questioned and has been discredited by the way these wars have been fought.

## **IV - CONCLUSION**

During his first two terms, Tony Blair has proved to be a strong-minded Prime Minister with regards to foreign affairs, who, once a problem is acknowledged, ensues with determination and conviction, which can undoubtedly be identified as him trying to act according to his beliefs. This is particularly true of his Christian beliefs, for it follows his own convictions of identifying good and evil and then unhesitatingly acting with determination. Thus it can be said that he was true to his words and did let his moral compass guide him. However, as the previous chapter shows, the means to which he resorted in order to deal with 'evil', when examined along established philosophical guidelines of morality, were morally highly questionable and often did not lead to satisfying ends. The

---

<sup>224</sup> Guenther, 2000: *Uranium Projectiles: Severely Maimed Soldiers, Deformed Babies, Dying Children* (2<sup>nd</sup> extended version, Freiburg: Ahriman-Verlag); p.22

bombardment of Iraq in 1999 proved to be futile, since it did not bring about a change in Saddam Hussein's conduct. Kosovo was presented as a victory; however, many scholars pointed out that the intervention in many cases actually led to Serbs retaliating against Albanians in response to the air strikes (and thus *caused* ethnic cleansing). Also, many of the direct consequences of the intervention, which were ethically questionable, were largely omitted in the political and media discourse following the war. Will Bartlett lists some of them:

"The difference in the reaction to ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Albanians after the war; the lack of concern for the suffering of civilians in Serbia, [...] the lack of consideration that the policy of air strikes would itself prove to be a humanitarian disaster; and the negative attitude to the migration of refugees and asylum seekers."<sup>225</sup>

Retaliation for the 9/11 attacks was taken against Afghanistan, although most of the terrorists were Saudi nationals. It rid the country of the ultraconservative Taliban regime, but also paved the way for a huge renewal in poppy cultivation, an oil pipeline infrastructure and the rule of warlords, and Afghanistan thus recoiled to a quasi-feudalist system.

The war on Iraq in 2003 did bring about regime change (which officially had not been the aim), but in its aftermath failed to bring forth proof that Saddam Hussein had posed a threat to 'the civilised world' (much less an 'imminent threat'). The campaign left the country in turmoil, with Iraqi civilians as the principal victims of the war and of the subsequent suicide bombings, which had been hitherto unheard of in Iraq. Iraq, the secular state that in the 1970s and 1980s was virtually considered a developed country, an ally of the West, with high literacy rates and a – for Middle Eastern countries – exemplary

---

<sup>225</sup> Bartlett, in Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000; p.143

integration of women, now faces a highly uncertain future. Saddam Hussein is in custody on charges of human rights abuses, which hardly anyone would doubt is a highly positive outcome; but it is not obvious where Iraq is headed and whether it will be able to stop the current cycle of violence, and to what ends.

Thus, having intervened in the name of morality is questionable in basic moral terms. It can be assumed that Blair actually believes his moral judgement is right and irrefutable – however, as Richard Little observed, “Moral crusades [...] do not necessarily bring about moral outcomes.”<sup>226</sup>

Regardless, Blair remains certain that he will be vindicated: “That is something I am confident history will forgive”<sup>227</sup>

The common denominator in the interventions is the active involvement of the United States in order to further their national agenda – namely the securing and advancement of global American primacy. To use Brzezinski’s analogy, these wars were part of a game of geo-strategic chess, with the outcome still undecided. If the American’s play it well, they will win – and the world will be held in checkmate. Hypothetically, this might actually lead to a peaceful time for the world, but whether that would be so and what will happen as this dangerous game unravels remains highly uncertain.

Tony Blair has knowingly asserted himself by the side of the United States and willingly played a role in the establishment of the New World Order. This ensures that, in this game, Britain is not merely rendered a pawn. Also, it is a

---

<sup>226</sup> Little, in Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000;p. 262

<sup>227</sup> Blair, 2003c

sign of Blair's assumption that America will win, which would leave Britain on the side of the winner and would prove Blair right in having asserted on numerous occasions that Britain is a "force for good"<sup>228</sup> in the world. And it would be then, in those expected peaceful times, that he could hope for history forgiving his moral crusades, which have been fought by immoral means in the name of establishing a new world order – an era of peace and prosperity for all.

## Appendix

# Feiner:

r41: "Geopolitik ist für Brzezinski folglich eine Methode, mit der sein Konzept von Weltordnung in eine praktische Strategie umgesetzt wird."

r48: "Die moralische Dimension und damit verbunden die Verpflichtung zur *World Leadership* bei Brzezinski wird insofern deutlich, als er diese Position nicht als das Resultat einer beabsichtigten Politik der USA, sondern als eine historische Fügung darzustellen versucht. [...] Mit der Interpretation, das weltpolitische Engagement der USA sei nicht das Resultat ihrer nationalen Interessen, sondern ihnen von einer übergeordneten Instanz, 'der Geschichte', verstanden als Vorsehung, zugewiesen worden, verleiht

---

<sup>228</sup> e.g. <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1722.asp>

Brzezinski der Position der USA eine moralische Überhöhung, wie sie in der amerikanischen Tradition des Exzeptionalismus generell zu finden ist.“

**Krell:**

n144: “Die Mehrheit der relativen Entscheidungsträger [...] setzt sich aus zwei Gruppen zusammen: aus alten ‚Hardlinern‘ aus der Zeit des kalten Krieges, die sich an Kategorien der Macht, insbesondere militärischer Macht orientieren, und aus christlich-fundamentalistischen und nationalistisch ausgerichteten Neokonservativen.“

## **VI - BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### **Primary Sources: Speeches and Documents**

-all internet sources last accessed 15.10.2005 – 21.10.2005-

**Blair, 1997a:** *Labour Party Conference Speech*

<http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=47983>

**Blair, 1997b:** *Lord Mayor of London's Banquet 1997* [http://www.number-](http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1070.asp)

[10.gov.uk/output/Page1070.asp](http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1070.asp)

**Blair, 1999a:** *Chicago Doctrine*

[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair\\_doctrine4-23.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html)

**Blair, 2001a:** *Prime Minister Tony Blair statement in response to terrorist attacks in the United States - 11 September 2001* [http://www.number-](http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1596.asp)

[10.gov.uk/output/Page1596.asp](http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1596.asp)

**Blair, 2001b:** *Labour Party Conference Speech, 3 October 2001*; in Richards, 2004

**Blair, 2001c:** *Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons following the September 11 attacks - 14 September 2001* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1598.asp>

**Blair, 2002a:** *Prime Minister's speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library - 7 April 2002,* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1712.asp>

**Blair, 2002b:** *At Best when at Our Boldest – 1 October 2002* <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/IRAQ/TB011002.HTM>

**Blair, 2003a:** *Prime Minister statement on Iraq - 25 February 2003* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3088.asp>

**Blair, 2003b:** *Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate - 18 March 2003* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp>

**Blair, 2003c:** *Prime Minister's speech to the US Congress - 18 July 2003* <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page4220.asp>

**Blair, 2003d:** *Prime Minister interviewed on Iraq, WMD, Europe and the Euro - 31 May 2003* [www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3797.asp](http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3797.asp)

**Blair, 2004:** *Statement on the Butler report - 14 July, 2004* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/3054991.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3054991.stm)

**Bush, George, 1990:** *Address by the President of the United States – 11 September 1990;* <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r101:4:./temp/~r101gdZgw5:e0>:

**Bush, George Walker, 2001b:** *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People - 20 September 2001* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

**Bush 2001a:** *Remarks by the President - 16 September 2001* <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0109/S00071.htm>

**Bush, 2001c:** *Bush Says U.S. Proud to Lead Fight Against Terrorism - 17 September 2001* [http://www.usembassy.it/file2001\\_09/alia/a1091715.htm](http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_09/alia/a1091715.htm)

**Bush, 2002a:** *State of the Union Address 2002 – 29 January 2002* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>



**Bush**, 2002b: *Remarks by President Bush at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. 1 June 2002*  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/westpoint.htm>

**Rice**, Condoleezza, 2000: *Promoting the National Interest*:  
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5-p60/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html>

*Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VII:  
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

*Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - the assessment of the British government*, 2003: <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page271.asp>  
*Joint Vision 2020*, 2000: <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm>

*Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century*, 2000:  
<http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>

*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002:  
[www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html)

US General Accounting Office, 1994: *Iraq – U.S. military items exported or transferred to Iraq in the 1980s*; <http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9498.htm>

### **Primary Sources -Books:**

**Blair**, Tony, 1996: *New Britain – My vision of a young country*, London: Fourth Estate

**Brzezinski**, Zbigniew, 1986: *Game Plan – a Geostrategic Framework for the conduct of the US – Soviet contest*, Boston & New York: Atlantic Monthly Press

**Brzezinski**, Zbigniew, 1997: *The Grand Chessboard - American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books

**Huntington**, Samuel, 1996: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, London: Simon & Schuster

**Richards**, Paul [ed], 2004: *Tony Blair in his own Words*, London: Politico

---

### **Secondary Sources – Documents and Analyses:**

-all internet sources last accessed 15.10.2005 – 21.10.2005-

**Howard, Michael, 2001:** *Analysis of the Terrorist Crisis*

<http://english.pravda.ru/main/2001/11/01/19888.html>

**Ikenberry, G. John, 2002:** *America's Imperial Ambition*

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020901faessay9732/g-john-ikenberry/america-s-imperial-ambition.html>

**Thakur, Ramesh, 2000:** *The UN and Kosovo's Challenge of "Humanitarian Intervention"*

<http://www.isanet.org/archive/kosovoandun.html>

*The Spectator*, April 5, 2003

<http://www.lewrockwell.com/spectator/spec52.html>

*Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004*

<http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/report/report.pdf>

### **Secondary Sources – Books and Journals:**

**Bartlett, Christopher.J., 1992:** *'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945*, London & New York: Longman

**Baylis, John, 1981:** [\*Anglo-American defence relations 1939-1980\*](#), London: Macmillan

**Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 2004:** *The Choice – Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York: Basic Books

Central Office of Information, 1993: *Britain and the Gulf Crisis*, London: HMSO

**Chomsky, Noam, 2000:** *Rogue States – The Rule of Force in World Affairs*, Cambridge, MA: South End Press

**Coates, David and Krieger, Joel, 2004:** *Blair's War*, Cambridge & Malden: Polity Press

**Coker**, Christopher, 2003: *Empires in Conflict – The Growing Rift between Europe and the United States*, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

**Dale**, Graham, 2000: *God's Politicians - The Christian Contribution to 100 Years of Labour*, London: HarperCollins

**Dumbrell**, John, 2001: [\*A special relationship : Anglo-American relations in the Cold War and after\*](#), Basingstoke: Macmillan

**Feiner**, Sabine, 2000: *Weltordnung durch US-Leadership? Die Konzeption Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's*, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag

**Gamble**, Andrew, 2003: *Between Europe and America – The Future of British Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

**Hoogevelt**, Ankie, 2001: *Globalization and the Postcolonial World – The New Political Economy of Development*, 2<sup>nd</sup> revised edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave

*Hutchinson's Dictionary of World History*, updated version 1998, Oxford: Helicon Publishing

**Guenther**, Siegwart-Horst, 2000: *Uranium Projectiles: Severely Maimed Soldiers, Deformed Babies, Dying Children*, 2<sup>nd</sup> extended edition, Freiburg: Ahriman-Verlag

**Kampfner**, John, 2003: *Blair's Wars*, London: Free Press

**Krell**, Gert, 2003: *Arroganz der Macht, Arroganz der Ohnmacht – der Irak, die Weltordnungspolitik der USA und die Transatlantischen Beziehungen (Report 1/2003)*; Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK)

**Little**, Richard and Wickham-Jones, Mark [eds], 2000: *New Labour's Foreign Policy – A New Moral Crusade?* Manchester: Manchester University Press

**Meggle**, Georg [ed] 2005: *Ethics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag

**Ovendale**, Ritchie, 1998: *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century*, New York, St Martin's Press

**O'Sullivan**, Meghan, 2003: *Shrewd Sanctions – Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution

**Pilger**, John, 2002: *The New Rulers of the World*, London & New York: Verso

**Rentoul**, John, 1996: *Tony Blair*, London: Warner Books

**Riddell**, Peter, 2003: *Hug Them Close – Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'Special Relationship'*, London: Politico's Publishing

**Seldon**, Anthony, 2004: *Blair*, London: Free Press

**Shapiro**, Ian, 2003: *The Moral Foundations of Politics*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press

**Stiglitz**, Joseph, 2002: *Globalization and its Discontents*, London: Penguin

**Toennies**, Merle [ed], 2003: *Britain under Blair*, Heidelberg: Universitaetsverlag Winter

## **Secondary Sources – Internet sources (in order of appearance)**

-all last accessed 15.10.2005 – 21.10.2005-

<http://www.worldbank.org>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zbigniew\\_Brezinski](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zbigniew_Brezinski)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John\\_Macmurray](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Macmurray)

<http://johnmacmurray.gn.apc.org/DiscoveringMacmurray.htm>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/otr/intext92-93/Blair17.1.93.html>

<http://www.margarethatcher.org/Speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=105971>

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/swa-ops.htm>

<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1084>

<http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>

<http://www.fbi.gov/mostwanted/topten/fugitives/laden.htm>

<http://books.guardian.co.uk/writersreflections/story/0,,559970,00.html>

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/Policybrief17.pdf>

<http://staff.stir.ac.uk/david.miller/publications/opinion-polls.html>

<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,917298,00.html>  
<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0617-04.htm>  
[http://www.channel4.com/news/2003/02/week\\_1/06\\_dossier.html](http://www.channel4.com/news/2003/02/week_1/06_dossier.html)  
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990526a.htm>  
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990524a.htm>  
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110222001?open&of=ENG-AFG>  
[http://www.j-n-v.org/AW\\_briefings/ARROW\\_briefing011.htm](http://www.j-n-v.org/AW_briefings/ARROW_briefing011.htm)  
[http://www.cursor.org/stories/casualty\\_count.htm](http://www.cursor.org/stories/casualty_count.htm)  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0610aptallies.htm>  
[http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial\\_feb0704.htm](http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial_feb0704.htm)  
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/29/wtc.deaths/>  
[http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Unicef\\_mine\\_action\\_strategy\\_2002\\_2005.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Unicef_mine_action_strategy_2002_2005.pdf)  
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/moab.pdf>  
[http://www.mod.uk/issues/depleted\\_uranium/gulf\\_safety\\_instructions.htm](http://www.mod.uk/issues/depleted_uranium/gulf_safety_instructions.htm)  
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/index.html>  
<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1722.asp>

## **Statutory Declaration**

I hereby declare that I have written this thesis on my own, without anyone else's help. I have also, to the best of my knowledge, acknowledged the sources of all passages and ideas used, and have placed in quotation marks all quotes used verbatim. I have used no other sources or aids than those indicated.

This thesis contains 21.736 words

Alissa Nordmeier

Berlin, 25 October 2005

*Alissa Nordmeier*

