European Integration and National Identity – a comparison of the development of political parties’ positions on Europe in the UK and Germany

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04.04.2012
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0 Introduction

Germany is generally regarded as one of the most Europhile and the UK as one of the most Eurosceptic member states. Germany is the “good pupil” of Europe and Britain the “awkward partner”. The scope of this work shall be to illuminate reasons, objectives and origins of positions towards European integration, to show and compare the development of political parties’ positions in the last decades, and to illustrate deviations from the common perception of Britain being Eurosceptic and Germany Europhile. Euroscepticism will thereby be illuminated before the background of national identities.

The conceptions of national identity in Britain and Germany are deeply rooted in the history of these two countries. The underlying narratives of Germany’s and Great Britain’s self-image could not differ more strongly: Britain’s identity is based on the belief in its long history of continuity, of its always having been first: Sovereignty of Parliament and rule of law in Great Britain go back to the 13th century; since the 16th century no revolutions have taken place and Britain was the first country to be industrialised. Beside history and politics also Britain’s island status has made it different to the continent. The most common narrative of British history has been that of British exceptionalism. As a consequence, there are major fears in Great Britain that European integration threatens the sovereignty of its Parliament, or, in Thatcher’s words, that Britain has just “so much more to lose” than other European countries (in Mautner 2001: 11).

A common German historical narrative is that of the German Sonderweg and of Germany being the “verspätete Nation”. Both countries seem to understand their history as being special or exceptional but whereas Britain’s exceptionalism is based on its always being early, Germany’s “special path” is based on its being late: In the 19th century, when the other Western countries developed increasingly democratic structures, Germany was militarised and authoritarian. According to the Sonderweg narrative this “late” development again facilitated the later NS regime.

As a consequence of the Second World War Germany had a low degree of national identity, which is often cited as a reason why Germany became the “good pupil” of Europe: The lack of national identity was substituted by integration in Europe. Beside conflicts over national and European identity other sources for Euroscepticism will be presented and assessed with regard to how they are reflected in the positions of political parties. The positions of Conservative and
Labour in the UK and the CDU/CSU and SPD in Germany will be analysed for periods of government and opposition respectively. In the case of Germany, the positions of the FDP and Greens will also be briefly explained for periods where they have contributed to Germany’s European policies in coalition governments. However, as the focus of this work lies on the comparison of the positions of the two major parties of both countries, the description of the Greens’ and the FDP’s positions will remain marginal. The development of positions will be explained in the time period from the end of the Second World War until the Schröder and Blair governments. This time period has been chosen as it allows for an analysis over a time span long enough to study the development of party positions in both phases of government and opposition at different crossroads of European integration. A relatively strong attention will be given to the period after German reunification due to its significance for Germany’s role in Europe and to the deepening of integration in the 1990s. The aim of this work will be to illuminate the potential for conflict European integration had on political parties’ policy formulation, or rather to show how national identities have influenced the formulation of European policies of the major parties in the UK and Germany. There are of course other factors such as state structures and the political system that influence party positions. These will be mentioned briefly as they may be interlinked with national identity, but will not be the focus of attention. Neither will be the development of the positions of the media or public opinion. Instead European integration is understood as an elite driven project, i.e. public opinion will be mentioned when it influences parties’ positions but will not be studied separately.

In their study on party responses to European integration, Marks and Wilson rebut the widely spread hypothesis that “party family is not significantly associated with party position on European integration” (Marks, Wilson 2000: 441) but state that variations in positions on Europe tend to be much lower within party families than variations within single countries (cf. Marks, Wilson, 2000: 439). The scope of this thesis also includes the elaboration of how this applies to parties in Germany and the UK, i.e. what has shaped their positions more significantly: identification with their party family or their country.
1 European and national identities in the UK and Germany

1.1 The relationship between national and European identity and Euroscepticism – a definition of terms

1.1.1 National Identity

The link between culture and politics has received increased attention as the integration of Europe has proceeded. Zygmunt Baumann speaks of “identification as a never-ending, always incomplete and open-ended activity in which we are all, by necessity or choice, engaged” (Demossier 2007: 54). Also European integration is a still on-going process in which all European citizens are, by necessity, involved. So, their identification with Europe evolves and sometimes causes conflicts with their national identities.

Dieter Langewiesche describes national identity as the product of national self-images that help us to understand the history of our country and create a sense of belonging. These images are the result of historical developments and powerful myths of origin which influence political action (cf. Langewiesche 2008: 154).

National identity is not only built on a shared history but also on a shared culture. In this context, Marion Demossier cites Ross (2000: 40) who argues that culture is the “basis of social and political identity” and a

framework for organising the world, for locating the self and others in it, for making sense of actions and interpreting the motives of others in it, for grounding an analysis of interest, for linking collective identities to political actions and for motivating people and groups towards some actions and away from others” (in Demossier 2007: 51)

Langewiesche describes national identity as a means to unify the nation against others but also points to the fact that national self-images are not static but can change and also be exploited to assert certain interests:

Sie postulieren Werte, die beanspruchen, für die gesamte Nation verbindlich und ewig gültig zu sein, doch sie gehen aus historischen Entwicklungen hervor, werden also geschaffen, verändern sich und bleiben umstritten. Deshalb gehören nationale Selbstbilder zu den Mitteln, die in den Meinungskämpfen um die Gestaltung der Zukunft von allen eingesetzt werden, die sich an diesen Kämpfen beteiligen (Langewiesche 2008: 154).
The latter who are involved in these “wars of opinion” are to a very large extent party elites as has been acknowledged by Marcussen and Roscher. Elites “are constantly required to justify – and adjust – their actions in order to gain the support of their electorates and constituencies” (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 328). One means of justification can be the promotion of certain nation state identities. How political elites in Germany and the UK tried to shape national identities before the background of European integration will be elaborated in the following chapters.

1.1.2 European Identity

The underlying argument of this thesis is that a common European identity has an important effect on support for European integration and therefore Euroscepticism (cf. Fuchs et al. 2009: 108). It should therefore be clarified what can be understood by a common European identity and how it relates to national identity and Euroscepticism. Speaking about a European identity one first has to establish what people understand by “Europe”. Astrid Kufer states that

The meaning of ‘Europe’ still appears to be quite abstract for many citizens today, mainly due to natural, linguistic and financial barriers and a lack of personal contact with other Europeans (Kufer 2009: 38).

As a consequence, cultural and political elites play an important role in “establishing and communicating a common meaning of ‘Europe” (Kufer 2009: 38). Also the concept of “Europe” can be defined either from a cultural point of view as “Europe-as-culture” (Kufer 2009: 39) or from a more political point as a reference to “the processes of EU-integration and its symbols and institutions” (Kufer 2009: 40) in the sense of a “Europe-as-EU” (Kufer 2009: 39). As the latter implies a socialisation process Kufer assumes that this form of identification is stronger in long-term member states and those who are part of the monetary union (through the symbol of the euro) (cf. Kufer 2009: 39f.). She confirms her assumption with the fact that in long term member states such as Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands the euro is rather regarded as a positive characteristic of the EU (cf. Kufer 2009: 48). The fact that Germans first rejected the euro but now appreciate it further proves her point.

Kufer defines ‘culture’ according to Ross (1997) as a “system of meaning that people use to manage their daily worlds”, which she interprets as referring to the “commonly shared framework of language, knowledge and world-views of a given society” (Kufer 2009: 36). The cultural identification with Europe in the sense of a “wider Europe as a community of values” (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 333) has been
especially strong during the Cold War in differentiation to ‘the other’, meaning Eastern Communist states.

Kufer assumes that the more European citizens share a common view and definition of ‘Europe’, the more likely it is that they will develop a European identity (cf. Kufer 2009: 37). This argument reflects a “constructivist perspective” (Fuchs, Guinaudeau, Schubert 2009: 92). This perception assumes that a collective identity can be based on “any commonalities or differences, be they geographical, physical or cultural, sociological or political”. The European integration has led to “numerous economic and political commonalities, i.e. the four liberties (of persons, goods, capital and services) or the ‘Euro’” (Fuchs at el. 2009: 93) that could foster the identification process.

In short, Fuchs et al. conclude from their empirical study, in which they evaluated findings from a Eurobarometer survey from 2004 on citizens’ identification with Europe, that a common European identity exists, but concede that their study could not answer “how resilient the existing European identity is and secondly, how European identity can be strengthened and fortified” (Fuchs et al. 2009: 109).

On the other hand, there are some authors, who subscribe to the ‘no-demos thesis’ which describes “the idea that a European demos is not conceivable in the absence of a shared ethnic identity” (Leconte 2010: 63). In their view, a European identity is not possible as there are “not enough European reference points to support a European identity” (Fuchs et al. 2009: 92). These authors explain their assumptions with the argument that “there is no evolution of an affective attachment to the EU by the citizens” (Fuchs et al. 2009: 92).

Furthermore, McLaren argues that people perceive European integration as a threat to their own national identity and that rather than rationally calculating costs and benefits of integration they fear the loss of influence of the nation-state (cf. McLaren 2002: 554). She argues that citizens were “socialized to accept the power and sovereignty of the nation state (McLaren 2002: 555) and therefore consider the transfer of power to the European Union as a threat (cf. Fuchs et al. 2009: 94). The reactance theory by Lilli develops McLaren’s theory further and comes to the conclusion that because of this negative correlation between national and European identity the two are mutually exclusive (cf. Fuchs et al. 2009: 95). This essentialist view stands in contrast to the constructivist perspective and claims “that there is no future for European identity (…) unless it becomes a replica of the nation-state” (Demossier 2007: 59). According to this point of view also the emergence of democracy is only possible on the nation state level (Leconte 2010:63).
Yet, to conclude with Fuchs et al., the arguments for a European identity and therefore the existence of multiple identities are more dominant and also “more plausible” (Fuchs et al. 2009: 95). Besides, Demossier also points to Craig Calhoun (1994) who argues that the problem of both constructivist and essentialist theories is that they “downplay the idea of choice” (Demossier 2007: 59) as they are built on the idea that identities are created by external forces (cf. Demossier 2007: 59). Demossier further agrees with the idea that constitutional patriotism in the sense of Habermas, which defines a “new type of post-national citizenship founded in the existence of a shared political culture” that is emptied of any cultural meaning to avoid racism and xenophobia. She further points to the fact that in our global world the nation state may “no longer sufficient or effective in regulating social relations and economic change” (Demossier 2007: 63), which further supports her point that different forms of identity will continue to exist and develop next to each other.

Nevertheless, the democratic deficit and lack of a European public sphere have regularly been cited as sources for Euroscepticism. Public debates usually remain confined to national public spheres (cf. Koopmans 2007: 183), which is to a large extent due to the fact that there are no European wide and very few transnational media (cf. Jarren, Donges 2002: 108). In summary, it can be said that the democratic deficit and lack of a European public sphere give rise to scepticism concerning a European political identity (cf. Leconte 2010: 62).

1.1.3 National identity – inclusive vs. exclusive identities

Fuchs et al. state that it has been established from the socio-psychological discussion that multiple identities, i.e. a European identity alongside the national or regional identity, are possible and even normal in Europe (cf. Fuchs et al. 2009: 94). It might seem logical to assume that people with a strong national identity are susceptible to Euroscepticism (cf. Leconte 2010: 91). Accordingly, the example of Germany’s weak national identity and relatively strong support for European integration is often presented as an argument for this hypothesis. However, there are also Eurosceptic countries with low national pride such as Latvia or the Czech Republic (cf. Leconte 2010: 92). This can be explained by the fact that “a weak collective identity can exacerbate fears of being ‘diluted’ in the process of European integration” (Leconte 2010: 93). On the other hand, there are countries where both attachment to the nation and attachment to Europe decrease.

It has therefore to be taken into account that there is no direct causal relation and that even a strong national identity “can both reinforce and undermine support for
European integration” (Hooghe, Marks 2004: 416). The ‘no-demos thesis’ that can lead to the assumption that national and European identities are mutually exclusive (cf. Fuchs et al. 2009: 95) has been especially popular in Great Britain (Kuhne 2006: 1). British national identity is exclusive, whereas Spanish, German and, as it happens, also Scottish and Welsh national identities are inclusive, i.e. they can feel a strong connection to their own country and Europe at the same time (cf. Hooghe, Marks 2004: 416). Hooghe and Marks argue along this line that citizens with a strong national identity “are more, not less, likely to identify with Europe” (Hooghe, Marks 2004: 415). At the same time, the strong national pride of the English seems to be a hindrance to identification with Europe. Hooghe and Marks therefore assume that, as (inclusive or exclusive) identification with the European project is “constructed through socialization and political conflict” (Hooghe, Marks 2004: 417), political elites play a major role in the shaping of European identities. They further hypothesise that in countries where the national elites support European integration national identity will be positively associated with European integration, whereas in “countries where the political elite is divided on the issue, national identity is likely to rear its head” (Hooghe, Marks 2004: 417).

They prove this hypothesis by the fact that there are some countries with a high rate of exclusive national identity but which still favour European integration:

In Portugal, exclusive national identity depresses a citizen's support by just 9.5%. In the UK, at the other extreme, the difference is 29.5% (Hooghe, Marks 2004: 417).

Their explanation for this phenomenon is the influence of political elites, or more specifically, their division on the question of European integration. The following chapters on party positions in the UK will prove their point.

1.1.4 Euroscepticism – a definition

According to Cécile Leconte the term Euroscepticism was created during the debate on the EC in Britain in the 1980s. Leconte cites Harmsen and Spiering who explain that the term was first published in an article in The Times in 1985 and initially described the ‘anti-Marketeers’ until it was popularised in Thatcher's Bruges speech in 1988 (cf. Leconte 2010: 3).
Leconte further explains the term Euroscepticism in its literal sense. Eurosceptics to Leconte are therefore those who submit the issue of European integration to a sceptical examination: support for European integration should not derive from any theoretical or normative belief (for instance, the belief that an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe is necessarily a good thing) but must be assessed on the basis of practical cost/gains analysis and according to its respect of national (political, cultural, normative) diversities. In this sense, the Eurosceptic opposes, to the ‘dogma’ of an an ever closer union, a pragmatic stance, evaluating European integration on its merits (Leconte 2010: 5).

In the current academic discourse the term Euroscepticism describes various forms of opposition to European integration (cf. Leconte 2010: 4) that differs according to the specific country context (cf. Leconte 2010: 4). The most acclaimed distinction between different kinds of Euroscepticism has been developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak. They differentiate between Hard Euroscepticism,

where there is principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Taggart, Szczerbiak 2008: 7),

and Soft Euroscepticism,

where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory (Taggart, Szczerbiak 2008: 8).

Cécile Leconte provides a more detailed distinction, namely:

utilitarian Euroscepticism, which expresses scepticism as to the gains derived from EU membership at individual or country level; political Euroscepticism, which illustrates concerns over the impact of European integration on national sovereignty and identity; value-based Euroscepticism, which denounces EU’s ‘interference’ in normative issues; and cultural anti-Europeanism, which is rooted in a broader hostility towards Europe as a continent and in distrust towards the societal models and institutions of European countries.

A prime example for utilitarian Euroscepticism is Margaret Thatcher with her ‘I want my money back’ claim but also the discourse in Germany about being the ‘paymaster of Europe’ falls under this category (cf. Leconte 2010: 49). Political Euroscepticism includes scepticism towards supranationalism and the pooling of sovereignties but also criticism of the EU’s democratic deficit or the
creation of European symbols to foster a common identity (cf. Leconte 2010: 50ff.). Value-based Euroscepticism denotes scepticism about the interference of the EU in matters where value systems are at stake, e.g. abortion, divorce etc. Cultural Euroscepticism is typical for the British debate (cf. Leconte 2010: 4) and can mean different things: the conviction that Europe as a civilisation has no common historical or cultural roots and therefore does not exist, the 'no demos argument', i.e. a common identity cannot exist without a shared ethnicity, the typically British notion that the EU is built on specifically continental European values that defy (neo-) liberal traditions and presuppose a strong role of the state or even ethnocentrism and xenophobia, or, in particular with regard to British tabloid press, Germanophobia (cf. Leconte 2010: 61ff.).

1.2 British national identity in the European context

1.2.1 Is there a common 'British identity' including all the nations of Great Britain?

Britain can be seen as a Eurosceptic nation in which national identity clearly exceeds a European sense of belonging as has been reflected in different Eurobarometer surveys over the years (cf. McCormack 2005: 70f.). Accordingly, it has been argued that the strong attachment to national identity in Britain is the reason for the country’s reluctance to commit itself to the supranational structures of the European Union (cf. McCormack 2005: 72). On the other hand, rising fragmentation of Britishness has led to devolution and increased assertion of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish interests and cultural confidence. Hence, Euroscepticism can be regarded as an English phenomenon (cf. McCormack 2005: 72). McCormack cites Haesly (2001) who points to the quite positive attitudes many Scots and Welsh have towards European integration (in McCormack 2005: 72).

It should therefore be noted that when talking about British identities in the European context one is talking about a fragmented identity: Britain has its own set of identity questions alongside the question of a European identity.
1.2.2 Development and characteristics of the British national identity

Vernon Bogdanor summarises the stark differences in the lessons drawn from the Second World War in Germany and Great Britain in the following:

For Britain, the war seemed to have shown not the weakness of nationalism and the need for supranational organization; rather, it had shown what could be done with the force of British patriotism (Bogdanor 2005: 691).

Whereas the War destroyed the basis for German patriotism it provided for a strengthening of British national pride – with far reaching consequences for European integration as will be elaborated in the following. In short, what in Germany was identified as the cause of the problem was the solution from the British point of view.

It is a widespread feeling in Britain that identifying with Europe will lead to a loss of national identity (cf. Smith 2006: 434). This is a logical consequence of the fact that British national identity has to a very large extent been constructed against continental European identity, which has become the “other”. “There can be no ‘us’ without a ‘them’” (Mautner 2001: 5) and the “them” for Britain is continental Europe. Mautner explains this fact, that European integration can cause “a crisis of identity” (Mautner 2001: 4) partly with the nature of nationalism, for which Smith (1991: 74) has established the following premises:

1. The world is divided into nations, each with its own individuality, history and destiny.
2. The nation is the source of all political and social power, and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances.
3. Human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and realise themselves.
4. Nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in the world (Smith 1991: 74 in Mautner 2001: 4f.).

The above mentioned “keywords” “individuality, history, destiny, loyalty, identification and freedom” (Mautner 2001: 5) closely relate to the notion of British exceptionalism.

The British identity is based on “cultural, political and religious factors in English history” (Smith 2006: 433). To this has to be added the geographical factor of the British “Island myth” (Mautner 2001: 7), i.e. Britain’s “insular, geopolitical situation” (Smith 2006: 433). The latter also serves as the basis for the Smith’s essay on the roots of British Euroscepticism “Set in the Silver Sea”. The title is taken from a poem by 14th century poet John of Gaunt. This poem reflects very well the British self-image of their special island status, which is one characteristic of the notion of
British exceptionalism or even superiority: Britain, in contrast to Europe is protected by invasion as it lies

in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands (in Smith 2006: 438 f.)

Closely linked to the island myth is the self-image of being a “sea-faring nation establishing links with countries all over the world rather than just those on the continent of Europe” (Mautner 2001: 8). This self-image explains not only the British Atlanticism and its close ties to Commonwealth countries but also the fact that Britain was not part of the first phase of European integration in the 1950s. The latter was summed up nicely by The Independent on 14 March 1995 as ‘Empire Blood Proves Thicker than Water’ (cf. Mautner 2001: 9).

The political culture in Britain is commonly portrayed as being very different to that on the continent: The British political system has basically not experienced any changes since the Glorious Revolution in 1689 “which established a parliamentary monarchy and emphasized the undivided sovereignty of Parliament” – a “sovereignty which the European Community was, in practice, if not in theory, to undermine” (Bogdanor 2005: 695). The common history writing in Britain stipulates that British history is characterised by continuity and stability – as expressed in its unwritten constitution (cf. Bogdanor 2005: 695). Closely interlinked with this narrative is the notion that Britain has always been early (cf. Ward 2004: 111): It was among the first countries to have a parliament and was the cradle of industrialisation.

In short, Britain not only has not a close geo-political link to Europe but also feels that its institutions are superior to those on the continent in general and those of the European Union in particular. Margaret Thatcher expressed this feeling quite clearly in a House of Lords Debate in 1993 by saying,

We have so much more to lose by this Maastricht Treaty than any other state in the European Community

or later in her autobiography: if I were an Italian, I might prefer rule from Brussels too (in Mautner 2001: 11).
These statements show how the British self-image is constructed against Europe, ‘the other’: “Britain is talked up by talking Europe and Europeans down” (Mautner 2001: 12). John of Gaunt’s poem shows that this representation of Britain as being different and therefore to some extent superior was not invented by Thatcher but goes back long in history and therefore represents an important pillar on which British national identity has been constructed.

The notion of British exceptionalism also has religious reasons: The Puritan strand of Protestantism prevalent in Britain reflected the sense of exceptionalism distinct from Popish Europe and legitimised its colonialist endeavours:

English Puritan concept of ethnic election was similarly conditional: God would cherish his chosen English people only so long as they obeyed His commandments and performed the tasks with which He had entrusted them, in this case the strict observance of the true faith, its defence against Popish enemies, and where necessary, its imposition on unwilling parts of the English commonwealth, such as Ireland (Smith 2006: 443).

To sum up, Britain’s national identity is built on geographical, historical, political and even religious pillars and, most importantly, has experienced a continuous development over many centuries. What is more, its identity has to quite a large extent been constructed in opposition to Europe.

1.3 German national and European identity

1.3.1 Development and characteristics of the German national identity

Langewiesche summarises the historical narrative that has characterised the German self-image in the following:

Deutschland – eine verspätete Nation, die einen Sonderweg in die Moderne gegangen ist, abseits der westlichen Vorbild-Nationen (Langewiesche 2008: 146).

The term “verspätete Nation” was coined by the philosopher Helmuth Plessner. It means that the national self-image of Germans formed very late, only in the 19th century as compared to the 16th and 17th century in other European states. According to Plessner, it was impossible for Germany to catch up with this historical delay (cf. Langewiesche 2008: 146f.).

Closely linked is the concept of the German Sonderweg, i.e. the fact that the process of democratisation and parliamentarisation set in much later in Germany than in other Western states as it was hindered by the institutional structuring in the
unification of Germany in 1871. This, it is argued, not only led to the First World War but also the National Socialist regime (cf. 161f.). Nationalist feelings that accompanied the unification of Germany and climaxed during the Nazi era had already reared their heads in the wars of liberation when the argument circulated that Germans were God's chosen people (cf. Kämper 2001: 90).

Götz explains that in the decades leading to unification in 1871 still two different concepts of ‘people’ (Volk) persisted in Germany: the ‘demos’ concept, which describes a ‘nation of choice’ (Willensnation) and was prevalent during the 1848 uprising, and the ‘ethnos’ concept that defined the people by its ethnical roots. However, after the unification in 1871, the ‘ethnos’ concept prevailed, authoritarian, anti-democratic tendencies grew and German nationalist, anti-modern and anti-Semitic forces and imperialistic ambitions were set free (cf. Götz 2011: 118).

The origins of the concept of the German Sonderweg go back to the social-democrat opposition who first described the institutional structuring of the newly built German nation state as an obstacle to progress (cf. Langewiesche 2008: 162). One of the first German Sonderweg historians was Hugo Preuß who explained the German “otherness” (Anderssein) by the contrast between the authoritarian state and the people’s state (Gegensatz von Obrigkeitsstaat und Volksstaat). At the same time, he presented England as the “mother country of modern governance” (Mutterland moderner Staatsführung) (cf. Langewiesche 2008: 164). He declared England the “politically most apt nation in the modern world” who evolved into a modern state in the course of a 1000-year development (cf. Langewiesche 2008: 165). The reference to Britain’s 1000-year development might be a bit misleading here, as from this may be deduced that German history only starts in 1871. Of course, German history includes the Holy Roman Empire and is deeply rooted in Western culture and Christianity. The point is that whereas Germany does look back to a shared history of values, it does not have the experience of being a nation that Britain has. The Sonderweg interpretation of German history builds on this basis of Christian Western culture but then describes how from 1871 on, Germany took the Sonderweg in history which describes an anti-Western aberration (cf. Langewiesche 2008: 162).

After the war, chancellor Konrad Adenauer “considered the firm anchoring of post-war Germany in Western Europe as the best way of overcoming another Sonderweg” (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 341). This new European identity was built in contrast to Germany’s nationalist and militarist past and also against the
communist regimes of the East. Or, “in other words, Germany’s own past, as well as communism, constituted the “others” in this identity construction” (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 341). Marcussen and Roscher argue that political actors can change national identities during “critical junctures”, i.e. “perceived crisis situations occurring from complete policy failure but also triggered by external events” (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 330f.). The end of the Second World War constituted such an event: The Nazi ideology was perceived as having failed, opening up an “ideational space” that gave elites the possibility to promote “new ideas about political order and about nation-state identity” (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 331).

In short, Germany had to completely re-build its national identity: The expansionist, authoritarian, nationalist and militarised Germany was to become Europeanised and democratic according to “Thomas Mann’s dictum that ‘we do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany’” (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 340).

Before the background of the very late development of German parliamentarism as compared to the long history of the British parliament the strong attachment to parliamentary sovereignty of the British becomes more understandable – as does the consequently much greater power of the British parliament (cf. Winter 1999: 28). Accordingly, these historical developments explain why the German parliament has comparatively little power as its influence is confined by the German Constitutional Court and federal structures. On the other hand, however, these federal structures resemble the EU’ multi-level level structures and together with Germany’s Europeanised identity made it much easier for Germany to confer power to supranational structures (cf. Krell 2009: 412).

However, before the background of the German history of National Socialism the question of the German self-image remains sensitive. Ute Pannen states that the atrocities of National Socialism made the construction of a German national identity almost impossible: Germans certainly could not build their identity on their history. According to Pannen, the GDR established their national identity instead on the cult around leading figures such as Stalin and Lenin and the Federal Republic of Germany on the German Wirtschaftswunder and new symbols such as the label Made in Germany and the D-Mark (cf. Pannen 2007: 278). Also Germany’s powerful welfare state and its democratic constitutional order are elements of national pride (cf. Götz 2011: 127). Besides, from the 1980s on, Germany developed some pride in its leading role in ecological development (cf. Götz 2011: 135).

The still ambivalent feelings Germans have towards their own identity shall in the following be explained on the basis of the controversy around Hans Haacke’s
Reichstag decoration “Der Bevölkerung” in the year 2000. The title refers to the inscription on the front of the Reichstag building “Dem Deutschen Volke” and therefore criticises that nationality is automatically linked to ethnicity, i.e. *ius sanguinis* in contrast to *ius solis*. Haacke himself explained that he considers the term *Volk* as being exclusive and racist (cf. Pannen 2007: 285). The term *Bevölkerung* on the other hand is more inclusive, which is again in line with the fact that Haacke defines himself as a constitutional patriot (cf. Pannen 2007: 284), i.e. adopts an understanding of patriotism which is devoid of any national and by extension exclusive feelings but is built on common political and constitutional values.

In the course of the debate Haacke also had to defend himself against the critique that his work of art could conjure up the national socialist *Blut und Boden* ideology as the surrounding area of the inscription “Der Deutschen Bevölkerung” is filled with soil, and some CDU Parliamentarians claimed that substituting *Volk* with *Bevölkerung* was unconstitutional (cf. Pannen 2007: 283). The Bundestag finally voted for the realisation of the installation but only after a long and protracted debate which circled around the question if Germans can or should develop a “normal” relationship to their country comparable to that of the French or British (cf. (Pannen 2007: 294). The stark contrast to the latter’s completely different historical development explains to some extent the Germans’ conflictual relationship with their own national identity and the insistence of some parliamentarians on the term “Volk”: Whereas Britain’s tradition as a nation goes back many centuries, Germany is still a young nation and has not had as much time to identify what it means to belong to this nation. Or, as Steven Wall, former Private Secretary to John Major, explained it from John Mitterrand’s point of view, “Germany was a people, not a state or a nation” (Wall 2008: 116) – a statement which explains very well the adoption of the ‘ethnos’ concept in 1871 and, most strikingly, also captures the debate today.
1.3.2 European identity – a complement or substitute for German national identity?

In 1996, chancellor Helmut Kohl said in front of the ‘Deutschland-Stiftung’:

_Europäische Identität ist kein Gegensatz zu unserer nationalen Identität. Liebe zum Vaterland, Liebe zu Freiheit, Patriotismus und einer europäischen Gesinnung dürfen in Deutschland nie wieder getrennte Wege gehen._

In this definition by Helmut Kohl national identity in Germany is inseparably linked to its European identity which is in line with Thomas Mann’s demand to create a “European Germany”.

On the one hand, Germany’s anchoring in Europe was seen as a necessity in order to maintain peace and stability in Europe. On the other, Germany already took pride in its new role in an integrated Europe for it knew about its economic potential. Kurt Schumacher also expressed himself along this line of argument while stressing not only the importance of the German economy for Europe but also the fact that the German economic potential might serve as some sort of reparation for the destruction of Europe (cf. Kämper 2001: 92).

However, Germany’s building of its new Europeanised identity was not entirely unproblematic: Much emphasis was put on the fact that Germany is firmly rooted in the history and tradition of the _Abendland_, the West, i.e. in particular Western humanism. Kämper explains this collective argument as the logical reaction to the general assumption of the rest of the world that “all the Germans are Nazis, have become culpable, have foregone any claims to integration in the community of nations” (Kämper 2001: 95). Besides, in the search for reasons why National Socialism could come to power academics relied on processes from European or Western history as did Alfred Weber in his “End of History”. However, one conclusion that was drawn from this by Karl Jaspers was that it was not the Germans “who were responsible for committing the most dreadful atrocities, but Europeans” (Jaspers1986: 264 in Kämper 2001: 98). By declaring National Socialism a “crisis of the West” (Kämper 2001: 100) “German guilt was relativised and glossed over by means of its Europeanisation” (Kämper 2001: 101).

In summary it can therefore be said that in the early years after the Second World War European identity was not only a substitute for the lack of a national identity but it also helped to relativise Germany’s dreadful past. Or, as Marcussen put it,
Germany re-established its identity against its own past, seen as ‘the other’ (Marcussen, Roscher 2000: 341).

2 The development of parties’ positions on Europe

2.1 The early years of integration

2.1.1 Party positions in the UK

In the inter-war years, there were calls within the Labour Party for an integrated Europe: In 1927, later foreign minister Ernest Bevin called for the establishment of the “United States of Europe”. However, he already clarified that this could not exclusively be realised in the form of a political union but rather on the basis of economic integration (cf. Krell 2009: 211). Parts of the Labour party pursued this policy until the late 1930s when later finance minister Hugh Dalton even declared the following:

It must be a first principle of our action to dilute national sovereignty as much as possible over as wide an area as possible (in Krell 2009: 211).

Also the later Prime Minister Clement Attlee was of the opinion that “Europe must be federate or perish” (in Krell 2009: 211). However, when in government, Labour’s official stance shifted towards opposition to European integration, even though a significant minority still supported the idea that a group of socialist European countries could act as a third force between the USA and the Soviet regime (cf. Krell 2009: 212).

Labour’s opposition to integration can on the one hand be explained by nationalist reasons, i.e. the fear of Britain losing its status as a world power, its special relationship with the US and close ties to the Commonwealth. On the other, they feared to lose control over economic governance with detrimental consequences for British workers (cf. Krell 2009: 212).

Unlike in Germany, in the UK both major parties were hugely Eurosceptic in the early years after the War. There was, however, a small group of so called “Strasbourg Tories” such as Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys who supported the European project (cf. Baker et al. 2008: 97). Also Winston Churchill had famously called for a “United States of Europe” but by this he meant that Britain should be “with Europe, but not of it” (Churchill cited in Bogdanor 2005: 690). Britain
should act as a “sponsor”, i.e. preserve its role as a world leader, “sustain the Anglo-American alliance and avoid risking disloyalty to the traditions of Britain’s Empire and Commonwealth” (Crowson 2007: 15). Churchill was also involved in the United Europe Movement (UEM) launched by his son-in-law, Strasbourg Tory Duncan Sandys. At one of the UEM’s congresses Churchill spoke out for an economic and political cooperation and even a “parallel policy of political unity” (in Crowson 2007: 15). But, as Crowson notes, “Churchill’s European rhetoric was symbolic, lacking in specifics: the details and practicalities were for others to sort out” (Crowson 2007: 15). The pro-European discourse of these prominent Tories “raised expectations about the likelihood of a positive British European policy” (Crowson 2007: 16), which were, however, shattered when the Conservatives entered office in 1951 (cf. Crowson 2007: 16). Instead, it turned out that when speaking about “European unity” Conservatives actually meant “the defence of Europe”, i.e. a united Europe could act as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, which was in line “with a particular reading of history” that saw Britain’s role in helping to “resist the domination of Europe by an aggressor. whether it was Elisabeth I, Henry IV’s Grand Design, the Holy Alliance, the Congress of Vienna or the congress system” (Crowson 2007: 17).

Furthermore, Britain under Conservative rule in the early 50s already made it clear that Britain was not willing to give up any of its sovereignty to a supranational organisation (cf. Crowson 2007: 15). Patriotism was at its height after the War: Churchill praised Britain’s “finest hour” (Bogdanor 2005: 691) and, as Bogdanor notes, for Britain, the experience of the war did not necessitate a supranational organisation but had proven Britain’s own strength.

2.1.2 Party positions in Germany

In the years after the War, for the major part of the governing CDU/CSU the peace settlement for Germany and the political organisation of the European Union were two sides of the same coin. Hence, German politics could only be European politics (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 292). Adenauer wanted to give German people and especially Germany’s demoralised youth a new political perspective that was worth commitment.
For him, this perspective were the “Federal States of Europe” and he endorsed the Schuman plan, the first step towards integration with the words:

Wir wollen ihn, wie alles, was zum Zusammenschluss Europas führt … Wir werden unsere Jugend im Geiste der europäischen Gemeinschaft erziehen (Kleinmann 2005: 292)

Typical for the CDU’s identification with Europe was its emphasis on the common consciousness of commonalities of the culture of the Christian West („abendländische Kultur“). This also found expression in its commitment within the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI), an association of European Christian parties or factions (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 293). Kleinmann argues that this dedication goes back to internationalist endeavours of political Catholicism in the inter-war period (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 292). Besides, a Christian Democrat government was well suited to bring forward European integration as Christian Democrat parties look back at a long tradition of affinity to supranational institutions – the church – and accordingly, a rejection of nationalism (cf. Marks, Wilson 2000: 451) as allegiance of the church had been stronger than allegiance to the nation. What is certainly true is that the return to Christian values signifies a clear break with the nationalist Right that had gained momentum ever since Bismarck and, from the Sonderweg perspective, paved the way for National Socialism.

In short, the Union parties in the early after-war years shaped their image as the “pro integration” party – an image that they also used in the election campaigns, during which it was explicitly claimed that Christian parties are much more integrationist than socialist parties (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 297). However, there were also other opinions within leading CDU politicians: Minister of the Interior Gustav Heinemann (who later joined the SPD) and Minister for All-German Affairs Jakob Kaiser took on a more national Conservative stance which was reflected in a more distanced relation to the Western powers. Instead, they spoke out for a more neutral status because of Germany’s middle position (“Mittellage”) by means of a Christian Socialism that could build a bridge between East and West (cf. Schukraft 2010: 31) – a position comparable to that of the Labour Party.

The SPD on the other hand opposed the Schuman plan because of its supposedly capitalist and cartelist character (cf. Schuhkraft 2010: 21) – a position comparable to Labour’s fears about disadvantages to British workers. More importantly, however, the SPD considered the reunification of Germany a pre-requisite for European integration (Krell 2009: 146). Without the context of the fear of European integration being an obstacle for German reunification the SPD’s stance would probably have
come as a surprise as the party had a rather long tradition of internationalism and had already pledged for the “Federal States of Europe” at its Heidelberg programme in 1925 (cf. Krell 2009: 146). Krell calls this statement a rather distant programmatic goal with little direct influence on policy formulation (Krell 2009: 146) but it should nevertheless be noted that the SPD put emphasis on a pan-European socialist cooperation.

Furthermore, Krell points to the fact that the emphasis on reunification before Western, and therefore European, integration could also be explained by biographical aspects as 50 of the 131 SPD Parliamentarians were refugees from the former East of Germany (cf. Krell 2009: 147).

However, the SPD’s position changed gradually until party leader Herbert Wehner officially declared that the SPD’s support for Germany’s integration in the West and Europe – a step that was made necessary by foreign policy realities and electoral considerations (cf. Krell 2009: 149).

2.2 Positions from the 1960s until German reunification

2.2.1 The evolution of positions in Britain

2.2.1.1 Positions within the Labour Party

The Labour party’s position on Europe from the 60s to the early 90s has experienced many shifts, which to a large part were influenced by politics of opposition and electoral strategy reasons. After Harold Macmillan announced Britain’s membership application in 1961, Labour’s president Hugh Gaitskell famously evoked the idea of Britain’s entry into the EEC representing “the end of a thousand years of history” (in Krell 2009: 214). Interestingly, Labour presented itself as the “guardian of the British nation-state” (Featherstone 1988: 54 in Krell 2009: 214) and thereby claimed territory that has traditionally been occupied by the Conservatives – a strategy that, according to Krell, served electoral as well as partisan purposes (cf. Krell 2009: 214). To support its stance, the Labour party emphasised the importance of relations with the Commonwealth for different reasons: They claimed that external economic relations with the Commonwealth had an important influence on the costs of living in Great Britain and would help to sustain Britain’s role as a world power. Some on the Left of the party also emphasised the Commonwealth’s role as a “nucleus of a better world society” (Krell 2009: 214), i.e. they argued that the Common Market would stop developing countries from selling agricultural products in Europe and thereby damage their
trade (cf. Forster 2002: 40). Alongside these arguments a typically left-wing argument also figured, namely that the Common Market would be harmful to working class interests (cf. Forster 2002: 40).

In the following years however, the party became increasingly divided on the issue – a development which was influenced by a shift in public opinion: The ailing British economy stood in contrast to an increasingly prosperous European economic climate and membership with the EEC was thought to be advantageous for research and innovation which the British economy needed. Besides, Labour became increasingly critical towards the special relation with the USA due to the Vietnam War (cf. Krell 2009: 215).

This development led to Labour MPs voting for Britain’s second application to join the EEC with Wilson’s 1967 bid. However, Labour formulated certain requirements for Britain’s entry into the EEC in order to protect Britain’s national interests. Krell in this context points to the fact that interestingly, only one of the five requirements, namely the national command over the economy, can in the broader sense be described as a typical demand of the political left. The other requirements all reverberate the classical articulation of national interests more typical of Conservative parties (cf. Krell 2009: 216).

Krell describes this shift of Labour’s European positioning as a general rethinking of Britain’s relations with Europe that took place in the late 1960s. However, Labour’s stance on Europe in the 60s and 70s was still very volatile and reflected the deep divisions within the party. Labour Leader and Prime Minister Harold Wilson himself changed his position on Europe several times (cf. Krell 2009: 215). By 1975, however, he and his government had adopted a pro-integration stance which stood in contrast to the opinion of large parts of the party (cf. Krell 2009: 217): Labour left-wingers such as Barbara Castle and Tony Benn initiated a referendum against EEC membership and campaigned with right-wing Conservatives such as Enoch Powell against their own party (cf. Crowson 2007: 41).

Krell makes the point that Labour’s positioning on Europe has always been influenced by Labour’s role in the political process and therefore, by electoral strategies (cf. Krell 2009: 221; 227). So, shortly after Labour was defeated in the elections to the House of Commons in 1979 they shifted back towards opposition to European integration (cf. Forster 2002: 68) and in their 1983 election manifesto Labour demanded withdrawal from the EC. The reasons cited against integration were national sovereignty and the belief that the EC was a stumbling block for
socialism. Besides, paradoxically, also the socialist tradition of internationalism, which has often been cited as an argument for the approval of integration by left parties, played a role in Labour’s rejection of integration: In the early 80s the EC comprised only nine members and therefore appeared to Labour as a rather exclusive circle – as opposed to the much bigger community of the Commonwealth (cf. Krell 2009: 223).

Due to this new shift in the positioning on Europe divisions within the party aggravated. When at the Labour Party Conference in October 1980 five million to two million party members voted to withdraw from the EC prominent members (David Owen, William Rodgers and Shirley Williams) left the LP and founded the SDP (Social Democratic Party) (cf. Forster 2002: 68).

However, the Eurosceptic shift brought Labour no electoral gains as the defence of national sovereignty was a topic already occupied by the Conservatives under Thatcher. Labour’s devastating defeat in the 1983 elections therefore triggered again a process of re-orientation (cf. Krell 2009: 229) that finally led to a new shift towards support for a stronger European integration in opposition to Thatcher. This process was also supported by the gradual shift towards approval of European integration by the British unions (cf. Krell 2009: 234). Jacques Delors’ efforts to support the concept of a Social Europe played an important part in gaining the support of the unions (cf. Krell 2009: 235). Conversely, Labour’s support for Europe was again a reaction to Thatcher’s concept of Europe. She saw the Treaty of Rome as “a charter for economic liberty” that was now “under attack from those who see European unity as a vehicle for spreading Socialism” (Thatcher’s Bruges speech, in Krell 2009: 237).

2.2.1.2 Positions within the Conservative Party

Also within the Conservative Party many major shifts of opinion on the issue of European integration have taken place and have led to several major divisions within the party.

Harold Macmillan’s first bid for entry in 1961 came at a time when Britain’s demise as a superpower became evident and joining the Six was presented as the answer (cf. Crowson 2007: 28). Unlike within the Labour party, sovereignty was not an issue but instead, “entry was presented as a free trade exercise” (Crowson 2007: 28).
In 1970, the next Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath launched Britain’s third bid for entry. In the resulting vote in the House of Commons in 1972, sixteen Conservative MPs voted against the party line and four abstained from the vote. These divisions within the party culminated in the 1974 general elections when Enoch Powell called on Conservative anti-Marketeers to vote Labour (cf. Crowson 2007: 40). In the following year, anti-Marketeers supported the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) initiated by Labour left-wingers. Divisions within the Conservative party were evident but Eurosceptics still had problems in winning the upper hand as they were seen either as “traitors or ‘Reds’” (Crowson 2007: 41). Also the national media were still mostly on the ‘Yes’ camp. The Times, The Daily Telegraph and the The Daily Mail still supported the ‘Yes’ campaign and only the Morning Star advocated leaving the EEC during the referendum (cf. Crowson 2007: 43).

But with the 1975 referendum “began a process of realignment” (Crowson 2007: 43) not only in the Labour but also in the Conservative party. The “gradual transformation of the Conservatives from the party of Europe into the party of scepticism” had begun. It was argued that Macmillan’s application was a step away from the traditional Conservative programme and might give way to socialism and play into the hands of Labour (cf. Crowson 2007: 44). Hence, the question over European integration had played a role in Heath’s downfall (cf. Crowson 2007: 40).

However, it would still take some time until the anti-Marketeers gained the upper hand. Crowson argues that between 1974 and 1979 the Conservatives “could still be broadly seen as the least divided of the main parties when it came to Europe. They were a pro-EEC party” (Crowson 2007: 45).

When Thatcher came to power in 1979 her aim was to re-establish national pride among a country confronted with rising unemployment, an economic crisis and riots. She therefore reinstated “a traditional concept of Britishness” which was “firmly based on Englishness” and was “exclusive rather than inclusive” (Ward 2004: 109). From this way of reasoning it is easy to deduct why for many Conservative Britons it was difficult to reconcile national identity and European integration (cf. Ward 2004: 110).

However, even when Margaret Thatcher was “hand-bagging Europe over budgetary contributions” (Crowson 2007: 51) she still advocated the Single Market that she hoped would foster free market ideals and limit the influence of Communist parties (cf. Crowson 2007: 51). Also the Single European Act (SEA) was a “British led initiative” (Crowson 2007: 51). It introduced the free movement of goods, services and people and “expanded the areas of EU interest to include foreign policy...
cooperation, the environment and social policy and increased the powers of the EP, giving it a veto over any single market legislation” (Crowson 2007: 51). The SEA was in Britain portrayed as a success for British leadership in Europe as it was supposedly advantageous for the City of London (cf. Crowson 2007: 51). At the time, the Conservative Party under Thatcher was still “the party of Europe, albeit on pragmatic pro-business grounds” (Geddes 2005: 122).

However, while for Thatcher the SEA was the final stage of the EEC, for other member states it was seen as a step towards further integration and expansion of the European Union to new policy areas (cf. Geddes 2005: 123). Crowson describes the SEA as “the beginnings of a gradual awakening period” (Crowson 2007: 53) that culminated in the realisation of the government’s failure to secure its aspired position in Europe as was reflected in Thatcher’s Bruges speech:

> We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels (in Crowson 2007: 53).

After this shift in position, Thatcher’s stance reflected not only the “combative and virulent Euroscepticism of a conviction politician” but was also the “product of a convert’s zeal” (Forster 2002: 81). She refused to sign the non-binding Social Charter which to her embodied “Marxist ideas of class struggle” (Geddes 2005: 123). This shift of opinion shows that Euroscepticism was now moving to the party mainstream (cf. Crowson 2007: 54), which led to major divisions within the party in the early 1990s and finally turned the party into the most Eurosceptic of British parties towards the end of the 1990s.

2.2.2 The evolution of positions in Germany

2.2.2.1 The development of positions within the SPD

As mentioned above, the SPD’s initial reservations about the European project soon gave way to support for European integration.

The Brandt government gave new incentives to European integration: It committed itself to strengthening the European institutions, in particular to strengthening the rights of a directly elected European Parliament, and to pushing forward European enlargement, most of all the accession of Great Britain (cf. Krell 2009: 150). The outstanding motive of Brandt’s European policy, according to Krell,
was, however, the creation of a social Europe as opposed to a „Europa der Geschäfte“:


Krell describes Brandt’s European policy as characterised by visionary ideas but points to the fact that it often failed to result in realo-political implementations. In contrast, he describes Schmidt’s European policy as more pragmatic (cf. Krell 2009: 150). Also, with regard to Brandt’s Ostpolitik, it can be said that he prioritised “the widening and democratisation of the EC during his Chancellorship over further steps towards European integration” (Sloam 2005: 17).

Krell denotes that Schmidt pursued little efforts to speed up political integration, which was largely due to the economic downturn in the 1970s, but instead put more emphasis on economic integration (cf. Krell 2009: 151). In general, the economic crisis fostered protectionism (cf. Kessler 2010: 121) and a greater emphasis on national interest also in Germany (cf. Kessler 2010: 122).

As the focus of this work is on the two major parties in each Germany and the UK, the European policy of the SPD’s coalition partner, the FDP, will not be discussed in detail. In general, it can, however, be noted that, acting as a “pivot” in the process of coalition building, the FDP “had a stake in maintaining the continuity of Germany’s stance on European issues” (Lees 2008: 27f.). The same is true for the CSU: Even though it has repeatedly shown Eurosceptic attitudes on the Ländere уровень it always reverted to the consensus on state level (cf. Lees 2008: 16). The latter shows the effect of the German electoral system that favours coalition governments which tend to be rather centrist.

2.2.2.2 The development of positions within the Union parties

In the article “Europa – Leitbild und Herausforderung” published in the KAS publication “Brücke in eine neue Zeit – 60 Jahre CDU” Hans-Otto Kleinmann praises the CDU as the most European party. And indeed, Adenauer’s European policy proved irreversible and paved the way for all other governments to come (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 301). Nevertheless, the determination of the Union Parties’ European policy did not always run smoothly, especially due to differences in opinion between the two sister parties CDU and CSU. One of the first of these differences occurred in the 1960s over the question whether to adopt a Gaullist or
Atlanticist vision of Europe. The Gaullist vision of Europe provided for a “Europe of nations” favoured by the French which is independent from the US, acting as a third force. In contrast to this, the Atlanticists aimed at a closer partnership with the US within an Atlantic system of interdependencies. The latter model was first and foremost adopted by prominent CSU politicians such as Josef Strauß and Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 302). Chancellor Kiesinger, however, refused to choose between these two options (cf. Schuhkraft 2010: 58) and, gradually, this conflict resolved and gave way to a more pragmatic policy including aspects of both concepts (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 303).

Like his predecessors, Kiesinger aimed at strengthening the Franco-German friendship, which first came under strain in the late sixties and Kurt Georg Kiesinger had to act as a mediator or “honest broker” between France and the UK (cf. Schuhkraft 2010: 57). Kiesinger’s efforts, however, did not bear fruits and de Gaulle rejected Britain’s second bid for entry in 1967 as he had its 1963 bid (cf. Schukraft 2010: 60). Besides, Kiesinger’s image as an “honest broker” suffered when his Minister of Finance, Franz-Josef Strauß and Minister of Economic Affairs, Karl Schiller, prevented the revaluation of the D-Mark in the 1968 currency crisis. Germany acted against the wishes of the European partner states, above all France, and openly asserted its national interest for the first time (cf. Schuhkraft 2010: 62).

When in opposition from 1969 on, Brandt’s “neue Ostpolitik” presented itself as another challenge for the Union parties as they feared that the new focus on the East could come to the detriment of the policy of Western integration (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 305). As Kleinmann points out, being in opposition gave the Union parties more leeway for conceptual development which led to a deepening of the European commitment and the concrete demand for a political union (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 305). Like the SPD under Brandt, the CDU also demanded the strengthening of the powers of the EP, which should be elected directly (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 307). Their claim for a widening of the competences of the EP, a better coordination of national economic policies and Community tasks, a better distribution of competences and further development of Community organs was part of a wider plan to fight the upcoming Eurosclerosis (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 311).

When back in power the new Conservative government followed the social liberal government’s policy which they had previously criticised for its strong pursuit of German national political interests (cf. Kessler 2010: 122). This was in particular the case with budgetary and economic questions. Otherwise, Kohl wanted to give new impetus to the European project, in particular the objective of a political union, which, however, according to Kessler, remained rather vague (cf. Kessler 2010:
123). Most importantly, the period of the Kohl government was strongly marked by the question of German reunification which raised fears of a too powerful Germany among its European partners. The government therefore emphasised its commitment to the European treaties and the German Grundgesetz or rather the reunification clause. This stance is reflected in Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s statement that summarises the continuity of the German position on Europe ever since Adenauer: “Deutschlandpolitik ist europäische Friedenspolitik.” (in Kessler 2010: 122).

3 European integration after German reunification – rising Euroscepticism and assertion of national interest

3.1 Britain in Europe post-Thatcher

3.1.1 “At the heart of Europe”? The Major government and Tory positions 1990-1997

Thatcher’s Bruges speech was the turning point in the British Conservatives’ relationship with Euroscepticism: According to Andrew Geddes, while it “did not change the substance of Conservative Government policy towards the EU, it did reconfigure Conservative political discourse on Europe and legitimised Eurosceptic opinion” (Geddes 2005: 115). In the sense of the Bruges speech, Europe was now in large parts of the Conservative Party seen “as a Franco-German plot with UK interests necessarily marginalised or a device to secure Socialist re-regulation of the UK economy” (Geddes 2005: 117). The Bruges speech had not only changed the Conservative discourse on Europe but also triggered enormous divisions within the party that centred around ideas about the state and national sovereignty (cf. Geddes 2005: 125). There were, however, different strands within Eurosceptic Conservatives. Geddes names anti-Marketeers, who had been against the Common Market from the start, neo-liberals, who saw the EU as a threat to the rolling back of the state, constitutionalists, who feared a threat to parliamentary sovereignty, and patriots and nationalists, who considered the EU a threat to British identity (cf. Geddes 2005: 127). To this can be added the hyperglobalists, i.e. neoliberals who emphasise the importance of an independent nation-state within a free-market, globalised world (cf. Gifford 2006: 853). In contrast to neo-liberals, hyperglobalists are strictly against further integration, whereas the former at least saw the single market/currency as a chance for free market development and might therefore be
ready to accept further integration (cf. Crowson 2007: 57f.). In short, they unite the neoliberal and nationalist strands within the Tories (cf. Marks, Wilson 2000: 455). Euroscepticism ran deep within the Tory party already in the early 1990s: 93% of Tories at the time were against the Social Chapter, 84% were against the rejection of the 48-hour week, 96% against the introduction of Works Councils and 71% believed that dirigisme at the European level was to blame for unemployment.

Taken together, this gives a picture of two out of three Tory MPs being Eurosceptic. In the government, on the other hand, supporters of European integration prevailed (cf. Schwarz 1996: 44f.).

John Major wanted to end Thatcher’s confrontational course on Europe, which was at least partly to blame for her demise (cf. Winter 1999: 47). Accordingly, Majors early statements on Europe sounded promising. In a speech in front of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung he claimed the following:

I want us where we belong. At the very heart of Europe. Working with our partners in building the future (in Winter 1999: 48).

Major’s big challenge was therefore to mediate between strong Eurosceptics and supporters of the European project within his party. This shows how also the political systems of countries influence EU politics: Britain’s first past the post system favours a two-party system in which the government has to better take into consideration backbench opinion (cf. Winter 1999: 31). This backbench Eurosceptic opinion, however, created major divisions within the party and led to Major having to endure repeated attacks on his leadership (cf. Crowson 2007: 61).

Gifford explains the rise of Euroscepticism with its “populist manifestation” (Gifford 2006: 854). With the general political discontent parties are inclined to resort to populism to gain support. Gifford cites Mair who states that in this case parties “are no longer partisan [and] claim legitimacy on the basis that they represent the mass of the people”. Gifford further describes how populism “appeals to a united people or nation against the existing power structures, which are accused of dividing it” and “dichotomizes complex political debates, not only into right and wrong and good and bad, but also into the nation and the ‘other’” (Gifford 2006: 855). In Britain this populism is founded in the “post-imperial crisis within the British political party system” (Gifford 2006: 856) and both Thatcherism and New Labour are popular movements that developed out of the two major parties but “aimed to transcend and marginalize the parties from which they sprang” (Gifford 2006: 856). In Britain’s imperial decline, Europe had taken the role of ‘the other’ and “Euroscepticism was a
way to appeal to the people outside of the mechanisms and institutions” (Gifford 2006: 856). Eurosceptics insinuated that the political elites could no longer be trusted as they let the British people be dominated by Brussels centralism (cf. Gifford 2006: 862) which was also characterised by fears of German domination (cf. Gifford 2006. 863). Hostility against Germany among the Conservative party culminated in 1990 when Nicholas Ridley called the monetary union a “German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe” (The Spectator, 22nd September 2011). In the early 1990s this Germanophobia reflected parts of the public’s opinion, among which the reunified Germany stirred fears of a new German hegemony: Whereas in 1977 “23 per cent believed that there was a strong possibility of the rise of Nazism within Germany”, “53 per cent held this view” in 1992 (Ward 2004: 110).

In short, Eurosceptics aimed at the ideological “cultural reworking” (Gifford 2006: 857) of their politics drawing on national myths and British national identity in “an appeal to the people based upon the cultural and symbolic construction of British exceptionalism” (Gifford 2006: 858) where the “freedom of the people was posited against a centralizing European state” (Gifford 2006: 862). The latter arguments clearly reflect the ideology of nationalism according to Smith’s definition that nationalism stipulates that “human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and realise themselves” (cited in Mautner 2001: 5).

These arguments were the foundation of the populist mobilisation of the Eurosceptic ‘Maastricht rebels’ against the Major government. Their objectives were to delay the bill, obtain a referendum and support “Treaty amendments that they considered fatal to it” (Gifford 2006: 859). The latter meant that rebels supported the Labour opposition in their demand to restore the social chapter as they believed that Major would not proceed with the bill without the opt-out (cf. Gifford 2006: 859). The situation was similar to that in the context of the 1975 referendum and shows the extent of divisions within the party.

The government had to call for a confidence motion on the Social chapter issue and only with the threat of early elections that Conservatives would have been likely to lose did the government win the support of rebels (cf. Gifford 2006: 860). It was clear nevertheless that Major did not have the support of his own MPs whose loyalty was to the anti-European cause, not their own party (cf. Gifford 2006: 860).

The rebellion led to a shift to the right of the Conservative party (cf. Gifford 2006: 860) which again led to the defection of prominent pro-European members such as former deputy party chairman Emma Nicholson’s to the Liberal Democrats (cf. Crowson 2007: 63).
In short, right-wing Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party in the early 1990s “destroyed the credibility of the Major Government” as Major was forced to step away from his original stance of leading Britain “to the heart of Europe”. Or, in the words Tony Blair directed at him: “I lead my party, you follow yours” (in Schwarz 1996: 43). The latter comment is all the more interesting considering that “there was no difference of substance” (Wall 2008: 160) between Major’s and Blair’s European positions. The only difference was that Major had problems implementing them due to stark divisions within his own party.

The government “did not fundamentally challenge the populist ideology of British exceptionalism” (Gifford 2006: 864) and even Major’s Eurosceptic shift could not reconcile the divisions within the party and he was succeeded as party leader by the Eurosceptics William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith (cf. Gifford 2006: 865).

John Major’s gradual shift towards more Eurosceptic positions is also reflected in his performance at the Maastricht negotiations and related intergovernmental conferences. All of his decisions reflect the general British stance which supports the intergovernmental cooperation on EU-level but aims at limiting the supranational dimension.

The end of Cold War meant a loss of Britain’s privileged position in Europe. As it was not willing to accept any deterioration in its special relationship with the US and its subsequent leadership role Britain did not want to accept a West European Union (WEU) independent of NATO (cf. Schwarz 1996: 55).

The general problem with Major’s European policies was that he claimed that Britain would stop being confrontational but he did not really want any fundamental change in politics (cf. Winter 1999: 50). So, alongside his concerns about the WEU, Major also rejected the Social Chapter and was against any widening of competences of the EP at the Intergovernmental Conference on political union in 1991 (cf. Winter 1999: 53). Instead, he favoured a stronger role of national parliaments in the decision making process (cf. Wall 2008: 146). Most importantly however, he was against the aim of creating a federal union. He also managed to keep the word “federal” out of the preamble of the Treaty but had in return to accept a stronger EP and an increase in qualitative majority voting (QMV) (cf. Winter 1999: 58). In general, Major was very satisfied with the outcome of the Maastricht negotiations as the pillared treaty structure perfectly matched British interests as many important areas were subject to intergovernmental, not Community structures (cf. Wall 2008: 147).

After intense fighting with the Maastricht rebels the Treaty was finally ratified on 2nd August 1993 but only after a vote of confidence (cf. Crowson 2005: 133).
Winter points to the fact that the UK and Germany have at times also shared the same opinions (cf. Winter 1999: 61). At the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference, Germany, like the UK, was against the communitarisation of the CFSP (cf. Stark 2004: 228). Also, when in 1993, France and Southern European countries wanted to fight unemployment with an investment program, Germany and the UK both preferred to reduce wages and had similar views on the Eastern enlargement. Tensions arose again due to the EMU crisis (cf. Winter 1999: 78f.) and the Schäuble-Lamers idea of a core Europe, which stirred fears of a too powerful Germany (cf. Winter 1999: 84).

According to Winter, the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference marked again a return to the “traditional” pattern of the Franco-German friendship and an isolated Britain (cf. Winter 1999: 93). What is more, at the end of his premiership, Major was again following the confrontational course on Europe initiated by his predecessor and blocked the work of the Council of Ministers until the export ban on British beef was removed even though British farmers had already been granted a Community compensation of 70% of their losses (cf. Winter 1999: 97f.).

In summary can be said that the Conservative Party had, from the late 1980s on, gradually adopted Euroscepticism, which finally became “the defining characteristic of the Conservative Party’s identity and enshrined in its policies” (Baker et al. 2008: 92). Accordingly, the British Conservative Party became “the only mainstream European party with the potential capacity to form a government that is placed under the so-called ‘soft’ Euroscepticism heading” (Gifford 2006: 854).

3.1.2 Positions of Labour in opposition

As mentioned above, Thatcher’s Eurosceptic turn contributed to Labour’s turn towards Europe in two ways: First, linking “Europe” to “Socialism” helped Labour to adopt a more positive attitude on European integration and second, Labour managed – despite its own rather recent divisions over the topic – to profit from the divisions within the Conservative Party. By pointing to these divisions and emphasising the fact that the Tories’ confrontational course upset the European partners, Labour tried to convince the electorate that they were better suited to represent British interests in Europe (cf. Krell 2009: 237; 242). For Labour, this was also a chance to demonstrate foreign policy competence – a field of politics in which public opinion traditionally held Conservatives higher (cf. Krell 2009: 239). Besides, Labour had discovered Europe as a new level of action to implement social policies in cooperation with their socialist counterparts of other member states. They had
doubts about the confines of the nation state: In the sense of the American sociologist Daniel Bell they argued that in our globalised world, the efficiency of nation state level political instruments was limited (cf. Krell 2009: 244ff.). This change in position can be explained in the context of the cleavage theory by Lipset and Rokkan as cited in Marks and Wilson: They “argue that modern European party systems are shaped by a series of historical conflicts about state building, religion and class” (Marks, Wilson 2000: 434). Social-democratic parties compete with other parties on the class cleavage. But European integration causes a tension for these parties: On the one hand, economic integration may lead to liberalisation and threaten national social democratic accomplishments but on the other, political integration may open up new capacities to solve this problem. With increasing integration a regulatory space suitable for the implementation of social-democratic policies opened up (cf. Krell 2009: 454) and the logical consequence of the declining scope of action of the nation state was to transfer this level of action to the EU level (Marks, Wilson 2000: 437) (cf. Fig. 2).

Beside the confines of the nation state and the electoral dimension, also the fact that Labour held many local authorities in Britain, which profited a lot from European structural and regional funds, supported their pro-European shift. It has also been argued that the strong representation of – traditionally more Europhile – Scottish politicians within the party was a reason for the pro-European party alignment (cf. Krell 2009: 246ff).

In summary, it can be said that Labour had built up “an image of positive engagement and party unity” (Wallace 1999: 104). Nevertheless, they tried to side-line European policy issues in the election campaign, i. e. made clear their commitment to Europe but the details of their policies were kept rather vague. This was because of the rather Eurosceptic mood of the public and media which was again exploited by the populist approach of the Conservatives. Accordingly, Labour was afraid of “being accused of lack of patriotism” (Wallace 1999: 104).
When New Labour entered office in 1997 they opened up a new chapter on British-European relations. They intensified the cooperation with the main European partners France and Germany and deepened bilateral relations with other states such as Spain or Belgium. During Blair’s time in office, Britain made major concessions concerning qualified majority voting (cf. Faucher-King, Le Galès 2010: 79) and the British rebate (cf. Wall 2008: 179). Besides, New Labour supported an employment chapter and enshrined the Human Rights Act (cf. Wall 2008: 164) – the latter representing an important constitutional change. Most importantly, however, the signature of the Social Chapter represented a clear demarcation from the previous government (cf. Faucher-King, Le Galès 2010: 77).

Tony Blair’s aim was to sell Europe to the British citizens as a necessity for Britain in order to keep pace in the modern globalised world. At the same time, Labour had to avoid being accused of a lack of patriotism before the background of Conservatives’ Eurosceptical populism (cf. Wallace 1999: 104). New Labour therefore pledged to accord Britain a leadership role in Europe (cf. Wall 2008: 162). They had decided that a “passive or contrarian” (Faucher-King, Le Galès 2010: 77) role in Europe no longer suited British interests. In order for Britain to form Europe in the British interest, i.e. in order to create a “Europe of nations” not a “federal superstate submerging national identity” (speeches by Tony Blair in Wall 2008: 180f.), to initiate economic reforms and to guarantee a close alliance with the US, Britain had to take on a more supportive stance on integration. In doing so, it would not lose sovereignty but gain more influence:

I see sovereignty not merely as the ability of a single country to say no, but as the power to maximise our national strength and capacity in business, trade, foreign policy, defence and the fight against crime. Sovereignty has to be deployed for national advantage. When we isolated ourselves in the past, we squandered our sovereignty – leaving us sole masters of a shrinking sphere of influence (Blair in Wall 2008: 181).

In short, New Labour’s strategy on Europe can be summarised as de-radicalising “the impact of European integration on the structure of British politics by implying that it can be made consistent with the particularities of British political and economic development” (Gifford 2006: 865). Or, in other words, ‘New Labour’ also meant a ‘New Britain’: Blair did not want to leave patriotism to the Conservatives and therefore he built on internationalist traditions of the Left and aimed at creating a new, left, patriotism or sense of Britishness that was broader and more open than the Thatcherite concept (cf. Ward 2004: 110). This new patriotism and identity “were
described as “Rebranding Britain” or “Cool Britannia” (Ward 2004: 110). Labour saw “national identity as a flexible and inclusive concept” (Ward 2004: 111), which, accordingly, could much easier be reconciled with European integration. Ward, however, also points to the fact that Blair still dwelt on the same notion of British history than did the Conservatives: At a party conference in 1996, he conjured up “the thousand years of British history”, pointed to the fact that Britain had had “the first parliament in the world” and “the industrial revolution ahead of its time”, the largest “empire, the world has ever known” and that “the invention of virtually every scientific device in the modern world” had taken place in Britain. He further summarised the British characteristics as: “Common sense. Standing up for the underdog. Fiercely independent” (in Ward 2004: 111).

This was, however, not the only continuity in New Labour’s European policies compared to the Conservative government: Like the Conservatives, the Labour government favoured the stronger involvement of national parliaments, was sceptical towards a common (instead of intergovernmental) justice and home affairs policy. Above all, they were opposed to a fusion of WEU and the EU (cf. Winter 1999: 104) as they feared that further commitment to European defence could impinge upon the “special relationship” with the US (cf. Faucher-King, Le Galès 2010: 78). For Britain, NATO had priority and, at the same time, they did not want to be accused of being incompetent in defence as had been the case in the 1980s (cf. Wall 2008: 169). In the light of the War in Bosnia, however, Tony Blair wanted the EU to be able to “take action in its own backyard” (Wall 2008: 169). In the following years, the EU contributed to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, which needed the consent of the US and “Tony Blair played a decisive part in assuring that consent” (Wall 2008: 172). Also, “he needed an area where Britain could demonstrate leadership” (Wall 2008: 169). According to Wall, Blair chose defence as this area and, at an EU summit in 1998, showed “a commitment to go further and faster in the direction of European defence integration” – a commitment that was not easy to follow suit considering the government “for whom doing nothing to weaken NATO, let alone the perception of Alliance interests on the part of the United States, was paramount” (Wall 2008: 172). Just how paramount this alliance was, was shown in Blair’s decision to join the Iraq War despite the opposition of France and Germany (cf. Faucher-King, Le Galès 2010: 78).

In summary, it can be argued that even though New Labour’s European policies represented a departure from the previous government its positions were still rooted in British history and national identity.
3.1.4 Development of Tory positions in opposition

Major’s defeat in the 1997 elections was a victory for the Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party. William Hague, a known Eurosceptic, was elected new party leader and “immediately set about confirming his Eurosceptic credentials”. He “appointed prominent Eurosceptics to the Shadow Cabinet” (Crowson 2007: 64) and conversely, lost three pro-European shadow ministers within a year (cf. Crowson 2007: 64/65). Hague denounced the EU’s lack of democratic accountability and the “artificial repression of nationality” that comes with integration. Conversely, he argues that “the original danger which confronted the founding fathers has gone” (Hague in May 1998, Crowson 2007: 66).

When the Conservatives lost again against Tony Blair in 2001 it became obvious that the Conservative’s campaign topics of the EU, immigration and tax turned out not to be relevant to voters. What is more, with this focus Conservatives “sent out a message of extremism” (Crowson 2007: 67). It certainly did not help that Peter Tapsell compared Blair’s European policy with Goebbels’s propaganda policy (cf. Crowson 2007: 67) – and Schröder to Hitler (BBC online, May 23rd, 2001).

Consequently, when Iain Duncan-Smith replaced Hague as party leader, he tried to side-line the European topic but from the public statements he did make it was clear that his “Eurosceptic tone had hardened” (Crowson 2007: 68).

Indeed, after increasing divisions on the topic, the Eurosceptic trend had by then won the upper hand and determined the Conservatives’ future policy on Europe, which was marked by a “strident nationalism” and “the desire to defend British interests against any perceived threat from Brussels” (Crowson 2007: 225).
3.2 Germany – back to “normality“?

3.2.1 Deepening integration under Helmut Kohl – positions of the Union parties from Maastricht to Amsterdam

Since the 1980s the general cross-party consensus vis-à-vis support of European integration in Germany had gradually waned and even though increasing Euroscepticism was not due to the Treaty on European Union, the project 'Maastricht' accelerated this development. The end of block thinking after the Cold War led to an increase in political Euroscepticism and the debate about the democratic deficit gained influence (cf. Leconte 2010: 46). The latter was reflected in the German Constitutional Court’s judgement on Maastricht, which defined the limits of primacy of EU law over national constitutional law (cf. Leconte 2010: 55). A generally tense economic situation and an increase in unemployment might also have contributed to Euroscepticism (cf. Kessler 2010: 155).

However, it was not the increase in Eurosceptic thought that had changed Germany’s role in Europe but the German reunification in 1990. The most populous country in Europe stirred suspicions of trying to exert a political and economic hegemony (cf. Stark 2004: 359). For Kohl, the increased responsibility following German reunification therefore translated into an even greater support for European integration (cf. Meyer 2004: 260). He therefore continued to emphasise the importance of integration for peace and stability and affirmed that German reunification and European integration were two sides of the same coin (cf. Kessler 2010: 139) – a point of view that stands in complete opposition to William Hague’s statement that “the original danger” had passed.

Kohl continued the soft power approach that Germany had followed in the EC since the War and that consisted of agenda setting instead of direct power (which has often been pursued by the UK) (cf. Sloam 2005: 22f.), and, in general, of an exaggerated multilateralism (cf. Sloam 2005: 89). The latter was due to the ‘semi-sovereign state’: This term\(^1\) defines Germany’s internal and external constraints: constitutional and institutional constraints – e.g. the Basic Law, cooperative federalism and the powerful Bundesbank – and “guilt and moral reparations on the one hand,” and the “suspicious reaction of West Germany’s partners to any slight sign of assertiveness” (Sloam 2005: 14/15) on the other.

It was often argued that the re-unified Germany was on its way “back to normality”. However, Hans Stark argues that Germany, at least in its foreign policy,

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\(^1\) coined by Katzenstein (1987) and further developed by Paterson and Green
was still far from being “normal” and from determining in a clear and overt fashion the place and role of national interest. Instead, the formulation of national interests remained “une entreprise douloureuse et conflictuelle dans une Allemagne certes unifiée, mai loin d’être normalisée” (Stark 2004: 359).

Kohl aimed at creating a political alongside the economic and monetary union, this project, however, failed because of the resistance of the other states but also because of Kohl’s own contradictions – a failure that was much regretted in the current economic and financial crisis (cf. e. g. Spiegel online, November 29th, 2011).

In the early years of reunification, for instance, Germany did not want to admit military out of area interventions of the EC following a qualified majority vote. It wanted to prevent communitarisation of CFSP but safeguard national sovereignty in defence – even though this significantly reduced the global impact of CFSP and therefore the EU (cf. Stark 2004: 228) – a decision that was, however, revoked again in the Intergovernmental conference in 1996 (cf. Meyer 2004: 340). On the other hand, a too strong common European defence would have accentuated European-American divergences. So, paradoxically, even though Germany was one of the strongest supporters of integration it had to compromise in this field due to political and psychological reasons and its transatlantic commitment (cf. Stark 2004: 228) – a compromise that does not match Kohl’s passionate discourse on the role and importance of European integration:


Kohl was the last chancellor who had still experienced the third Reich and was a studied historian, which explains his historical perspective: He shared Adenauer’s vision on Europe that aimed at integrating Germany closely into Europe in order to prevent another anti-Western aberration (cf. Kessler 2010: 132).

Nevertheless, Kohl’s European policy has been described as pragmatic (Stark 2004: 229; Kessler 2010: 131). So what are the reasons for this discrepancy between the results of Kohl’s European policy and his original visions? One explanation was his aim of trying not to deter the other Member States with too great an assertion of national interest that could have stirred fears of a new German hegemony. Germany’s historical heritage influences its role in Europe which means
that it has to be careful not to assert its national interests too manifestly. However, there have also been other factors that led to a series of compromises.

It is undeniably true that the CDU is the “party of Europe” due to Adenauer’s legacy and its continuous affirmations concerning the support for deeper integration. However, it is generally agreed upon that, by the early 1990s, the CDU had lost some of its enthusiasm for integration. Between 1991 and 1994 they gradually gave up their support for a “United States of Europe” and instead attached again more importance to the nation state (cf. Meyer 2004: 229). Also, in comparison to party declarations from the 1980s, there was now much more emphasis on diversity of national identities and cultures in Europe and the importance of the principle of subsidiarity (cf. Meyer 2004: 230) – a concept that derives from Catholic Social Teaching (Schöfbeck 2010: 222). Kohl at that time continued expressing his commitment to a deepening of integration but also stressed the importance of the binding forces of the nation state and of avoiding too much centrality and protecting diversity. In short, having taken into account rising Euroscepticism, he now added some national appeal to his support for integration (cf. Meyer 2004: 231).

One area where Kohl had to make major concessions during the Maastricht negotiations was the project of a political union – even though the government’s claim for a political union was not free of contradictions. On the one hand, they always emphasised that the monetary union had to be accompanied by a political and economic union but on the other, the German government was strictly against a strengthening of economic cooperation in the sense of the French proposal of a “gouvernement économique”. The German government feared that this would equal a return to neo-keynesian policies and could be an obstacle to structural reforms or lead to a transfer union (cf. Stark 2004: 295; 306). Accordingly, they were able to enforce the stability pact which stipulated that countries were not liable for other member states’ debt, which a further harmonisation of member states’ budgetary, fiscal and social policies in the sense of a closer political integration (cf. Stark 2004: 295) originally demanded by Kohl would have entailed. The single currency necessitated a strengthening of solidarity between prosperous and less prosperous countries as well as a communitarisation of fiscal policies. Germany as the biggest net giver was not in favour of such a solution, hence the decision for a stability pact (cf. Stark 2004: 273f.) but against a “gouvernement économique”.

It has of course to be noted that beside Germany’s own contradictions at the Intergovernmental Conference on political union in 1991 Germany’s maximum demands concerning the political union were deemed to fail from the start due to the reserved stance of the British government under Major towards deeper integration.
Nevertheless, Major still tried to maintain a good working relationship with Germany because he hoped that Germany would advocate strict stability criteria in the monetary union (cf. Meyer 2004: 270).

Another field where the Kohl government had to accept compromises was that of the federal union. On the one hand, other Member States, most of all Great Britain, were strictly against federalism (the “F-Word”) as for them this principle represented centralism and technocracy. Adopting the principle of subsidiarity was therefore a means of conserving the idea of federalism under a different label (cf. Stark 2004: 200). On the other hand, subsidiarity was also a response to claims by the German Länder who also feared a loss of sovereignty. The Kohl government had to shift its positions during the Maastricht negotiations accordingly until they more closely resembled British or French positions concerning the transfer of sovereignty than Kohl’s original idea of a federal union (cf. Stark 2004: 229). Nevertheless, it has to be noted that Germany’s soft power approach meant finally led to “a structure that both suits and resembles German federalism” (Sloam 2005: 23). A positive effect of the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity was that it could act as a means for the European Union to connect more closely with its citizens (cf. Meyer 2004: 277) who, in the course of EMU negotiations, considered the EC increasingly as an elite project (cf. Meyer 2004: 257). However, Meyer argues that the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity was also motivated by a real sense of unease about the weakening of the nation state (cf. Meyer 2004: 284).

Eurosceptic voices came above all from the CSU: Minister President Streibl announced in April 1992 not to accept the Maastricht Treaty if the Länder were not to be given further competences. But the CSU also criticised the federal government’s European policy in general as they considered it an elite project too far away from European citizens. The CSU’s concrete demands were to increase the number of German MEPs, expand the use of German as a working language and ensure an acceptable financial burden for Germany (cf. Meyer 2004: 285).

In May 1993 Edmund Stoiber took over Streibl’s office as the “antipode of German European policy” (Meyer 2004: 286). In a letter to Helmut Kohl he demanded to slow down the integration process and spoke out against a federal Europe but for a Europe of nations and even called the chancellor’s image of Europe an aberration (“Irrweg”). This was the first time that an influential politician clearly demanded a change of course in the government’s European policies (cf. Meyer 2004: 370).
The CSU’s criticism did not remain unnoticed but the government considered that they had taken this criticism into account by adopting the principle of subsidiarity (cf. Meyer 2004: 288). Also, party leader Wolfgang Schäuble demanded that the government should not yield to the Eurosceptical mood (cf. Meyer 2004: 287).

The latter, however, presupposed a rigorous stance as with negotiations on the EMU the public opinion became increasingly hostile towards further integration: In 1992, only one-fourth of Germans supported the abolition of the D-Mark, 75% of interviewees in this Allensbach survey were against a federal state of Europe and only few found that European membership brought Germany more advantages than disadvantages. This trend has been explained by the “democratic deficit” of the EC, i.e. that citizens lacked information and means to influence EC politics (cf. Meyer 2004: 289). The great importance the D-Mark had for Germans can only be explained by history: Germans had experienced hyperinflation in 1923 and after the crash in 1929 the downfall of the middle classes and four years later the seizure of power by the Nazis. After the Second World War, it was only because of the strong D-Mark and Bundesbank that the Germans could develop a new national identity (cf. Stark 2004: 271). This great significance of the German currency explains the Germans’ unwillingness to give it up. For Kohl, however, there was no question of abandoning the economic and monetary union, which was central to European integration (cf. Stark 2004: 273). This question was not as clear to the CDU’s coalition partner: The FDP experienced an existential crisis in 1994/95 that incited parts of the party to try and appeal to the electorate with an Eurosceptical course (cf. Meyer 2004: 323). The party elite and especially the new party leader Wolfgang Gerhardt, however, managed to marginalise nationalist currents within the FDP that supported Eurosceptic positions and spoke out against the abolition of the D-Mark (cf. Meyer 2004: 317f.).

The period between the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam saw a decline in the popularity of Kohl. Accordingly, by insisting on a deepening of the political union he risked throwing away his chances for re-election. So, paradoxically, he distanced himself from his earlier assertion that the EMU had to be accompanied by a political union but slowed down the process of political integration to accelerate the EMU (cf. Stark 2004: 364). However, despite some hesitations he continued his commitment to the EMU, which was the project, by which he wanted to be remembered (cf. Stark 2004: 415; Meyer 2004: 372).

The principal aim of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996/97 was to reform EU institutions. Objectives that largely reflected German propositions were to make the Union more democratic in order to make it more approachable to European
citizens, and to strengthen CFSP to increase the EU's visibility internationally (cf. Stark 2004: 365).

In general, however, German propositions were rather vague (cf. Meyer 2004: 367; Stark 2004: 371), which reflected the public's scepticism. But this also meant that the consensus with the other member states could be reached more easily (cf. Stark 2004: 371). But nevertheless, the results of the IGC were not very satisfying for the German government because in the end, it was faced with a triple opposition: that of the German Länder – which feared a loss of competence due to an extended majority vote –, public opinion and the majority of other member states (cf. Stark 2004: 377).

The Amsterdam Treaty, above all, left the impression of a “lack of political ambition” (Stark 2004: 415): Countries that were traditionally promoted a deepening of integration were surprisingly cautious in their propositions. As mentioned above, the explanation for the German government’s caution lies in the hostility of the public before the background of upcoming elections (cf. Stark 2004: 415).

More importantly, however, the Amsterdam negotiations also witnessed a resurgence of the assertion of national interests. For the CDU this meant that the demand to completely overcome the nation state and create a “United States of Europe” or even the demand for a “European federal state” became outdated. Also, they had to accept that the public was much less willing to give up sovereign rights than previously assumed (cf. Meyer 2004: 368f.).

A turning point in this respect was the Amsterdam veto of the German government against the majority vote in immigration and asylum policies. This way, Kohl demonstrated that Germany was willing to fight for its national interests as well (cf. Meyer 2004: 371) but the strong insistence on national interests, according to Meyer, took the other member states by surprise (cf. Meyer 2004: 347).

Also, Theo Waigel’s demand to lower the German net contribution (see Fig. 1 for Germany’s net payments) falls under this category and shows that Germany was no longer willing to play the role of the “good pupil of Europe” (Meyer 2004: 347).

In summary, it can be said that by the mid-1990s it was clear that Kohl’s European had become less enthusiastic and pioneering than in the 80s reflecting the general public mood (cf. Meyer 2004: 367). His passionate mission statements could no longer convince the public and had given way to descriptions of the dramatic consequences of a collapse of the single currency – a mission with which he wanted to go down in history (cf. Meyer 2004: 372).
3.2.2 Parties in opposition: development of positions within the SPD

German European politics have for the most part been characterised by a large consensus between parties in government and opposition. In a survey given by Krell, 81.1% of European political actors agreed to the statement that, between 1982 and 1998, there was “often a consensus between the government and the SPD in European issues” (Krell 2009: 154). Accordingly, the SPD even actively supported the government's stance on Maastricht with their publication “„Europa. Eine historische Chance für Deutschland – 10 vernünftige Gründe, die für Maastricht sprechen“ (in Krell 2009: 170). However, this consensus within the SPD was not free of inconsistencies. So, in 1992, Oscar Lafontaine, then Minister-President of the Saarland, threatened not to endorse the government’s proposals on the EMU (cf. Krell 2009: 170). Beside Lafontaine then Minister-President of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder criticised the EMU timetable (cf. Krell 2009: 173). This also reflects a particularity of the German system which can give opposition parties more power in European issues: If they have a strong representation at Länder level, they can still achieve a “blocking majority” (Sloam 2005: 26) in the Bundesrat.

So, like in the Union parties, the process of European integration held the potential to create divisions within the party: Whereas the SPD generally had agreed with the integration goals since the 1960s, deepening integration since the late 80s produced more differentiated positions. Not only the EMU was regarded critically by parts of the SPD but also the Single Market, which was in parts seen as the “Binnenmarkt der Konzerne” (Krell 2009: 171).

Furthermore, at times the EMU served as a basis for populism within the SPD (cf. Krell 2009: 171). So, the SPD’s candidate in the Baden-Württemberg state elections in 1996 flirted “with a Eurosceptical policy position” (Lees 2008: 25): As at the time 80% of the population were sceptical of the Single Currency, he tried to win them over by proposing a delay of the introduction of the Euro of at least five years (cf. Lees 2008: 25). Spöri was however immediately attacked for his course by the party elite who also tried to relativise Schröder’s statements on the Euro (cf. Krell 2009: 174). Krell concludes that the fact that either Schröder nor Lafontaine nor Spöri had demonstrated any specialist European-policy knowledge otherwise shows the populist motivation for their statements (cf. Krell 2009: 176). Krell, however, also emphasises the fact that Eurosceptic statements like these aimed at increasing the popularity of individuals. European topics were never instrumentalised in the sense of a general opposition strategy – which was the case in the UK. One reason for this is of course the fact that the German Basic Law does not allow for referendums on
the state level (cf. Lees 2008: 16). Besides, the cross party consensus on Europe made it difficult for one party to stand out. This consensus in deeply rooted in Germany’s historic development and Europeanised identity and reflected in the positions of both major political parties. This development of course stands in stark contrast to the British understanding for their country’s role in Europe, which is again in line with Krell’s argument: He has identified national identity, political culture and history as factors that can cause divergence among parties of the same party family (cf. Krell 2009: 485).

Europe, or in this case, the EMU, could therefore not serve as a basis for an opposition strategy but instead helped to intensify the “disjuncture between elite and popular opinion” (Lees 2008: 19). Besides, the SPD had made the experience that the German electorate preferred a continuity in foreign politics, so formulating opposite positions on European integration would not even have been rewarded in elections (cf. Krell 2009: 186).

Nevertheless, Krell denotes an increase in importance of the European topic during the SPD’s time in opposition. Also, whereas in the 1980s the SPD’s European policy was often limited to rather global or distant goals, the deepening of integration in the 90s brought about a concretising of objectives. This also meant that, like the CDU, the SPD stepped away from the demand of a “United States of Europe” (cf. Krell 2009: 185f.).

In this context it should also be noted that the SPD increasingly saw European integration as a means of promoting social-democrat demands. Like Labour in Britain, they no longer deemed the nation state to be suitable to implement and deepen social-democrat commitments (cf. Krell 2009: 183). So, by 1994, the SPD had discovered Europe as an appropriate and necessary level of action for social policies, i. e. to fight mass unemployment and create prosperity (cf. Schildberg 2010: 206). The SPD assessed the problem solving capacity of the nation state to be smaller than the CDU considered it to be but believed in the EU’s role in fighting mass unemployment while the CDU, according to its liberal-conservative traditions, puts a higher emphasis on the economic advantages of the union (cf. Schildberg 2010: 207).

So, if the SPD had a point of opposition in European policies vis-à-vis the Union parties it was its emphasis of the creation of a “Social Europe” as opposed to the “Europa der Geschäfte”. So, also in their 1998 election programme, the SPD emphasised the EU’s role as a level of action for social policy and warned of social dumping through European regulations (cf. Schildberg 2010: 207). This was in opposition to the CDU who spoke out against a “sozialistisches
Europa der Umverteilung that would lead to a transfer union (in Schildberg 2010: 207).

It should be noted that already in 1998 the SPD put forward the concept of solidarity while the CDU argued against a transfer union – a pattern that would emerge again in the debt crisis of 2011.

3.2.3 Red-green coalition – re-assertion of national interest?

Schildberg denotes that in the SPD’s 1998 electoral programme there was a clear upgrading of the European frame due to the great emphasis on the social dimension of the integration process (cf. Schildberg 2010: 216), which is again related to the SPD’s view that the nation state is no longer capable of solving certain problems on its own. Schildberg points to the fact that the European dimension is omnipresent in the SPD’s electoral program and not limited to the foreign policy chapter. The program invokes the idea of an Europeanised Germany that acts as the motor of European integration and commits to peace, freedom and international solidarity (cf. Schildberg 2010: 214). The social dimension hereby serves as an identity marker. More specifically, they demand binding regulations against fiscal and social dumping, a better cooperation in the fields of research and development and refugee and asylum policies, an increase in majority voting in the Council and a strengthening of the EP. At the same time however, the SPD also emphasises the importance of avoiding overregulation and of creating a union close to its citizens (cf. Schildberg 2010: 215).

In brief, it can be stated that the SPD’s European policies had experienced a shift to the left due to the acknowledging of the boundaries of the nation state (cf. Schildberg 2010: 216). The new social-democratic formulation of European policies was a way to take the SPD’s engagement with European integration a step forward while still adhering to the general cross-party consensus. Together with the Green Party as a coalition partner even more pro-European than the SPD (cf. Sloam 2005: 74) and European visionary Joschka Fischer, who in his Humboldt speech in 2000 demanded a federation of nation states (cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 196), the SPD could have been expected to play a leading role in bringing the integration process forward.

However, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet points to the fact that in government the SPD did not earn a reputation for high sensitivity in dealing with its European partners. At some occasions the opposite was true. So, when Germany wanted to lower its contribution to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) this was received by France
as being “Eurosceptical” or even “nationalist” (cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 181) and Schröder’s “Leitantrag” of 2001 that aimed at bringing back competences to the national level to save costs was commented by Le Monde as “L’Allemagne égoiste de M. Schröder” (in Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 198).

Indeed, Schröder, who had already made himself known with some rather Eurosceptic or at least “Euro-populist” (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 183) remarks did not share Kohl’s historical vision is not surprising considering that he was the first chancellor who has not experienced the Second World War (cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 177). Whereas Kohl tried to meet the other member states’ concerns about the strengthened reunified Germany with assertions that “German unification and European integration were two sides of the same coin” (Sloam 2005: 35), in the SPD, there was an increased feeling that Germany had proven trustworthy in the last decades and therefore did not need to base its European policy decisions on Second World War guilt (cf. Sloam 2005: 93). Sloam explains that this generational change led to a change in foreign policy: The Kohl government still adhered to the “exaggerated multilateralism” (Sloam 2005: 89) that had been the basis of German foreign policy ever since World War II in order to create trust among other states and thereby restore German sovereignty. Under Schröder, this changed to a more “pragmatic multilateralism” (Sloam 2005: 91).

Schröder emphasised Germany’s right back to “normality” after the atrocities of the Nazi regime:


He further described Germany as a „erwachsene Nation“ which could formulate enlightened national interests as a matter of course (in Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 177).

To Schröder, Germany’s primary national interest was to lower German financial contributions in Europe. The latter had more than doubled between 1990 and 1994. But with the financial burden of integrating the Eastern German states Schröder felt he needed to prioritise (cf. Sloam 2005: 92), i.e. take on a more pragmatic stance in relation to the European partner states.
Accordingly, Schröder further stated in the SPIEGEL:


The government aimed at reducing Germany’s financial contribution in three ways: through introducing the ‘co-financing’ concept in CAP, through ending the Cohesion Fund and the British rebate – proposals that upset “three of Germany’s major partners: France, Spain and the UK, respectively” (Sloam 2005: 94). Even though Schröder could not achieve a substantial lowering of the German contribution as the British succeeded in keeping their rebate, but managed to lower their contribution by EUR 500m from 2002 and EUR 900m from 2004. So, from 2002 the German net contribution was 23.7% of the overall EU budget compared to 27.5% in 1999. Besides, until 2006, Germany would receive back money from structural funds of EUR 7.4bn and a special payment to East Berlin of EUR 100m (cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 181).

Another area in which the generational change and related change in foreign policy could be noticed was in defence and security policy. In contrast to the early 90s when the participation of German troops in UN peacekeeping missions the decision to send German troops to Serbia in June 1999 did not cause a big stir in the SPD (cf. Sloam 2005: 94f.). Also Joschka Fischer, whose attitude towards self-regulating German power was much more comparable to Kohl’s (cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 177) showed “pragmatism” “by the fact that he had the self-confidence to reinterpret the ‘nie wieder Krieg’ […] motif of post-war Germany into the phrase ‘nie wieder Völkermord’” (Sloam 2005: 95f.). Another field, where the latter adapted to the new political climate and differed from his previous position was the demand for a European federal state. Having labelled himself a post-nationalist in the Habermasian sense, he acknowledged the importance of nation states in his Humboldt speech and conferred them an important role in the integration process. However, his informal proposition, even though he pledged that the role of nation states in this federation would be bigger than that of the German Bundesländer, was rejected by the UK and France who feared that German influence would become too strong (cf. Winkler).
3.2.3 The Union parties positions in opposition

Schildberg points out the European policy was far less a topic in the CDU’s 1998 electoral program than in the SPD’s. The CDU emphasise again their commitment for European integration in order to create peace and stability but the SPD, by declaring the European Union a new level of action to implement their social-democrat agenda, gives more weight to their European policy than the CDU does. The CDU/CSU explicitly rejected a “centralist European federal state” and spoke out clearly against a “transfer union” that would result from the SPD’s plans. So, whereas the SPD now sees European integration as a chance to create a “social Europe”, the CDU program alluded to fears about too much integration. In contrast to the SPD, which emphasises the boundaries of the nation state, the CDU believes that the nation state is still the appropriate level of action for most fields of policies and wants to confer to the European level only those tasks that in their view can be decidedly better taken care of at the European level (cf. Schildberg 2010: 215f.).

The same arguments can be found again in their 2002 program where the CDU emphasises again that social security has to remain on the national level:


Integration is supported for economic policy reasons even though, of course, the CDU – unlike the British Tories – has never understood Europe as a purely economic union but as a cultural community of values (cf. Schildberg 2010: 226). Even though British Tories and the CDU do not strictly belong to exactly the same but rather the broader party family – the CDU is rooted in Christian-democrat traditions whereas British Conservatives combine neoliberalism with a nationalist appeal (cf. Marks, Wilson 2000: 451; 454) – Krell’s argument of national identity and history acting as divergence criteria (cf. Krell 2009: 485) can also be applied to these two parties: With the British national identity being based on Britain’s island status and unique history it is obvious why British Tories lack the value-based link to the European community.

With progressing integration and especially with Eastern enlargement, the commonality of European values has been given increasing attention within the CDU. Hans-Otto Kleinmann points to the difficulty of further establishing a common European identity in the light of a “new” Europe that is less and less based on occidental (Western) tradition and a Christian foundation (cf. Kleinmann 2005: 318).
The latter of course is also the reason why the CDU opposes the admission of Turkey.

Besides, Lees denotes a more Eurosceptical note in the CDU/CSU’s 2002 manifesto:

The CDU/CSU’s position on the European institutions was more critical than was the case in the time of Helmut Kohl’s leadership, and closer to the position that Stoiber had spelled out in Bavaria (Lees 2008: 31).

The CSU had tried to impose a more nationalist Bavarian program but steered back again when the 2002 elections were approaching (cf. Lees 2008: 30f.), which underlines again the fact that European policy in Germany is not suited for an opposition strategy. Like the SPD, the CSU flirted with more Eurosceptic positions on the Länderevelvel but shifted back again when it came to national elections. Accordingly, the CSU’s populist political Euroscepticism comparable to that of British Tories, which was expressed in the examples of individual CSU politicians claiming to have saved the Bavarian identity from Brussels over-regulation (as was the case with the alleged “Dirndlverbot” (SZ vom 2.6.2009), never found its way to the national level.

4 Conclusion

The national narratives that form the basis for national identity, namely the Sonderweg narrative in Germany and the perception of British exceptionalism, have led to two completely different assumptions about the two countries’ role in the EU. For Britain, the notion of being “exceptional” meant that after the Second World War UK governments did not deem it necessary to be in Europe at all, or, as Winston Churchill put it, Britain should be “with Europe, but not of it”. Having built their identity against Europe as “the other”, integrating with Europe for the UK meant above all a threat to its national sovereignty. Eurosceptics felt that a “thousand years of history” were at stake, or, more specifically, they feared the loss of parliamentary and judiciary sovereignty and dissolution of their cultural uniqueness.

In Germany, exactly the opposite was true. Whereas the end of the Second World War meant a rise of patriotism for Britain, it was the end of German national pride. Germany had to completely re-build its national identity and due to its semi-sovereign state the only way to do so was through a very strong multilateralism. Its political elite built up a new Europeanised national identity that was anchored firmly
in general Western history and culture. Only eventually did Germany start to build a new German identity alongside its Europeanised identity. The relatively weak German national identity and its special role in the European Union, i.e. the trust it had to regain among its partners and the resulting newly found power, is reflected in the parties’ relationship with Europe. Until the Kohl era, the general foreign policy consensus was to continue the “exaggerated” multilateralism that had allowed Germany to regain the trust of its partners in order to gradually regain its sovereignty. The soft power approach of this strong multilateralism had served Germany very well for decades. However, by the late 1980s and 1990s Euroscepticism was on the rise – even in Germany, the “good pupil of Europe”. The notion of being the paymaster of Europe became more and more widely spread – not only among the public but also the political elites.

So, already towards the end of the Kohl governments a tendency towards a stronger assertion of national interests could be observed. With Gerhart Schröder, a generational change had taken place: He was the first chancellor who had not experienced the War anymore and was therefore able to assert Germany’s national interest with greater confidence.

In Britain on the other hand, there have been few reservations about asserting national interest, which has made it an awkward partner in Europe. Great Britain has always had a strong national identity. As the latter was constructed against Europe as “the other”, it turned out to be rather exclusive, giving way to the exploitation of Eurosceptic thought among the two major parties. Positions within both parties have experienced several dramatic shifts or even complete reversals of positions which have often been the result of electoral strategies.

Also, in contrast to Germany, Euroscepticism in Britain has served as a basis for populism. In Germany, due to the cross-party consensus and Europeanised identity, Eurosceptic populism has always been limited to individual politicians. This is again in line with Hooghe’s and Mark’s argument that elites’ divisions over European integration have led to Euroscepticism among the public. It could be argued along this line that in Germany, where Europe has never served as an electoral strategy for opposing parties, the public as well has been less divided on the subject and has followed along the general consensus.

Although according to Leconte, Euroscepticism was originally a British construct, occurrences of utilitarian and also political Euroscepticism have taken place in both Germany and Great Britain. Thatcher demanded the rebate but also in Germany, the paymaster debate gained strength in the 1990s and consecutive governments, especially the red-green coalition, started to make more assertive demands.
regarding national interests. Since the Maastricht Treaty, also political Euroscepticism, which is largely reflected across the party spectrum in Britain, can be found in Germany.

Cultural Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is typical only for Britain and would be highly unlikely to occur among German mainstream parties considering Germany’s Europeanised identity.

Despite the stark differences of party positions on Europe in the two countries – the cross-party consensus in Germany versus the great prevalence of Euroscepticism in Great Britain – there are also some commonalities among parties in these two countries. In the 1990s, both New Labour and the SPD started to deduce their support for integration from the understanding that social democratic values can better be promulgated outside the confines of the nation state. Doing so, they built again on the traditional internationalist orientation of left-wing parties. This required a certain flexibility and “plurality of national identities” as it means showing allegiance to social-democratic ideas, the national and European identity at the same time (cf. Ward 2004: 110). This line of argumentation gains further meaning before the background of the process of European identity building: Transferring certain policies to the European level might enhance peoples’ identification with Europe and therefore contribute to lowering the democratic deficit of the EU. Marks and Wilson’s argument is therefore applicable to Labour and the SPD: The identification with their party family in this case was finally stronger than territorial or historical differences. Nevertheless, as Krell argues, national identity, history and geographical location have often acted as criteria of divergence for these two parties as well, as has been shown in Labour’s rejection of integration in the 1960s and, in general, the always stronger assertion of British interests also among the Labour party.

British Tories and the CDU/CSU, do not strictly belong to exactly the same party family. Whereas the CDU’s name already points to its Christian Democrat tradition, British Conservatives combine a neoliberal orientation with a national appeal. This led to these two parties adopting opposite positions on European integration. Still, some commonalities exist. Both Tories and the CDU/CSU consider the nation-state a more capable policy arena than the left-wing parties in both countries. Even though the CDU is more inclined to supranationalism due to its historic roots and British Tories are for the same reason more prone to nationalism, they both anchor their support or scepticism for European integration in traditional, Conservative, values: the CDU/CSU in Christian Western tradition and the Tories in the “traditional
concept of Britishness” (Ward 2004:109). To sum up, it is, even in their European policy, to some small extent observable that they belong to the same party family even though, of course, they fundamentally diverge on European policies due to their historical development.

It can be concluded that the building of Europe has been closely influenced by the national identities of its member states as reflected in the European policies of UK and German political parties. Both the assertion of national interest and Euroscepticism of political parties reflect the national self-perception and identity: Whereas Germany has developed a Europeanised national identity and had shied back from the assertion of strong national interests for decades Great Britain has regarded European integration widely as a threat to national sovereignty and strongly claimed her national interest.

However, European policy has had greater repercussions on parties in Great Britain: Whereas in Germany the cross-party consensus on European policies prevented parties to adopt electoral strategies of opposition, in Great Britain, the topic of Europe had the power to divide parties. In the case of the Conservatives in the early 90s, this even had the result of voters losing trust in their party due to the party's strong divisions and factionalism.

One explanation for these divisions lies in the British electoral system in which party leaders have to pay closer attention to backbench opinions. The other explanation, however, lies in the ideological dimension of the debate in Britain and the conjuring up of national myths. Both factors do not exist in Germany, where the Europeanised German national identity, the cross-party consensus and an electoral system that tends to produce rather centrist coalition governments have so far prevented strong Euroscepticism.
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Appendix

Figure 1: Net payments (after redistributions) of Germany, France and the UK, 1992–2000, as a proportion of overall net payments

Source: Sloam 2005: 183

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Figure 10.2 Net payments (after redistributions) of Germany, France and the UK, 1992–2000, as a proportion of overall net payments


Source: European Commission.
Figure 2: The social democratic possibility curve

Source: Marks, Wilson 2000: 444; Krell 2009: 454